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Abstract
We take a critical view of the standard approach to finance and growth. The
mapping between the theory and empirics is shown to be poorly understood, and
this is traced to deficiencies in our understanding of the microeconomics at play.
By looking at both primary and secondary historical evidence we argue that issues
of aggregation are critical, and that spatial factors are also prevalent. Further,
we suggest that these disaggregated elements can change over the course of an
industrial revolution. A model in the spirit of standard finance and growth theories
is extended to consider these further effects, and we calibrate the model to data on
historical growth paths.
In order to advance our understanding of the microeconomic factors that cause
the observed phenomena in the finance-growth nexus, we develop a general equilib-
rium theory of financial intermediation in which exchange costs are endogenously
determined by technologies, endowments and preferences. We suggest that incom-
plete contracts might be central to these phenomena. We link this framework to
an understanding of power and political economy in a setting with heterogeneous
agents. We develop these results numerically, showing a number of interesting
interactions between markets, exchange costs and institutions in economies with
different levels of wealth.
The model of endogenous exchange costs can be thought of in terms of the find-
ings coming out of our historical analysis. We outline in some detail the further
iv
steps that need to be taken before we can speak of the microfoundations of finance
and growth with any confidence. First, a fully dynamic model of markets and
coalitions must be embedded within a story of economic growth that can match
the dynamic observations. Second, we must develop our conception of incomplete
contracting and the link with institutions and political economy. The thesis thus
opens a number of interesting avenues for future research.
JEL Classifications: D51; L14; O16; O40; N23.
Keywords: Finance and growth; economic history; institutions; exchange costs;
incomplete contracts.
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Introduction
What is the relationship between the financial development of an economy and
its sustained level of economic growth? This is an old question, going back at
least to the nineteenth century. It is also an important question. The financial
market sits between savers and investors. It exists within an institutional framework
as ordered by the legislative and political environment. Financial intermediaries,
banks and stock markets facilitate insurance against risk, finance entrepreneurial
activity, evaluate and monitor investments and become experts in the gathering
and dissemination of costly information, to name just a few of their functions.
Imperfections in financial markets, and the parts that institutions have to play in
determining these imperfections, are thus central to economic activity.
The flurry of activity in finance and growth research over the last fifteen years
has covered a great deal of empirical and theoretical ground. We can now be confi-
dent in stating that there does exist a positive correlation between financial depth
and economic growth. Consequently, financial development has been accepted, in
some academic and policy circles, as one of the factors considered to play a de-
termining role in the level of sustained economic growth. But the literature is
still pushing to be taken seriously in an academic sense. The best textbook on
economic growth, Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004), neglects the subject almost en-
tirely. For, while a correlation exists, we do not yet have a solid understanding of
the relationship on a more fundamental level.
1
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The lack of consensus is exacerbated by the nature of the debate. There is
little dialogue between opposing schools but, as is often the case, a compromise
might be found. It could be argued that while proponents have been too quick to
roll-out policy prescriptions for engendering industrial take-off in developing coun-
tries, paying too little attention to the underlying theoretical mechanisms and their
quantitative significance, opponents have been too unwilling to take the consistent
empirical and theoretical findings as at all meaningful.
This thesis intends to begin to address a number of the problems in the orthodox
approach to finance and growth. We concentrate on an applied theoretical perspec-
tive, but also look at some of the foundations of current empirical work. We intend
to make a step towards a deeper, more qualified understanding of the mechanics of
finance and growth. In the process, it is hoped that we can both contribute to our
understanding of any finance-growth mechanism and demonstrate to sceptics that
the question is worth taking seriously.
The Scope of this Thesis
We focus on the connection between finance and growth in the context of the devel-
opment of pre-industrial economies. As such, we abstract from short-run fluctua-
tions, concentrating instead on the conditions of finance and growth in the long-run.
Also, we leave aside the importance of financial institutions in transition economies.
Given the already-present wealth of empirical evidence on the subject, we spend
most of our analysis developing a theoretical understanding of finance and growth.
However, the empirical and historical analyses that we do undertake are intended
to directly feed into the theoretical steps that we take.
Despite this focus, throughout we use the word ‘finance’ in the same general
sense in which it is interpreted in the literature: Everything from the microeco-
nomic, contractual relationships between financial institutions and the agents (both
2
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debtors and creditors) demanding their services to macroeconomic aggregates such
as ratios of financial debt to national output. Our primary aim is to shed light on
the ways in which finance, in these senses, can have an impact upon the entry into
sustained high growth of a poor, pre-industrial economy. This is why we focus on
the historical record of industrialisation in market economies.
Outline of the Thesis
The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 introduces the literature on finance
and growth from three perspectives: Empirics; theory; and history. We develop
a critique of the current understanding of the relationship between finance and
growth. Chapter 2 extends this survey by developing a parsimonious model that
can capture the salient mechanisms of prevailing theories of finance and growth.
This model is then calibrated to historical data. We draw some conclusions about
quantitative implications of work of this kind. We develop more general conclusions
by extending a standard quality-ladders endogenous growth model to include similar
finance and growth mechanisms. Common themes from these models are assessed
in the light of our critique from Chapter 1.
Chapter 3 then takes a step towards a richer understanding of the dynamic and
disaggregated elements to the finance-growth nexus. This is principally motivated
by an investigation of both primary and secondary historical sources. We take the
lessons from this analysis and form a model of finance and growth which extends
that in Chapter 2. We find a number of more subtle, microeconomic issues at play.
As such we need to construct, from microeconomic foundations, an understanding
of the causes and effects of the more nuanced aspects of the finance and growth
connection. Chapter 4 thus develops a new framework for understanding the exis-
tence and size of exchange costs and coalitions. Chapter 5 begins to tie together
the findings from each of these Chapters and suggests directions for future work.
3
Chapter 1
Finance and Growth:
A Critical Survey∗
The literature on finance and economic growth has experienced a renaissance in
the last fifteen years. The construction of a large World Bank dataset covering
the second half of the twentieth century facilitated a large number of cross-country
studies. While most of this work supports the hypothesis that finance plays a
determining factor in economic growth, there have been one or two voices urging a
more cautious interpretation of the data.
At the same time as creating new opportunities for research, the database has
engendered a, perhaps excessive, focus on cross-sectional results based on financial
depth alone. Recognising this, some economic historians have begun constructing
datasets to reveal the time-series experience of countries going through a period of
industrial and financial revolution. However, the time-series data remain somewhat
sparse and, in general, the implications of the literature in terms of growth and
transition over time have been largely neglected.
The theory of finance and growth has been developed, almost in parallel to
∗Part of this chapter has been released as Trew (2006a), and published as Trew (2006b).
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the cross-section empirics, to explain why finance may cause growth. It has been
demonstrated that, in a comparative sense, financial institutions can play a role in
the level of sustained growth. There is here, however, no clear quantitative lesson to
be drawn from the existing literature; yet modern macroeconomic theory is judged
largely against its ability to be calibrated by and replicate data in a consistent
way. Many theoretical considerations of the finance-growth nexus do not rigorously
confront theory with data.
This Chapter serves to motivate and frame the remainder of the thesis. We
provide a general survey, but concentrate on those aspects of the literature which
are not covered in orthodox surveys of the subject, such as Levine (2005). We argue
that growth theory and growth empirics have become disconnected, especially in
relation to the question of finance and growth; in an important sense, they answer
different questions. We take up some of these issues in Chapter 2. In addition, we
demonstrate that both theory and empirics can learn from cliometric evidence and,
in general, a greater appreciation of the historical context. We begin to study the
historical context in more detail in Chapter 3. The conclusions we draw from this
work feed into an analysis of the microeconomics of finance and growth in Chapters
4 and 5.
The Chapter is organised as follows: Section 1.1 surveys the current state of
knowledge in empirical, theoretical and historical terms. Section 1.2 considers the
potential for future research on finance and growth to be more fully integrated
across empirical-theoretical-cliometric lines. Section 1.3 concludes with a summary
of our main findings.
5
Chapter 1. Finance and Growth: A Critical Survey
1.1 Existing Literature
1.1.1 Contemporary Empirics
Empirical exploration of the relationship between economic growth and financial
structure has been widespread, beginning with the ground-breaking work of Gold-
smith (1969) and pioneered in recent years by Ross Levine, with much of his work
summarised in Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2001) and Levine (2005).
Goldsmith (1969, Preface) saw the need to “relate certain measurable charac-
teristics of financial structure to a quantitative expression of economic growth.”
His novelty was in considering what constitutes financial structure (how to define
it), in collating a wide range of data from a number of countries across time and
in attempting to present quantitative evidence for the idea that financial structure
matters. Goldsmith was important for taking the first step and exposing areas of
weakness in understanding and empirical inadequacies, but could draw no robust
conclusions from his analysis.
The core measure of a country’s financial development used by Goldsmith is the
financial interrelations ratio (FIR): The value of all financial instruments outstand-
ing divided by the value of national wealth. On cross-country evidence from mainly
developed countries it is shown that there is a ‘loose and irregular’ association be-
tween financial development and higher per capita income (in his regression anal-
ysis, R2 = 0.19). On the relationship between financial development and growth
the conclusions are less clear: “Even in the long run there is no close correlation
between the rate of growth of real national product and of FIR.” (op. cit., p. 378.)
Goldsmith finds some evidence, therefore, but is unable to draw conclusions on
causality, partly, he argues, because there is not sufficient data to show it. McK-
innon (1973) also embarks upon an empirical investigation, and again finds mixed
evidence on causality.
6
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King and Levine (1993a,b) were the first to demonstrate the potential for large
panel datasets to make rigorous the finance and growth debate. They found not
only a consistent contemporaneous relationship between aggregate measures of fi-
nancial depth and growth, but also a strong predictive component. They argued
that current financial depth can predict economic growth over the consequent ten
to thirty years, concluding that “better financial systems stimulate faster produc-
tivity growth and growth in per capita output by funneling society’s resources to
promising productivity-enhancing endeavours.” (King and Levine, 1993b, p. 540.)
Beck et al. (1999) introduced the large World Bank database that grew out of
the early King and Levine work. This, in turn, made possible most of the empir-
ical research to which we refer in this thesis. The obvious endogeneity problems
inherent in finance and growth regressions were considered in Levine et al. (2000):
The positive causal link from finance to growth was found to be robust to vari-
ous instruments. The longer dataset forms the backbone of Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and
Levine (2001). The book asks the questions first posed by Goldsmith: Does fi-
nancial structure change as countries develop; does financial development influence
economic growth; and does financial structure (bank- or market-based) influence
economic growth? The findings are relatively consistent. It is shown again that
financial development does accelerate growth, that an economy generally becomes
more market-based as it grows, and that growth does not seem to be significantly
different depending on whether a country is predominantly market- or bank-based.
Rather, they argue that institutions such as the legal system are crucial in sus-
taining growth. The importance of property rights and contract enforcement, as
substitutes for social capital, is underlined (op. cit. p. 12.),
. . . policymakers may achieve greater returns by focusing less on the
extent to which their country is bank-based or market-based and more
on legal, regulatory, and policy reforms that boost the functioning of
7
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markets and banks.
These studies, and many others besides, find empirical support for the argument
that finance leads growth, in some sense.
There have been some questions raised by, among others, Driffill (2003) about
the interpretation of empirical results like those outlined above. These concerns
have been omitted from surveys such as Levine (2005), so we pay special attention
to them here. Indeed, on further analysis, we suggest that the impact of data
limitations may be more acute than is generally believed. It will be argued that
these limitations have the tendency to exaggerate the role of finance in determining
economic growth.
The World Bank dataset, which currently1 covers the period 1960-2005 for 192
countries, is not complete for all countries. For example, consider a preferred
measure of financial intermediation, the private credit-to-GDP ratio: The mean
number of observations per country is 24.1. As such, a typical cross-sectional
estimation necessarily involves an average of financial variables over a long period,
often over the whole sample period. Some empirical work has begun to use panel
data (for example Levine et al., 2000), but the longitudinal scope of the panels
used is limited (in the case of Levine et al., the panel consists of five seven-year
averages over the period 1960-95) and this depth comes at the cost of cross-sectional
breadth (Levine et al. include only 71 countries from a total sample of nearly 150
at that time). Not only is it hard to think about finance leading growth when the
averaging time periods are so long, but such a trade-off also leaves estimations open
to selection bias issues.
A number of specific results, obtained using this dataset, have been called into
question. Driffill (2003) and Manning (2003) argue that the results in Levine and
1The dataset is available from http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/finance/. We refer to the
March 14 2005 revision throughout this thesis. A September 2006 update brings the dataset up
to 2005, but makes no other substantial revision.
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Zervos (1998) have implausible implications for the effect of financial development
on growth. Specifically, the results suggest a one-percent per annum increase in
growth rates could be obtained if developing countries increased the level of finan-
cial development to those of more successful countries. He demonstrates that a
number of results hinge on the inclusion of outliers, while the inclusion of regional
dummies, especially those for the Asian Tigers, also renders coefficients on financial
development insignificant. Driffill goes on to consider the robustness of the work on
industry-level data of Rajan and Zingales (1998). It is shown again that the posi-
tive effect of financial development on growth is contingent upon the specification
employed, particularly that including broad regional dummies tends to neutralise
the significance of financial variables. Driffill concludes that the positive results on
data over this period were likely driven by the growth of the Asian Tigers, growth
which is more naturally attributed to other factors (on this see, among others,
Young, 1995; Rodrik, 1996; Landes, 1998).
With this in mind, it should be noted that the Levine et al. (2000) dataset
ends in 1995, before the Asian financial crisis; a period of economic downturn pre-
ceded by deepening financial markets. Financial depth, as measured by Levine
et al.’s preferred indicator of financial depth (the ratio of private credit-to-GDP),
increased significantly in the Asian Tiger countries over the period 1992-1998: In
China by 30.9%; Hong Kong, 40.3%; Indonesia, 21.9%; the Korean Republic, 53.8%;
Malaysia, 45.7%; the Philippines, 142.9%; and Thailand, 89.3%. The year 1998 saw
a reduction in GDP in all of these countries except China (the respective percent
changes in real GDP per capita were: 5.35; -8.21; -11.6; -9.08; -0.62; -4.06; -10.74).2
While it is, of course, not possible to draw any hard conclusions from such analysis,
if Driffill (2003) is correct in suggesting that most of the significance of financial
variables is driven by the growth experience of the Asian Tigers, then this episode
2This data is from the Penn World Table, see Heston et al. (2002).
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calls for a more refined classification of financial depth. A measure which controls
for both institutional and regulatory factors that might determine the efficacy of
financial deepening in spurring growth may obtain very different results.3 Addi-
tionally, a distinction in growth regressions between foreign and domestic providers
of finance may provide more qualified results.
Aghion et al. (2005) use the same 1960-95 dataset as Levine et al. (2000). They
also include the same 71 countries despite using the dataset in a purely cross-
sectional way (employing an average of the private credit variable over the entire
thirty-five-year period) to demonstrate the positive effect of financial development
on convergence. It is possible that their results would be very different if we re-
estimated on the whole sample, increasing both the number of countries and the
endpoint to include properly the Asian financial crisis. While Aghion et al. (2005)
do test for some geographical differences, they do not test specifically for the East
Asian bloc.
The potential significance of selection bias issues is here even more important
since Aghion et al. take an average for their financial proxy over the whole sample
period. Countries with available data are more likely to have converged (for example
the sample includes only 11 of 54 African countries) and countries with sparse data
are generally those that were poor in 1960, such that available data tends to be at
the end of the sample, as can be seen in Figure 1.1. Data are given in Appendix
Table B.1.
Added to this, the trend of financial development as measured by the credit-to-
GDP ratio is itself rising over time across countries. This can be seen by inspection
of the data: The credit-to-GDP ratio trends upwards in around 55 of the 71 coun-
tries in the sample. As such, the measure of financial development for countries
who were relatively poor in 1960 and so with data for only the later years, is biased
3There has recently been a move to consider institutional and legal issues, see particularly
Levine (2004) and Beck and Levine (2005).
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Figure 1.1: Distribution of Missing Observations for the Finance to GDP Ratios in
the Levine et al. (2000) Dataset
upwards relative to a rich country with data for every year. It should be noted
that the upward trend is not specific to the credit-to-GDP ratio; two of the three
alternative proxies used in Aghion et al. (2005, Table 4), trend upwards. The
third, a ratio of commercial bank to central bank assets, is relatively stable for
most countries over the period, and this is the one proxy for which the coefficient
on financial development is insignificant (this variable has been dropped from the
Beck et al. (2000) dataset in later revisions).
The combination of these factors – the long average, the data sparsity, the
sample selection bias and the upward trend in the financial development indicator
selected – means that those countries that did converge have, as a result of the
methods used, necessarily had a higher measure of financial development over the
period. This would explain, at least partly, why the results in Aghion et al. (2005)
are so robust to alternate specifications. This critique is, unfortunately, not specific
11
Chapter 1. Finance and Growth: A Critical Survey
to the Aghion et al. paper; see Beck et al. (2004, p.9): “. . . we sometimes use data
averaged over the period 1960-1999, and sometimes we use data over the period
1980-2000. . . ”.
It should be clear that one ought not to be overly reliant on either purely
cross-sectional empirics or limited panel datasets. Driffill (2003) suggests a greater
emphasis on long-run, historical time-series. He stresses in particular the impor-
tance of comparing countries at similar stages of development in order that more
robust conclusions might be drawn.
The overall message from contemporary empirical research on finance and growth
is indicative but problematic; time-series evidence must be consolidated in order
that we can speak with confidence on the relation between financial institutions
and growth within a country over a period of transition.
1.1.2 Theories of Finance and Growth
Following the pioneering contributions of Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Grossman
and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992), endogenous growth theory
has been at the heart of most theoretical attempts to understand the mechanisms
of long-run growth. The finance-growth nexus is no exception. Theories have gen-
erally differed along three aspects: The type of endogenous growth; the finance
mechanism (the sphere in which constraints impact); and the treatment of asym-
metric information (within that sphere of financial influence). Using this structure,
Table 1.1 outlines the main features of some of the most influential finance and
endogenous growth models. It should be clear by inspection that, regardless of the
source of endogenous growth, the main feature determining growth in most models
is some financial constraint on the acquisition of either knowledge via education or
technology via entrepreneurship.
Financial intermediation in most models takes the form of a perfectly competi-
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Table 1.1: Core Features of Some Finance and Growth Models
source of
endogenous growth finance mechanism information problem
BS91 production insurance market and exogenous liquidity
externalities entrepreneurship shock
S92 production capital market exogenous productivity
externalities shock
KL93b vertical entrepreneurial funding, adverse selection
innovation heterogeneous agents (screening)
BC96 production contract or screen adverse selection
externalities heterogeneous entrepreneurs (ration or screen)
FM96 horizontal funding and monitoring moral hazard
innovation entrepreneurship (effort aversion)
BH98 horizontal entrepreneurship, project moral hazard
innovation appraisal, risk diversification (deceit)
GK98 human capital credit markets vs. none
accumulation intergenerational altruism
M03 vertical inn., entrepreneurship, moral hazard
capital accumulation screening (effort aversion)
AHM05 vertical entrepreneurship, credit moral hazard
innovation constraints (deceit)
BBC05 production entrepreneurship, markets adv. selection and
externalities and banks moral hazard
N.B. BS91 is Bencivenga and Smith (1991); S92 is Saint-Paul (1992); KL93b is King and Levine (1993b);
BC96 is Bose and Cothren (1996); FM96 is de la Fuente and Mar´ın (1996); BH98 is Blackburn and Hung
(1998); GK98 is de Gregorio and Kim (1998); M03 is Morales (2003); AHM05 is Aghion et al. (2005);
BBC05 is Blackburn et al. (2005).
tive system of banking or financial intermediation. Some consider a role for stock
markets, but often only as a choice between mutually-exclusive banks and markets
(such as Greenwood and Smith, 1997). Blackburn et al. (2005) is an interesting
exception, and considers both the joint-determination and co-existence of banks
and stock markets as determined by state-dependent moral hazard conditions. In
these models there is feedback from growth in the economy to the determination of
optimal financial structure, be it based on banking alone or on a mixture of banks
and markets. As an economy develops so it can afford those financial structures
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that better facilitate faster growth (Greenwood and Smith, op. cit.).
A related result is obtained by Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), who extend
Townsend (1978) to consider the consequences of the exogenous costliness of finan-
cial intermediation on market formation, inequality and economic growth. Inter-
mediaries both provide information for the assessment of investment projects and
facilitate diversification of risk. Something like Kuznets’s (1955) inequality hypoth-
esis is captured: In the early stages of development, financial markets are small and
growth is low; as financial markets develop, so inequality increases as only the rela-
tively wealthy can access their benefits; as the economy grows further, so financial
constraints diminish and the relatively poor begin to benefit from greater financial
sophistication, reducing inequality again. This is something also found by, among
others, Aghion and Bolton (1997).
In a related literature, multiple equilibria can emerge as a result of countries
with limited financial sectors caught in a low-growth trap. Saint-Paul (1992) is a
further approach to the modelling of stock markets, wherein stock markets that
facilitate international risk sharing enable specialisation in technologies and higher
growth. There is thus a low- (high-)growth equilibrium associated with low (high)
financial development, capturing the idea of different take-off points for industri-
alising nations. In Bose and Cothren (1996) a bank lends to an entrepreneur of
unknown quality and selects by either designing a separating menu contract (where
this is possible) or by implementing a costly screening technology, or by a mix of
the two. They show that in the early stages of financial development, a fall in the
screening cost can actually be growth-reducing because of the interaction between
dependence on rationing or screening. In concurrence with Schumpeter (1934), the
financial sector needs to reach ‘critical mass’ before advances in financial sophisti-
cation will improve growth.
Risk sharing also motivates the work of Acemoglu and Zillibotti (1997). An OLG
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economy is considered in which fixed costs present a barrier to large investments
with high return. Minimum investment requirements mean that agents cannot
always insure against the risk involved in investing in high-return projects. A series
of positive shocks can cause financial development and economic development to
take-off. Take-off occurs in all economies eventually, but at different stages as
determined by the fortune of agents in the economy. Credit constraints also impact
on growth and convergence in the model of Aghion et al. (2005).
A paper in which there is no explicit information problem is that of de Gregorio
and Kim (1998). In an economy comprised of agents with different levels of ability, a
first-best optimal level of investment in high-ability agents requires fully functioning
capital markets. It is shown that in the absence of such markets, intergenerational
altruism can obtain only a second-best equilibrium.
The majority of works outlined in Table 1.1 treat the financial sector as static4
(where the nature of the relationship between agents and intermediaries does not
change endogenously over time; again, Blackburn et al., 2005, is a notable ex-
ception), with the degree of efficiency of identifying/screening/funding/monitoring
suitable debtors determining the costs of financial intermediation and so the level
of economic growth. The static nature of this relationship requires that the level
of financial depth remains constant as the economy grows. This is clearly at odds
with the lessons drawn from the empirical literature, where at the least we know
that financial depth does change over the course of long-run period of sustained
growth. We develop in Chapter 2 a better understanding of this proposition.
Most papers consider some form of entrepreneur who cannot or will not person-
ally fund a project either because it is too large or too risky. Increasing the ease
with which entrepreneurs can obtain funds thus increases the rate of technological
progress and so the rate of economic growth. Others consider a role for the ac-
4This concept of a static intermediation relationship echoes that of Auerbach and Siddiki
(2004).
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cumulation of education or human capital as entering directly into the production
function; the efficiency with which this process is facilitated by screening or funding
agents thus has an effect on economic growth. Further papers look at the effect
of credit constraints on entrepreneurship and, again, the growth consequences of
higher efficiency in financial intermediation are, for all intents and purposes, equiv-
alent.
The major differences between these models largely revolve around the treat-
ment of asymmetric information. In a few (such as King and Levine, 1993b, and
Bose and Cothren, 1996) the information problem is relatively straightforward,
wherein asymmetric information plays a role in pre-contracting, i.e., where there is
adverse selection, and intermediaries are endowed with the ability to screen hetero-
geneous agents. Agent behaviour post-contracting in these models is not subject to
asymmetric information. In others (such as de la Fuente and Mar´ın, 1996; Black-
burn and Hung, 1998; Morales, 2003; Aghion et al., 2005) there is a post-contract
incentive for agents to shirk or deceive because of, respectively, an aversion to effort
or an ability to hide research outcomes. Such moral hazard issues thus bring the
modelling of static intermediation closer to reality, but often simply add another
wedge between agents and firms, scaling up intermediation costs and so, ceteris
paribus, scaling down balanced growth rates.
The implications for policy in these models are, in general, limited to advocating
liberalised financial markets and efforts to increase the efficiency of banks and
markets while providing the institutional support required to diminish the costs of
moral hazard and enforce contracts. The book by Rajan and Zingales (2004) is a
prominent example of the sorts of policy prescriptions derived from this literature.
In terms of theory, King and Levine (1993b) show that a simple tax on income from
financial intermediation will have a monotonic effect on the level of intermediation
and so on growth. An interesting result is that of Morales (2003), where effort-
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averse entrepreneurs with limited liability can be influenced by being subject to
bank monitoring. It is shown that, under certain conditions, it is possible that a
research subsidy (one direct to the entrepreneur) will accentuate the moral hazard
problem and actually reduce growth. It is suggested, therefore, that policy used
to stimulate growth should concentrate on financial intermediation and that the
optimal tax on research can be non-zero. Aside from that paper, we must be careful
to take policy implications from models in which the absence of any governance is
Pareto optimal. The lessons on appropriate institutions drawn from, among other
things, the work of Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2001) have, as yet, not impacted
significantly on theories of finance and growth.
In short, the theory reviewed briefly here suggests that greater financial effi-
ciency (be it in providing insurance, pooling resources, screening entrepreneurs or
monitoring borrowers) reduces the disincentive to, or increases the feasibility of,
entrepreneurship or the accumulation of human capital, thus increasing the rate
of technological progress and consequently also the long-run growth rate of the
economy. In general, a country with higher financial efficiency, by way of lower in-
formation asymmetries or better financial technologies, will have a higher long-run
economic growth rate. The relationship is monotonic and (normally) continuous;
larger differences in efficiency obtain larger differences in long-run growth.
A key component missing from most of these models is a consideration of their
quantitative implications. However, as we demonstrate in Chapter 2, even a simple
numerical representation of the models outlined here must be treated with circum-
spection. The models described here are, for the most part, essentially cross-section
theories: Changing parameter values results in comparative balanced growth paths
for separate economies, not the movement within a single economy from one growth
path to another. Or, rather, we could think of these models as reflecting changes
within a country that exhibits no transitional dynamics.
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Without doubt, the development of a theory that can easily be interpreted
numerically will be a topic for future work. Doing so would help in three ways:
It would aid an understanding of the principle mechanics behind most finance and
growth theories; it would create the potential for testing against data; and, it
would enable the implications of the theory to be placed in an historical context.
In this regard, the recent work of Townsend and Ueda (2006) is a major advance.
They build upon the work of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), solving the model
analytically for transition growth paths. Again, financial structures are formed on
the basis of exogenous fixed and marginal costs to using financial services. These
costs, at the heart of the theory, are not explored. More significantly, the analytical
model is calibrated to micro-level data for the Thai economy. They compare the
quantitative implications of the model to data from Thailand for the period 1976-
1997. There is here a direct connection between rich microeconomic data and
the testing of a microfounded dynamic general equilibrium model. This exercise
is successful in capturing a number of the observed dynamic interactions between
finance, inequality and growth.
The intention of this thesis, however, is to consider the finance-growth relation
in the context of industrial take-off. Further, we wish to view financial conditions
as a product of their environment, not as exogenous constraints on borrowing,
investment or exchange. As such, we need to look more closely at the evidence on
financial intermediation and growth before proceeding to construct a model that
might capture them.
We develop in Chapter 2 a representation of prevailing theoretical mechanisms
that can be easily calibrated to historical data. In order to see the relevance of
such an exercise we first must place the theoretical implications into a more general
context. We discuss in Section 1.2 the coherence of the finance and growth literature
as a whole. To facilitate this discussion, we first need to consider briefly the question
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of finance and growth in the light of the existing historical literature.
1.1.3 Historical Evidence
Historical and cliometric research can have a lot to add to our understanding of
any subject. If our goal is to answer questions about the necessary preconditions
for developing countries to enter a sustained period of higher growth, then cross-
section analyses of developed countries or theories based on a static intermediation
problem can only aid us in a limited way. It is clear that the onus on establishing
more rigorous empirical evidence will lead to much fruitful historical research, and
a few papers have already begun in this direction. A consideration of the relation-
ship between finance and growth in countries going through a period of transition
might tell us more about the dynamics at play. Were there important changes,
for example, in the way in which agents raised finance over time? Did legislation
inhibit the emergence of the financial sector? Why, and how, do different financial
structures emerge? Why did the UK industrialise first, despite not being the first
to develop a sophisticated banking system? Are there any cliometric tests which
we could impose on theoretical models of finance and growth?
Rousseau and Sylla (2005) combine a long historical US-wide dataset with con-
temporary dynamic econometric techniques. Their dataset is comprised of aggre-
gate data covering the initial emergence of the financial structure we see today,
over the period 1790-1850. They argue that initial financial developments “placed
the United States of the early 19th century on a trajectory of economic growth
higher than that of other nations. . . The US financial system did (and does) what
a modern financial system is supposed to do, namely mobilize and efficiently allo-
cate capital, and provide opportunities for risk management” (Rousseau and Sylla,
2005, p. 21). Additional moves to present the empirics of finance and growth in an
historical context include Rousseau and Wachtel (1998) and Wright (2004).
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Bordo and Rousseau (2006) follow Rousseau and Sylla (2005) and embark upon
a long-run analysis of the finance-growth link, and move to consider what they term
‘deeper fundamentals’. Considering a number of case-study countries, again on a
aggregate basis, they add parameters for legal origin (intended to capture a coun-
try’s inherent attitude to property and contract rights), the political environment
and other factors into regressions on finance and growth. Conclusions from this
analysis are not clear since, “...there remains a substantial component of financial
development that is correlated with growth and yet not related to these measures
of deeper fundamentals.” (p.26).
We wish for empirical analyses of both contemporary and historical data to enter
into decisions made about the nature of a stylised theory of finance and growth. The
historical research, out of practical necessity, considers aggregate financial depth.
But the finding that financial depth may have led periods of sustained growth in
a number of countries does not mean that increasing financial efficiency by cut-
ting down on moral hazard and adverse selection will do so also.5 This distinction
is central to the disconnection between the theory and empirics of finance and
growth. The theory motivates financial frictions and their effect on growth based
on a microeconomic information gap between savers and investors. Empirical work
looks for macroeconomic relations between aggregate financial depth and aggregate
growth. If we are to attempt to consider messages emanating out of each approach
as a single literature, we must specify then the relationship between financial effi-
ciency and financial depth, something which is largely absent from the finance and
growth literature. A deeper historical analysis may provide the key, however.
Cliometric analyses of the type outlined above cannot, by themselves, support
theories based around information and the efficiency of intermediation. To do
5A novel and highly interesting exception, slightly out of place in this analysis, is that of
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), which demonstrates that bank liberalisation in the US increased
economic growth for efficiency, rather than depth, reasons.
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so would need a detailed consideration of the ways in which banks and markets
emerged over time: An analysis of the role of asymmetric information and en-
trepreneurship in forming the financial structures observed around the period of
industrial revolution, and not just of aggregate measures of financial depth. Large,
national financial institutions did not appear overnight but were the response to
economic incentives that emerged over time, building the financial structures we
see today from informal coalitions of agents that saw the initial incentives to act
as intermediaries.
Some, more normative, historical research has begun to approach these con-
siderations in the context of finance and growth. Wright (2002) provides some
evidence to support the mechanisms through which financial institutions can fa-
cilitate economic growth by compensating for asymmetric information conditions,
and so backs-up both the empirical evidence in favour of the finance-led growth
hypothesis and the dominant theoretical models. As Wright (p.212) notes, “Prob-
lems of information asymmetry, namely adverse selection, moral hazard, and the
principal-agent problem, collude to limit effective lending.” The author suggests
that the early US financial system was in fact much more effective than previously
believed, and invokes Adam Smith as being among the first to describe the ways
in which banks spur growth by addressing information problems. The central part
that asymmetric information plays in determining the efficacy of financial institu-
tions in engendering sustained levels of high economic growth is the message of this
work.
But such analysis does not get to the question of whether such financial struc-
tures emerge as a result of economic necessity or whether economic growth, and
industrial take-off, can actually be forestalled by an inadequate financial system
with the implication that an exogenous improvement in the financial environment
will facilitate takeoff. As we shall see in more detail in Chapter 3, the broader
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historical consensus on UK growth is that the role of finance in determining in-
dustrial development was at best limited. Cottrell (1980), Harris (2000), Shea
(2007), and others, cite both the ease with which a firm could find initial finance
and the ubiquity of profit-ploughback as a means of expansion. It is also shown
that a great deal of early financial intermediation was decentralised, where often
the regional manufacturing industries opted for local finance and not the use of the
London capital markets. Depicting only the growth of a national financial system
thus masks a great deal of complexity and dynamism regarding the relationship
between entrepreneurs and financial intermediaries. We leave a fuller analysis of
these important issues to Chapter 3. For the moment, we discuss in Section 1.2
the congruence of the various aspects of finance and growth described above. This
serves to motivate the remainder of this thesis.
1.2 Discussion
We have seen that the finance-growth nexus operates along at least four dimensions:
The size of the financial sector as a proportion of the economy (financial depth); the
effect of institutions and regulations on the efficiency with which financial services
are provided (financial efficiency); the nature and extent of asymmetric information
(both moral hazard and adverse selection); and the extent of disaggregation. In
addition, each of these evolves over time. Viewed from this perspective, the liter-
atures surveyed in this Chapter typically address the finance-growth nexus in an
incomplete way.
It has been shown that applied econometric work considers financial depth while
holding efficiency to be exogenous. By contrast, most theories consider financial
efficiency holding depth to be constant. This clear disconnection has significant im-
plications for the reconciliation of applied and theoretical work: Applied (theoreti-
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cal) research of this sort cannot without qualification be held to support theoretical
(applied) conclusions.
Quite apart from the mapping between the theory and empirics of finance and
growth, there has been little in the way of historical motivation or cliometric test-
ing in the standard approach to most theoretical modelling. Most theories consider
asymmetric information and financial efficiency but pay little heed to questions of
disaggregation; there is no scope for sub-national coalitions of financial intermedi-
aries to provide services more efficiently.
The time-series historical analyses based on financial depth have demonstrated
clear and consistent results that supplement what was learned from the cross-
sectional research. This literature tells us that the level of financial depth does
change over time, and that theories of static intermediation thus miss an impor-
tant element of the story which robust econometric analyses suggest is so important.
But in terms of understanding if and why financial depth leads economic growth we
need to understand the reasons why financial structures emerge. Economic theory
justifies the existence of banks, or more generally coalitions of agents who provide
finance, by appealing to microeconomic conditions such as asymmetric information
and risk aversion. It is necessary, if we are to endogenise the financial development
of an economy going through industrial transition, to consider historical experience
in this light.
Instead of appealing to such historical beacons, decisions about modelling are
typically driven by cross-section evidence in a way that limits the time-series im-
plications of the theory, i.e., there are few meaningful transitional dynamics. As
we show in Chapter 2, a major drawback with present theory is that, even if we
can back-out some indicative path for financial efficiency, this transition would be
exogenous (i.e., the time-series properties would be imposed to fit the data). We
must look properly at the historical record for clues to understanding the mechanics
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behind the degree of asymmetric information, and in this way develop a theory of
endogenous growth and endogenous financial development. We begin to do this in
Chapter 3.
The historical evidence presented in Section 1.1 suggests that the relationship
between agents and financial intermediaries is dynamic and disaggregated, and
where the level of financial depth is not constant. The mechanics of theories such
as King and Levine (1993b) appear, prima facie, to be difficult to square with with
the historical evidence presented here. The numerical implications of these models
raise further questions since they are also difficult to reconcile with the historical
literature. In general, the static approach to modelling finance and growth in which
financial depth is not endogenously changing and where aggregative factors are not
considered, is thus inappropriate and the implications of the models described in
this survey must be considered with caution.
The problem is in establishing the quantitative significance of each of these
aspects. If we can work towards uncovering the richness of the dynamic interplay
between asymmetric information, financial structure, financial depth and economic
growth, during the transition to an industrial economy, then we would have a
new, more historically congruent, micro-founded, theory of finance and growth.
Townsend and Ueda (2006) is an interesting start to work in this direction, matching
rich, disaggregated data on Thailand to a theory of inequality, financial deepening
and growth. But a step further than this would be to consider a long time series
of a country incorporating the pre-industrial, take-off, and post-industrial phases
of development with an understanding of the morphing financial depth, financial
efficiency, asymmetric information and aggregation issues all coming into play.
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1.3 Concluding Remarks
Applied and theoretical research on any question in economics cannot be considered
in isolation from each other. We have argued that the theoretical, contemporary
econometric and historical literatures on the finance-growth nexus are if not con-
tradictory then at best simply disconnected. An attempt at reconciliation will need
to move beyond the concentration on contemporary econometrics, beyond the as-
sumption of static information asymmetry, and beyond the conception of aggregate
variables alone.
These criticisms apply equally to empirical, theoretical and historical research.
Future work will thus need to identify the key features of the interaction between
finance and growth over continuous periods, such as the industrial revolution. The
historical literature surveyed briefly here strongly suggests that current theories
of finance and growth do not depict adequately the experiences of countries going
through industrial revolution. A potentially more fruitful avenue for research will be
to establish the historical experience of industrialisation, asymmetric information
and intermediation, and then construct a growth theory founded in microeconomics
that more faithfully reflects it. Understanding the relationship between increasing
financial depth and evolving conditions of asymmetric information through a period
of industrial revolution is required as a first step.
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Quantitative Implications of
Finance and Growth Theory∗
As described in Chapter 1, the connection between finance and economic growth
has been the subject of increasing attention over recent years. The majority of
this attention has been on its empirical aspect, however. Though the implications
of the empirical results cannot be taken without qualification, the core messages
emanating from this research have been consistent and forceful. It has been shown
that the extent of financial development in an economy, at least in terms of depth,
is related to the level of sustained economic growth.
Work such as King and Levine (1993a) has gone so far as to suggest that we
can draw predictions about the rate of economic growth over ten to thirty years
based on the extent of financial depth. By their nature, these sorts of implications,
and those of succeeding papers, are open to further validation: In short, are they
realistic? Driffill (2003) suggests that they are not, partly because of the strength of
outliers (specifically, the Asian ‘tiger’ economies) in driving the results, and partly
because of the simple implausibility of the predictions.
∗Part of this chapter has been released as Trew (2006a).
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The contemporary empirical work has more recently been augmented by longer
time-series analysis such as the cliometric work of Rousseau and Sylla (2005) and
Bordo and Rousseau (2006). The preliminary findings go some way to supporting
those of the cross-section work on the latter half of the twentieth century. Specif-
ically, they find a relationship over time between the level of aggregate financial
depth and the transition to a higher level of sustained economic growth. Questions
of causality, interaction with legal origin and the effect on technological progress
are still open.
These and other issues were explored further in Chapter 1 so we leave them to
one side here. Instead, having noted the capacity to hold empirical implications
to account in this way, we begin to address the absence in most of the theoreti-
cal literature of any quantitative, and therefore testable, implications. Despite the
near-ubiquity of calibration to data in the macroeconomic literature, growth theory
remains largely untested in this respect. Indeed, the absence of numerical appli-
cation is seen as one of the key weaknesses of the new growth theory which grew
out of the work of Romer (1986, 1990) and Lucas (1988). A strong critique of the
applied relevance of the endogenous growth literature is Parente (2001). It is the
intention of this Chapter to make a first attempt at confronting extant finance and
endogenous growth theory with data for historical growth paths.
Quantitative Finance and Growth
At the same time as finding relationships between financial development and eco-
nomic growth, work such as King and Levine (1993b) seeks to bolster empirical
findings with the development of theory relating financial matters to the determi-
nants of growth. The tacit implication is that the empirical findings are supported
by, and support, the theoretical results. But while the empirics typically con-
sider cross-section regressions on aggregate financial depth, the theories, with some
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exceptions, relate measures of financial efficiency to economic growth. In these the-
ories, there is assumed to be some wedge between savings and investments which
acts to reduce the rate of technological progress or human capital accumulation by
dampening entrepreneurial or educational activities. In order to consider results
from each approach as a single body of research, the connection between these
frictions and the level of aggregate depth then needs to be made explicit. But not
only is this connection typically absent, each approach implicitly answers a differ-
ent question. Indeed, it will be argued that, for a wide class of theories, balanced
growth actually implies that the economy needs to obtain a constant level of fi-
nancial depth. In general, then, the theory cannot without qualification be held to
support the numerical implications of empirical work.
The empirical literature has moved towards increasingly rich analyses. Work
such as Beck et al. (2005) has looked at the differing impact of financial development
on firm size and growth. A number of papers have also begun to consider factors
which determine the efficacy of finance in influencing growth. Beck and Levine
(2005) and Bordo and Rousseau (2006) are examples in the context of legal origin.
Work such as Aghion et al. (2005), however, has continued to focus on the jux-
taposition of cross-sectional econometrics with theory without explicitly stating the
connection between them. There is, in this approach, no calibration of theoretical
results to empirical facts, and no attempted simulation of time paths or cross sec-
tions found in the data. This sort of interdependence at the frontier of research
between theory and evidence is the lifeblood of contemporary macroeconomics, and
could yet be so in the economics of growth.
Outline of this Chapter
This chapter attempts to reduce the key mechanisms at work in many theories
of finance and growth to a single model that can be calibrated to data. Given
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the lack of the sorts of historical data required, it is our intention to minimise
the number of free parameters in the model. This allows us to interpret observed
growth rates in terms of implied historical financial efficiency. The simplicity of the
resulting model reflects the stripped-down nature of our approach. Nonetheless,
we demonstrate the validity of this simple model by developing a less reductive
endogenous growth model with quality ladders. This second model also serves to
reinforce our argument that the theoretical and applied approaches to finance and
growth are, in some senses, disconnected.
The intention is to develop quantitative implications which are transparent
enough to allow an interpretation in terms of historical growth paths and cross-
section results, though the focus will be on the former. We thus concentrate on the
calibration of the simple model. To the author’s knowledge, this is the first attempt
to calibrate prevailing finance and growth theories to match quantitatively either
historical time-series or cross-section empirics.
We first provide in Section 2.1 a brief recap of key theoretical contributions,
and argue that they can be considered in the context of a small number of core
mechanisms. We hope to keep any overlap with Chapter 1 to a minimum. We
then develop in Section 2.2 our parsimonious model. 2.2.1 presents a version in
the manner of King and Levine (1993b). This initial model with adverse selection
is calibrated to an historical time-series of growth in the UK. We draw implica-
tions for historical and cross-sectional financial efficiency in this context. Section
2.2.2 extends the model to include moral hazard considerations, and again develops
quantitative implications. Section 2.3 presents a more involved endogenous growth
model with quality ladders, and suggest that our simple model is a parsimonious
one. Section 2.4 concludes with our main findings.
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2.1 The Prevailing Mechanics of Finance
and Growth Theory
The intention then, in this Chapter, is to reduce the most commonly cited finance
and growth theories down to their core, laying bare the central mechanisms through
which finance is said to influence the rate of economic growth. We do not wish to
go as far as Pagano (1993) in simplifying the finance-growth link. In that model,
the wedge between investment and savings is simply posited. Instead, we wish to
model, at least following the spirit of prevailing finance and growth theories, some
level of detail in the microeconomic roots of financial frictions. We do not derive
an empirically motivated theory; we intend only to reflect the state of prevailing
thought in finance and growth theory. The representative theory will then be
considered in the light of its implications for time-series growth paths and for cross-
section comparative statics. This allows us to turn back to the more detailed
evidence on the realities of finance and growth in Chapter 3.
Capasso (2004) and Levine (2005) go through in some detail the nature of a
good deal of the theoretical literature. While a number of economists have long
questioned any suggested role of financial matters in determining growth, the time-
series evidence has shown that the two are at least positively related. Of course,
in an Arrow-Debreu world there is no necessity for financial intermediation, and so
no possible link between financial matters and the performance of the economy. In
a microeconomic sense, in order to motivate the existence of specialised financial
structures, we need to introduce frictions between those who save and those who
wish to invest. These frictions can arise because of at least incomplete but also
perhaps asymmetrical information. The symmetrical incompleteness of information
is not often held to be the only motivating factor, though Saint-Paul (1992) shows
that it is, of course, possible in the presence of economy-wide uncertainty. Most
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theories consider asymmetrically incomplete information to be the underlying cause
of financial structures. This line of thought has been pursued by Capasso (2004),
among others. Capasso demonstrates the similarities in many of the finance and
growth theories that incorporate asymmetric information.
Given the focus on asymmetric information, we are left with choices regarding
the source of economic growth, be it via exogenous changes in TFP or endogenous
growth, and the nature of the asymmetry, be it adverse selection and/or moral
hazard. In the main, the source of economic growth has followed the trend set by the
new growth literature and included either production externalities or imperfectly
competitive intermediate sectors which compete to increase either the quality or
quantity of intermediate goods. The majority of those concerned with finance place
at the heart of the growth mechanic some form of entrepreneurship in the pursuit
of technological advance, though work such as de Gregorio and Kim (1998) does
consider the accumulation of human capital.
As shown in Capasso (2004), the nature of the information asymmetry, whether
ex ante or ex post private information, is an important determinant of the resulting
financial structures. King and Levine (1993b) is the original finance and growth
model with adverse selection, in which entrepreneurs are screened by a financial
intermediary to determine their quality. The screening is costly, and the chosen
entrepreneurs develop better quality intermediate goods with some known proba-
bility. In Bose and Cothren (1996), banks can choose potential creditors with either
a costly screening technology or by designing a separating contract, or by a mix of
the two.
Models that motivate financial structures by the presence of moral hazard in-
clude Blackburn and Hung (1998) and Morales (2003). In each there is a post-
contract incentive for agents to either deceive or shirk. The latter is an interest-
ing extension to Howitt and Aghion (1998), which includes a role for taxation in
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achieving an optimal level of research activity. This is one of the very few theories
of finance and growth in which zero taxation is not Pareto optimal.
Most models specify the financial intermediation condition to be a static rela-
tionship between lenders and borrowers. Blackburn et al. (2005), however, combines
problems of both moral hazard and adverse selection in a model that can allow for
the co-existence of both stock markets and banks. That paper, along with Green-
wood and Smith (1997), allows for the nature of financial structures to change as
the economy develops. Blackburn et al. considers the joint-determination and co-
existence of debt and equity finance. In these sorts of model, where there exists a
decision over the nature of finance and so a relationship between economic devel-
opment and optimal financing method, the financial intermediation condition is, in
a sense, ‘dynamic’.
We can draw together some key aspects of the mechanisms underlying predom-
inant finance and growth theories. Something akin to entrepreneurship drives the
accumulation of either human capital or better technologies. The efficiency with
which the motive to innovate or accumulate translates into actual growth is de-
termined by the ease with which entrepreneurs can obtain finance for their risky
projects. With asymmetric information in the financial sector, this efficiency is
dependent upon the sophistication of the financial technologies, and on the extent
of moral hazard or asymmetric information. Additionally, as the economy becomes
richer, so it can afford those financial structures that better facilitate higher eco-
nomic growth.
A recent, and pathbreaking, analysis is that of Townsend and Ueda (2006),
which builds on the theory of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) to include transi-
tional behaviour. They develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of an economy
with evolving levels of financial depth and economic inequality. Financial structures
exist because of the imposition of fixed and marginal costs to exchange; i.e., the
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information problem is not explicit. Still, the model presented in Section 2.2 of
this Chapter demonstrates why the approach of Townsend and Ueda is so superior
to that which has gone before it. To reiterate, the purpose of this Chapter is to
demonstrate the dangers of drawing conclusions from arguments which omit the
sort of direct connection between data and theory propounded by Townsend and
Ueda. A theory of economic growth and financial efficiency, however it is motivated,
cannot be held to support, and nor can it be supported by, empirical relationships
between measures of aggregate financial depth and economic growth.
In Section 2.2 we develop a model in the spirit of King and Levine (1993b)
which links financial matters to economic growth. The model includes: A role for
entrepreneurship in the accumulation of human capital, as facilitated by the exis-
tence of an intermediary-banking sector; asymmetric information between lenders
and entrepreneurs in the form of moral hazard and/or adverse selection; and an in-
teraction between economic growth and financial development. We invoke a model
in which entrepreneurs wish to obtain finance for investment in their own human
capital, rather than for an addition to technology. It will be clear that for our
purposes the difference of each approach is minimal. The model is then devel-
oped numerically, with quantitative implications that can be compared with both
cross-section empirics and time-series data.
The largest omission from this simple model is a role for the co-evolution of
stock markets alongside banks. We leave this aside in order to keep the model
and its calibration simple. This omission is not necessarily to the detriment of
our conclusions. Indeed, as suggested by Blackburn et al. (2005, p. 145), “our
analysis invites one to think of debt and equity as complementary, rather than
substitute, means of corporate finance.” This echoes the previously noted findings
of Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Levine (2001). A further, related, aspect is the existence of
a ‘critical mass’ effect in financial development, of which Saint-Paul (op. cit.) and
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Bose and Cothren (op. cit.) are examples. We view these aspects as important,
but, again, ultimately not significant for the numerical simulations we propose.
2.2 A Parsimonious Model of Finance and Growth
The purpose of this section is to outline an endogenous growth model that can
capture the principle mechanics of significant theoretical works. It also reflects in
part the historical debate on the nature of asymmetric information, both in terms
of adverse selection and an extension to include moral hazard. We calibrate the
model to historical data for the UK and so trace out the implied ‘transition path’
for financial efficiency over the period of the industrial revolution.
We will take the financial intermediation relationship to be static, i.e., the way
in which intermediaries and agents interact does not explicitly change over time.
In addition, we assume that there are no arbitrary credit constraints so that the
causes of friction are entirely informational. With a suitable model we can thus use
numerical methods to compare quantitatively the implications of such models for
time-series growth with the historical pattern of industrial finance and growth.
The mechanism by which finance affects long-run growth follows the trend sug-
gested by the theories discussed in Section 2.1: Ever since King and Levine (1993b),
the majority of theories linking finance to growth revolve around entrepreneurship
and either human capital accumulation or technological progress. We adopt that
perspective also.
2.2.1 Financial Intermediation and Growth
In the model of King and Levine (1993b) intermediaries are effectively venture
capitalists that have the technology necessary to screen potential entrepreneurs
who are then employed and given funds to run a research project. Prospective
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entrepreneurs differ by type in their ability to carry through a research project.
The fruit of such labour is an addition to the stock of knowledge (specifically, via
a quality-ladders setup a` la Grossman and Helpman, 1991). The screening cost
is fixed and the intermediary consequently knows with certainty the ability of the
applicant. There is no costly effort (so no moral hazard), and the intermediary
market is perfectly competitive. Reductions in the cost of screening or in the tax
on intermediary profits thus increase the efficiency of the financial sector, increase
the rate of technological progress and so increase the rate of long-run growth.
Outline
In this model firms demand physical capital and human capital. We have a contin-
uum of agents in each household of total mass one, and a random distribution of
type within each. If we assume a large number of households then in the aggregate
we can work with the average distribution of type within a given household. So,
on average, a proportion ϕ1 has no ability to acquire human capital whatsoever, a
proportion ϕ2 has low ability Λ
′ and the remainder, proportion ϕ3 = 1 − ϕ1 − ϕ2
has high ability Λ > Λ′. It is important that able agents do not know their own
level of ability, only that they have some. If agents knew their level of ability, given
that the screening technology of the intermediary identifies ability with precision,
and given also that agents know this, there would be no reason for those with less
than high-ability to apply.
Agents with no ability take household responsibility for selling physical capi-
tal to firms. Only agents with high ability have the potential to develop human
capital. All agents with nonzero ability apply to a financial intermediary to be
screened. Those that are rejected do not contribute to household income. Those
that are accepted are consequently funded by the intermediary to acquire education
or conduct research, becoming human capital with fixed probability β. In the case
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of education this might reflect the likelihood of not dropping-out; in the case of re-
search this might reflect the probability of useful innovation. Either way, we obtain
the same result. Those that fail to develop human capital contribute nothing to
household income, those that do develop human capital are consequently employed
by firms and enter the production function as human capital. In the event that the
agent succeeds in acquiring human capital it is the researcher that owns the human
capital, paying a proportion t of income from human capital to intermediaries. The
intermediary thus sets t to maximise expected profits.
Firms
Firms use human capital, H, and physical capital, K, as inputs to the production
process, Yt = AK
α
t H
1−α
t .
6 Each firm maximises profits, pit = Yt− rKt−hHt, where
each takes the rates of return on physical capital, r, and human capital, h as given:
r = α(Yt/Kt) and h = (1 − α)(Yt/Ht). We can use equation for h to obtain the
firm’s demand for human capital, Ht = [(1 − α)Yt]/h, which, upon substitution
into the production function, obtains a form of the familiar Ak endogenous growth
setup,
Yt =
[
A
(
(1− α)
h
)1−α] 1α
Kt. (2.1)
Once we have found a relationship between the rates of return on human and
physical capital, we can treat this model as one in which externalities to production
are just enough to generate constant returns and ‘Ak’ growth. Following Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (2004), we can then think of K as something like a proxy for a
composite capital variable. In doing so, we assume that the H : K ratio is constant.
As in most of the extant theory, transitional dynamics will not exist here.
6In order to more faithfully reflect King and Levine (1993b), we might have thought of en-
trepreneurs adding to the stock of knowledge via a compound coefficient of technological progress
of the form Yt = AA˜1−αt Kαt . This difference would not matter for the purposes of our simple
numerical simulation.
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Intermediaries
The intermediary incurs the cost f(H) > 0 to screen agents for ability and funds
successful applicants to acquire human capital at cost x(H) > 0. Note that these
costs are not invariant to the level of human capital, and we make the assumption
that f ′ > 0 and x′ > 0, i.e., that the costs of intermediation are proportional to
the size of the demand for human capital. So both the outlay required to fund
the acquisition of human capital, x, and the cost of screening candidate acquirers
of human capital, f , is increasing in the level of human capital – a reasonable
assumption if we imagine that the higher the level of human capital aspired to, the
more costly it is to both fund and identify suitably able agents. This ensures that
the costs of intermediation do not become insignificant over time as a proportion
of the size of the economy.
We demonstrate in Section 2.3 that there is an analogous requirement for bal-
anced growth in a quality-ladders setup so it may be a general result that for
balanced growth in these simple economies with static financial intermediation we
require that the size of the financial sector is constant over time. This explains why,
even though (because of data limitations) econometric analyses consider largely fi-
nancial depth, most theory considers financial efficiency; within an endogenous
growth framework it becomes difficult to solve analytically for balanced growth
when the size of the financial sector relative to the economy is changing over time.
In an economy going through industrial transition, the size of the financial sector
does change significantly. It may be that to reconcile these facts, i.e., for both the
balanced growth rate and the level of financial depth to change endogenously over
a period of industrial takeoff, we require the financial condition to be dynamic,
instead of the static relationship depicted below.
We also require that it is not feasible for households to fund the amount x(H)
from their own resources. For a given agent, expected intermediary profits will be
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the probability-weighted incomes and expenditures. The probability that an agent
who applies will be of low ability is ϕ2/(1 − ϕ1), in which case only the screening
cost is expended. The probability of successfully developing human capital from
high-ability agents and thus obtaining a rent from him is β(1− ϕ1 − ϕ2)/(1− ϕ2).
If we assume competition then the expected intermediary profit is zero,
E(pi)= β
(
1− ϕ1 − ϕ2
1− ϕ1
)
[thH − x(H)− f(H)] +
+ (1− β)
(
1− ϕ1 − ϕ2
1− ϕ1
)
[−x(H)− f(H)] +
+
(
ϕ2
1− ϕ1
)
[−f(H)] = 0. (2.2)
Let us specify x(H) = ηxhH and f(H) = ηfhH, where ηx > 0 and ηf > 0 are the
cost parameters of intermediation, then we obtain a simple expression for the fee
charged by the intermediary.7 On the face of it, this restriction is not an unreason-
able one: Both the costs and revenue of financial intermediation are proportional
to agents’ income from human capital, hH. We thus have a form of static finan-
cial intermediation. This specification allows us easily to derive balanced growth
rates and it reflects the manner in which financial intermediation is modelled in
the literature. However, as we will see in Chapter 3, such an assumption is quite
likely to be inappropriate. The intention of this Chapter is to test the numerical
implications of extant theories of finance and growth, so we proceed for now with
static intermediation.
Using x(H) = ηxhH and f(H) = ηfhH with equation (2.2) we obtain,
t∗ =
1
β
{
ηx +
[
1− ϕ1
1− ϕ1 − ϕ2
]
ηf
}
. (2.3)
7It is possible to generalise this functional form but the consequences for the model are not
significant. Specifically, we can specify y(H) = ηyH, wherein we obtain t∗(h) and a less simple
form for the interest rate. We prefer the simpler form here since the problem becomes intractable
when we consider the full model with moral hazard.
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Equation (2.3) is increasing in the costs of financial intermediation, ηf and ηx, and
in the share of low ability agents, ϕ2, and decreasing in both the probability of
human capital creation, β and the share of high ability agents, ϕ3.
Households
The cost t∗hH is borne by consuming households. The household receives income
from physical and human capital, however, at the rates r and h respectively. Using
equation (2.3), the household budget constraint will thus be the familiar ct + k˙t =
rk + τ(1 − t∗)hH. We mirror King and Levine here by incorporating a tax on
income from innovation, where 1 − τ is the tax rate applied to household income
from human capital. Households maximise the discounted present value of future
consumption,
max
ct
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(ct)dt, (2.4)
where u(ct) is the instantaneous utility function. Assume CES preferences of the
form u(ct) = (c
1−θ
t − 1)/(1− θ). The Hamiltonian is,
H = e−ρt
(
(ct)
1−θ − 1
1− θ
)
+ λ [rk + τ(1− t∗)hH − ct] , (2.5)
given initial capital stocks. We also have the transversality conditions, lim
t→∞
e−ρtλtkt = 0.
The first order conditions are,
∂H
∂ct
= e−ρtct−θ − λ = 0; (2.6)
∂H
∂kt
= λr = −λ˙; (2.7)
∂ ∂H
∂ct
∂t
= −ρe−ρt(ct)−θ − θe−ρt(ct)−θ−1c˙t = λ˙. (2.8)
From the first order conditions we obtain the standard Euler equation governing
the growth rate of consumption, c˙t/ct = θ
−1(r − ρ).
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Equilibrium Growth
In this setup, we mirror the literature by making no distinction between equilibrium
and balanced-path growth. Hence, using the Euler equation, in equilibrium we
require that the net return on capital is equal to the net return on human capital,
i.e., that r = τ(1 − t∗)h.8 From the production function, equation (2.1) we have
the following expression for r,
r =
[
A
(
(1− α)
h
)1−α] 1α
. (2.9)
By the equilibrium financial intermediation condition, h = r/[τ(1 − t∗)], we may
solve for r from,
r = A[τ(1− α)(1− t∗)]1−α. (2.10)
Hence, we have a simple closed-form solution for the equilibrium growth rate,
γ =
1
θ
{
A[τ(1− α)(1− t∗)]1−α − ρ} . (2.11)
An increase in the efficiency of financial intermediation, by reducing ηf or ηx ceteris
paribus results in an increase in the equilibrium growth rate by reducing the cost of
intermediation, t∗. So there is simply a wedge in between what firms pay for human
capital and what agents receive, where the significance of this wedge reflects the
efficiency of financial intermediation. This is the main theoretical result of King
and Levine (1993b). Inasmuch as we can call exogenous changes in ηf changes in
financial efficiency over time within a country we can now calibrate this model and
consider its quantitative implications for historical growth.
8This is akin to the argument in Tsiddon (1992): “I assume that each financial intermediary
can provide a risk-free return to lenders that is equal to or greater than the risk-free rate of
return individuals can earn in the market for physical capital. Competition guarantees that each
financial intermediary has zero profit.” p. 305
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Calibration
Using data from Crafts and Harley (1992) for the level of industrial production in
the UK through the industrial revolution we can, with reasonable parameter values,
trace back the implied efficiency of financial intermediation in this setup. We use
here the ‘revised best guess’ (Crafts and Harley, 1992, Table A3.I) for the industrial
production series. This is a standard reference for such data, and it shows a similar
pattern to that in Bairoch (1982). The advantage of the Crafts and Harley dataset
is that they provide annual values. We do not extend the data to the current day
since the composition of output changed significantly, with a decreasing proportion
of industrial production towards the end of the twentieth century. Figure 2.1 shows
the path of the trend growth rate. We report the growth rate of HP-filtered series
with both λ = 100 since this is annual data and with λ = 10, 000 to show the
general movement in growth. All these data are reproduced in Appendix Table
B.2.
Whichever of the two weights we use in the filter the implications are the same.
Trend growth in the UK increased through the early periods of industrial revolu-
tion and decreased slightly after around 1825. This is a relatively typical pattern
for countries going through industrialisation during the eighteenth and nineteenth
century, and the only exception seems to be the US.
We can use the growth trend with λ = 10, 000 to find the implied value of ηf ,
ceteris paribus, by using the estimate of trend growth, γˆ, and equations (2.3) and
(2.11),
ηˆf =
[
1− ϕ1 − ϕ2
1− ϕ1
]{
β
[
1−
(
θγˆ + ρ
A
) 1
1−α 1
τ(1− α)
]
− ηx
}
. (2.12)
We must restrict some parameters for calibration purposes. For ηˆf > 0 over the
range of obvserved trend growth values we requireA[(1− ηx/β)(1− α)]1−α >ˆ¯γθ + ρ,
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Figure 2.1: Trend UK Growth of Industrial Production
where ˆ¯γ is the maximum growth rate observed over the sample. Bearing this in
mind we use the parameter values given in Table 2.1 in simulations of this model.
MATLAB code is reproduced in Appendix Section A.1. 9
Numerical Implications
So we have inferred the historical level of financial efficiency, in the King-Levine
mould, as that depicted in Figure 2.2. Here ηf is the implied proportion of inter-
mediary costs that go to screening agents. We use this single measure to reflect
implied changes in the efficiency of financial intermediation.
Here we have inverted the y-axis in order to reflect more clearly the movement of
9These results are considerably robust to changes in parameters, so long as we obtain positive
values for ηf . Without significantly altering the shape of the implied efficiency data over time we
can vary α between 0.1 and 0.9, ϕ1 and ϕ2 can take any value so long as ϕ1+ϕ2 < 1, β can take
any value in the interval (0, 1), A can be varied widely (while satisfying the inequality for ηf > 0),
θ can be varied (again, so long as we satisfy the inequality), and ηx can take any positive value
below unity.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Values for the Benchmark Model
capital share α 0.67
subjective discount rate ρ 0.02
elasticity of substitution θ 5
human capital probability β 0.75
proportion of zero ability ϕ1 0.4
proportion of low ability ϕ2 0.2
coefficient of technological progress A 30
scale parameter on financial investment ηx 0.01
tax parameter τ 1
Figure 2.2: Historical Financial Efficiency in the UK
implied financial efficiency over the period. Plainly there is a great deal of implied
movement in the parameter over time. We see an initially low level of financial
efficiency at the beginning of the industrial take-off and a peak of financial efficiency
at around 1830. The parameter then falls monotonically over the remainder of the
sample. The path of financial efficiency mirrors the path of the trend growth rate
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and so the implied drop in financial efficiency reflects the fall in observed trend
growth.
It should be noted also that we are only changing one variable; the implied path
of financial efficiency would be affected if we were to account for the technological
revolution by exogenously increasing A over the period. Nonetheless, the general
shape of the path would remain. The implication of this finance and growth model
is thus that the level of financial efficiency was, at the start of the industrial rev-
olution, (relatively) low. Financial efficiency then increased up until around 1830
before dropping again, almost to pre-industrial levels.10 This observation is an im-
portant one, and might be tested using appropriate historical data. In a sense it
is surprising to consider a rapid rise and then decline of financial efficiency, and so
this suggests that theories of finance and growth, in the main, cannot acceptably
account for the dynamics of industrial take-off. Again, this question cannot move
beyond speculation without further research.
In addition to these ‘time-series’ implications, we can consider the above results
in the context of a cross-section analysis. Indeed, this might be the only accept-
able implication since there are no dynamic elements to the transition from one
level of financial efficiency in the model above; in essence, different levels of finan-
cial efficiency imply different balanced growth paths in different economies. Given
the above calibration, we see that at low levels, differences in financial efficiency
mean larger difference in growth. Changing ηf from 0.5 to 0.49 obtains growth
path difference of 0.5 percentage points. Over higher levels of financial efficiency,
however, to obtain a difference of 0.5 percentage points, ηf must change from, for
example, 0.25 to 0.2.11 The implication is that countries with low growth levels
should exhibit lower variations in financial efficiency than those with high growth
10The process could equally well be applied to any other country with sufficient data; the growth
patterns of many industrialised countries have mirrored this peak shape, see Bairoch (1982).
11This result holds up to a wide range of different calibrations, as detailed in footnote 9 above.
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levels. At present, there are no empirical works that could validate this implication
on a cross-country basis. The work of Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) considers the
effect of bank liberalisation on economic growth in states of the US. They find a
positive causal effect on growth via an increase in financial efficiency, rather than
through increased financial depth. Perhaps partly because the focus of the article is
elsewhere, they do not find the sort of nonlinearity implied by the model presented
above.
2.2.2 Financial Intermediation, Moral Hazard and Growth
The degree to which the model presented in Section 2.2.1 reflects the state of the
literature is limited. Most work on financial intermediation and growth considers
some further role for asymmetric information, be it imperfect screening, costly
state-verification or effort-aversion and costly monitoring. Here we will take the
latter approach, along the lines of de la Fuente and Mar´ın (1996) and Morales
(2003).
In the King and Levine (1993b) model, the entrepreneur knows that there is no
difference in his income between success and failure, i.e., he is fully insured, and
yet he still supplies effort in the management of a research project, the success rate
of which he has no influence over. In the modification presented in Section 2.2.1,
the agent is not fully insured (though of course the clan of which he is part is fully
diversified) but, still, he has no influence over the probability of acquiring human
capital. It is likely, however, that there would be a relationship between the effort
the agent puts into acquiring human capital and the likelihood, β, of it occurring.
If agents are averse to effort there emerges a role for intermediaries in implementing
a costly monitoring technology, where ‘monitoring’ is hereafter synonymous with
‘controlling’, to increase their expected income by forcing an increase in β.
Morales (2003) considers an endogenous growth model with financial imperfec-
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tions but makes the probability of innovation endogenous. Researchers in Morales’
model, analogous to the entrepreneurs of King and Levine, dislike effort and have
limited liability, i.e., they pay back a certain amount less than their monopoly prof-
its from starting up in the intermediate sector in the case of success, but do not
suffer relative to their initial wealth in the case of failure. So there is a level of effort
that the entrepreneur will provide given his preferences over effort. The interme-
diary then has the ability to monitor the entrepreneur and force him to increase
effort, a mechanism used in a number of papers (inter alia de la Fuente and Mar´ın,
1996; Blackburn and Hung, 1998). In the model presented here an agent with high
ability is funded and acquires human capital with probability β, paying back an
amount to the intermediary in the case of success and nothing otherwise.
A simple approach is to assume that agents are averse to effort and that a
monitoring technology is required to increase effort. Effort in this model is reflected
in the probability of a good agent becoming human capital, so an increase in effort
is the same as an increase in β, though not one-for-one. We could endogenise
the quality of intermediary screening but for now we leave the simple case where
the agent and intermediary can only influence the probability of becoming human
capital.12 So, post-screening, the agent is faced with the following expected profit
condition,
β(1− t∗)hH −D(β), (2.13)
where effort aversion enters as D(β) = (hHβ2)/(2κ), which is an increasing and
convex function of β, and also increasing in the level of human capital. The param-
eter κ > 0 reflects the agents’ effort aversion, i.e., high κ suggests a low aversion to
effort. These assumptions might be justified on two counts: The marginal effect of
an increase in effort on the likelihood of success is decreasing in the probability of
success; and the higher the level of human capital to which an agent aspires, the
12Trew (2004) considers such an extension in a model that is closer to King and Levine (1993b).
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more difficult it is to succeed and so the higher the cost of increasing β. We also
abstract from taxation in this version, so τ = 1. The agent thus chooses his level
of effort to maximise his private return, given t∗ and κ,
β0 = κ(1− t∗), (2.14)
which is, importantly, invariant to h.
We thus have a minimum effort level in the absence of monitoring equal to β0.
An intermediary can spend resources on ‘monitoring’ the agent in order to force
his effort level higher. The cost of increasing effort is a function M(β − β0) =
[hH(β − β0)2]/2s of the difference between the desired β and the minimum, β0,
where s > 0 is, again, some scale parameter that influences the cost of monitoring
and we again assume that the cost of monitoring is increasing in the level of human
capital. So s is some indication of the sophistication of financial intermediaries in
mitigating the costs of moral hazard; the higher is s, the less costly is moral hazard.
These simplifying assumptions are necessary for both β0 and β
∗ to be invariant to
H so they could be modified, but the algebra would not permit a simple closed form
solution for growth rates. We define this function to be convex in the difference
between desired and minimum effort levels (the convexity here is a consequence of
convexity in effort-aversion). As such, the intermediary’s expected profit considers
this additional cost,
E(pi) = β
(
1− ϕ1 − ϕ2
1− ϕ1
){
thH − x(H)− f(H)− [H(β − β0)2]/2s
}
+
+ (1− β)
(
1− ϕ1 − ϕ2
1− ϕ1
)
[−x(H)− f(H)] +
+
(
ϕ2
1− ϕ1
)
[−f(H)] = 0. (2.15)
So the intermediary now maximises expected profits with respect to both β and
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t. If we again specify x(H) = ηxhH and f(H) = ηfhH, then the optimal β for a
given t is the positive solution to,
{
3β2 − 4βκ(1− t) + [κ(1− t)]2} /2s− t = 0, (2.16)
which is,
β∗ =
2
3
κ(1− t) + 1
3
{
[κ(1− t)]2 + 6st} 12 . (2.17)
It is easy to see from equation (2.17) that both an increase in the efficiency of
monitoring (increasing the scale parameter s) and a lower aversion to effort (higher
κ) results in a higher optimal effort.
Substituting the expression for the optimal β into the expected profit func-
tion, equation (2.15), and setting expected profits equal to zero, it follows that the
optimal levy on agents acquiring human capital, t∗, is the solution to,
23[κ(1− t)] +
[
(κ(1− t))2
9
+
2
3
st
] 1
2

{
2st−
[
(κ(1− t))2
9
+
2
3
st
]
+ (2.18)
− 2
3
κ(1− t)
[
(κ(1− t))2
9
+
2
3
st
] 1
2
+
1
9
(κ(1− t))2
 = 2s
[
ηx +
(
ϕ2
1− ϕ1
)
ηf
]
.
We can now find the growth rate of the economy, as before, as a function of
the financial intermediary conditions. It should be clear that parameterisation will
not be as simple as in the case without moral hazard since here we require both
t∗ ∈ (0, 1) and 0 < β0 < β∗ ∈ (0, 1], but there is a range of parameters for which we
obtain sensible results.
Again we have r = (1 − t∗)h13 so the level of growth in the economy is equa-
tion (2.11). The effect of parameter variations on growth are the opposite of the
13This condition does not change from the model without moral hazard. Decisions over screening
and effort are made within the cohort of agents, before employment as human capital, so do not
affect the conditions for dynamic optimisation.
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effect on the optimal t. For a reasonable range of parameters14 it can be shown
that the optimal financial intermediary cost, t∗, is decreasing in the efficiency of
monitoring technology, s, and increasing the degree of effort aversion (decreasing
in κ). Financial efficiency also has the expected effect, with t∗ increasing in both
ηf and ηx.
So we have a model of endogenous growth which incorporates both the role
of financial efficiency, along the lines of King and Levine (1993b), and a facility
to reflect the degree of moral hazard faced, in the spirit of Morales (2003). It is,
therefore, possible to consider the results from section 2.2.1 in the light of changing
moral hazard conditions over time.
We can also present an analogous result to that in Figure 2.2, with combinations
of financial efficiency and moral hazard required to obtain the observed UK growth
path through the industrial revolution. For each year we have an estimate of trend
growth, γˆ, from which we can infer, from equation (2.11), the implied estimate for
t∗,
tˆ∗ = 1−
(
θγˆ + ρ
A
) 1
1−α 1
1− α. (2.19)
Again, there are restrictions on parameters in order that tˆ∗ is in the unit interval.
Specifically this requires that 0 < θγˆ + ρ < A(1 − α)1−α, so we choose parameter
values that satisfy this given the range of growth rates over the period 1701-1913.15
Using parameter values given in Table 2.2, this inequality is satisfied for the entire
sample. The fact that we can use the same parameters for both models demon-
strates that the model without moral hazard is nested within the extended model
presented here, and also that both are not overly sensitive to parameter variations.
Having identified tˆ∗ we can find combinations of financial costs, ηf , and s that
14In these experiments the benchmark parameterisation is the same as that given in Table 2.1,
and in addition κ = 1, ηf = 0.1 and s = 10. We vary one parameter holding the others constant
in order to infer the partial influences.
15The minimum growth rate, using the same procedure as in section 2.2.1, is 0.47% and the
maximum is 3.60%
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Table 2.2: Benchmark Calibration for the Model with Moral Hazard
capital share α 0.67
subjective discount rate ρ 0.02
elasticity of substitution θ 5
proportion of zero ability ϕ1 0.4
proportion of low ability ϕ2 0.2
coefficient of technological progress A 30
scale parameter on financial investment ηx 0.01
scale parameter on screening ηf 0.1
effort aversion parameter κ 1
monitoring cost parameter s 10
obtain this growth rate using equation (2.18), and thus combinations of financial
efficiency and moral hazard that replicate the industrial revolution in the UK.
Figure 2.3 depicts this relationship, where we again simply reverse the z-axis to give
an impression of financial efficiency a` la King and Levine (1993b). As anticipated,
improving moral hazard conditions (increasing s) means that, ceteris paribus, a
given level of growth can be obtained with lower financial efficiency.
Figure 2.3 gives combinations of financial efficiency and moral hazard that result
in our estimated growth rate. MATLAB code is given in Appendix Section A.1.
We can see that either high financial efficiency and high moral hazard costs or low
financial efficiency and low moral hazard costs obtain the same growth rate, as in
Morales (2003). We can imagine a cross-section of the figure as being equivalent
to Figure 2.2.16 So changes in the conditions of moral hazard affect the level of
financial efficiency required to obtain a given growth rate.
The relation between growth and financial efficiency is monotonic but the degree
of variation is clearly dependent on the relationship between the rate of growth and
moral hazard conditions. Choosing a cross section at s = 2 suggests a high level
16We cannot think about a single cross-section as representing it perfectly since, in that model,
β is fixed whereas here it is endogenous and so changing over the period, but the general pattern
is consistent.
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Figure 2.3: Industrial Growth, Moral Hazard and Financial Efficiency
of financial efficiency throughout the period, while at s = 8 we see a (relatively)
dramatic variation in the level of financial efficiency. So while ∂ηf/∂s < 0 holds at
all points we have in addition,
∂ηf
∂s
∣∣∣
γ=γ
>
∂ηf
∂s
∣∣∣
γ=γ
where γ > γ. (2.20)
In other words, the partial effect of s on ηf is more negative (closer to zero) when
growth is low (high). So the most unusual implication of the figure is that as moral
hazard conditions deteriorate, so financial efficiency needs to vary less in order to
obtain equal changes in the growth rate. It will help our understanding of the
model if we consider the intermediary’s total spend on monitoring.
Interestingly, the total spend on monitoring, M(β∗− β0), is almost invariant to
s, as shown in Figure 2.4. The minimum effort level, β0, is invariant to s but the
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optimal effort level, β∗ is of course increasing in s while the overall monitoring cost
simultaneously declines. So increases in the efficiency with which intermediaries
can monitor agents endogenously decreases the level of moral hazard in interme-
diation without intermediaries actually spending significantly different amounts on
monitoring agents.
Figure 2.4: Industrial Growth and Spend on Monitoring
The reason why total monitoring spend falls as growth increases is because of
the implied increase in financial efficiency, decreasing the optimal intermediation
levy, t∗, and so increasing the minimum effort level, β0. This causes less emphasis
to be placed on the the effect of monitoring on growth. As such, we observe that
at high growth rates, when the minimum effort level is high and with roughly
constant and, most importantly, low spend on monitoring, the effect of changing
moral hazard conditions is less since it enters directly into the monitoring decision.
The transmission from moral hazard to growth thus follows: When moral hazard
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conditions mean that the level of effort in the absence of monitoring is low, the
total spend on monitoring is high and so, in such cases, the effect of changing
moral hazard conditions affects growth more severely.
This sort of result, where moral hazard and economic growth conditions interact,
is akin to that in Greenwood and Smith (1997) and Blackburn et al. (2005) and,
in the simple form presented here, could be tested empirically with appropriate
cliometric evidence.
The cross-section implication is more subtle than that in Section 2.2.1. The
general result holds, that countries with low levels of growth require lower differ-
ences in financial efficiency to obtain the same changes as countries with high levels
of growth. The effect of lower moral hazard is to mitigate this nonlinearity. In
a sense, we have the same result: Greater financial sophistication, either in terms
of the extent of moral hazard or in terms of financial efficiency, results in a lower
effect on growth of improving the level financial efficiency.
2.3 Finance and Endogenous Growth with
Quality Ladders
We wish to demonstrate that our findings from the simple Ak growth model might
be extended to a more involved endogenous growth setup. We introduce a finance
and endogenous growth model with quality ladders that reflects, to some degree,
the theoretical mechanisms outlined above. We wish to identify the nature of
financial conditions required to obtain balanced growth. In so doing, we wish to see
whether our proposition that static intermediation and balanced growth together
imply constant financial depth holds in a more general endogenous growth setting.
Developing this model also brings home the difficulties we would face in calibrating
such a finance and growth theory to data. We first lay-out a more general model
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without financial frictions, and then turn in Subsection 2.3.3 to our extension.
The following is a representation of the Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) en-
dogenous growth model with quality ladders, which itself is based on the models of
Grossman and Helpman (1991) and Aghion and Howitt (1992). The model is based
around three sectors: a competitive sector of final-good producers; a monopolistic
sector producing excludable intermediate goods necessary in the production of final
goods; and a research sector producing designs for intermediate good production. In
contrast to the horizontal endogenous growth models, where technological progress
manifests in an increasing number of intermediate goods a` la Romer (1990), here
we have a fixed number, N , of intermediate goods that increase in quality. Cer-
tain conditions result in the holder of the highest technology in a given good being
the pure monopoly producer of that good and this monopoly profit provides the
incentive for research and so growth in the model.
2.3.1 Behaviour of Firms
Levels of Quality in the Production Technology
Final good production of good j by firm i requires labour and the input intermediate
good j,
Yi = AL
1−α
i
N∑
j=1
(
X˜ij
)α
, (2.21)
where 0 < α < 1 and X˜ij is the quality-adjusted intermediate good,
X˜ij =
κj∑
k=0
(
qkXijk
)
, (2.22)
where quality is indexed by k and where κj is the highest quality rung in sector j.
Increases in the quality of good j are by q > 1, where q0 = 1. Intermediate good
Xij has unit marginal cost.
17 The total output of intermediate good j is thus the
17This is standard where output is a function of labour alone. If output q = f(L) and price is
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sum of output at each quality rung. A good j at stage k = 2 is a perfect substitute
for the same good j at stage k = 1, and is preferable in cost terms. Where only
the highest technology good is produced, the total quality-adjusted output of good
j is X˜ij = q
κjXijκj , and so output is Yi = AL
1−α
i (q
κjXijκj)
α.
The marginal product of an intermediate good is,
∂Yi
∂Xijκj
= αAL1−αi q
κjα(Xijκj)
α−1. (2.23)
If the leading-edge good is priced at Pjκj , the final-good competitors maximise,
profit = Yi − wLi − PjκjXijκj , (2.24)
so,
Pjκj = αA(Li)
1−αqκjα(Xijκj)
α−1. (2.25)
The intermediate-producer’s demand function is thus,
Xijκj = L
[
Aαqκjα/Pjκj
] 1
1−α . (2.26)
The monopolistic intermediary maximises profit, PjκjXijκj−Xijκj based on this
demand function,
pijκj = (Pjκj − 1)L
[
Aαqκjα/Pjκj
] 1
1−α ; (2.27)
∂pijκj
∂Pjκj
=
α
α− 1(Pjκj)
(2−α)/(α−1) − 1
α− 1(Pjκj)
1/(1−α) = 0;
Pjκj =
1
α
; ∀j. (2.28)
equal to marginal cost, P = ω/f ′, where ω is the nominal wage. If we divide both sides by P and
define w = ω/P as the real wage, we obtain that the marginal cost (in real terms) is 1 = w/f ′.
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So the monopoly price thus exceeds unity, since α < 1.
The aggregate output of the jth intermediate good is thus,
Xjκj = L
[
Aα2qακj
] 1
1−α , (2.29)
which is increasing over time with κj, unlike the models of increasing product
variety.
We can now write the production function as,
Yi = AL
1−α
i
N∑
j=1
[
qακj(Xijκj)
α
]
, (2.30)
which, with equation (2.29), becomes,
Yi = AL
1−α
i
N∑
j=1
[
qακj
(
Aα2qακj
) 1
1−α
]α
= A
1
1−αLα
2α
1−α
N∑
j=1
[
q
α2κj
1−α
]
Y = A
1
1−αLα
2α
1−αQ, (2.31)
where Q is the aggregate quality index,
Q =
N∑
j=1
q
ακj
1−α . (2.32)
Aggregate intermediate output,
∑N
j=1Xjκj , is,
X = A
1
1−αα
2
1−αLQ. (2.33)
We can see from (2.33) that since L and N are constant, the driver of growth
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in intermediate output is the changing level of the cutting-edge technology in each
sector, κj. It is also clear that both final output and intermediate production is
simply proportional to Q. Finding the growth rate of the quality index thus enables
us to find the balanced growth rate of the economy.
The Flow of Monopoly Profit
Profit for the intermediate monopolistic producer is, as above, pijκj = (Pjκj − 1)Xjκj .
So,
pijκj =
(
1− α
α
)
L[Aα2qακj ]
1
1−α . (2.34)
This profit accrues for only as long as the incumbent holds the cutting edge
technology, κj. When a new technology, κj + 1 is invented, the incumbent is
displaced, i.e. the profits accrue over the interval Tjκj = tκj+1 − tκj . The value to
a firm of innovation is, with a constant interest rate r, thus,
Vjκj =
∫ Tjκj
0
pijκje
−rtdt
= pijκj
[
−1
r
e−rt
]Tjκj
0
Vjκj =
pijκj
r
[
1− e−rTjκj
]
. (2.35)
So the value to a firm of acquiring the cutting-edge technology increases in the
sophistication of the good (κj), in the profit acquired while incumbent (pijκj), and
decreases in the interest rate (r).
Duration of Monopoly Profit
The monopoly profit, pijκj , is known so to determine the incentive to innovate, Vjκj ,
we must find Tjκj , the duration over which profits accrue.
57
Chapter 2. Quantitative Implications of Finance and Growth Theory
If Zjκj denotes the flow of resources (in units of Y ) expended by innovators
(researchers) in sector j when the current state of knowledge is κj, increasing Zjκj
increases the probability of a research breakthrough, but breakthroughs become
harder as κj grows. If pjκj is the probability per unit of time of a breakthrough,
we can specify,
pjκj = Zjκjφ(κj), φ
′ < 0. (2.36)
Equation (2.36) is a Poisson process wherein, for a given κj, the probability of
successful innovation per unit of time depends upon current R&D effort only, i.e.
we assume that individual sectors are small and that the probability of research
success across sectors in independent.
The weak Law of Large Numbers implies that microeconomic ‘jumpiness’ re-
sulting from individual sectors moving up the quality ladders will not transmit to
macroeconomic outcomes, and instead we obtain a smooth and stable growth path.
If we define G(τ) as the CDF for Tjκj , i.e. the probability that Tjκj ≤ τ , then the
change in G(τ) with respect to τ is the probability that innovation occurs at time
τ . For innovation to happen at time τ we require, first, that it has not happened
previously, with probability 1−G(τ), and, second, that it does happen in time τ ,
with probability pjκj . The probability is thus,
dG(τ)
dτ
= [1−G(τ)]pjκj . (2.37)
Assuming pjκj is constant over time, i.e. research effort, Zjκj is constant within
sectors and between innovations,
dG(τ)
dτ
+G(τ)pjκj = pjκj , (2.38)
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so,
G(τ) = e−
∫ τ
0 pjκj dt
(
A+
∫ τ
0
pjκje
∫ τ
0 pjκj dtdt
)
= e−pjκj τ
(
A+
∫ τ
0
pjκje
pjκj τdt
)
= e−pjκj τ (A+ [epjκj τ ]τ0)
G(τ) = e−pjκjA+ 1− e−pjκjτ . (2.39)
Since as τ →∞, G(τ)→ 1, it must be that A = 0, so,
G(τ) = 1− e−pjκj τ . (2.40)
The probability distribution function is, therefore,
g(τ) = G′(τ) = pjκje
−pjκj τ . (2.41)
We now have the present value of profits from innovation and the PDF for Tjκj .
We can thus substitute for Tjκj into equation (2.35),
Vjκj =
pijκj [1− e−rTjκj ]
r
, (2.42)
and take expectations, letting E[Tjκj ] = τ ,
E[Vjκj ] = E
[pijκj
r
(1− e−rτ )
]
. (2.43)
Combined with the probability of innovation at a point in time, we have that the
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expected flow of profit from being at the cutting-edge of a given sector is,
E[Vjκj ] =
pijκj
r
∫ ∞
0
(1− e−rτ )pjκje−pjκj τdt
=
pijκjpjκj
r
∫ ∞
0
e−pjκj τ − e−(r+pjκj)τdt
=
pijκjpjκj
r
[
−e
−pjκj τ
pjκj
+
e−(r+pjκj )τ
r + pjκj
]∞
0
=
pijκj
r
− pijκjpjκj
r(r + pjκj)
E[Vjκj ] =
pijκj
r + pjκj
. (2.44)
Using equation (2.34) we obtain,
E[Vjκj ] =
{(
1− α
α
)
L[Aα2qακj ]
1
1−α
}
/(r + pjκj), (2.45)
which is random, since the duration of incumbency as technological leader is itself
random.
There is additional uncertainty, however, since innovators cannot be sure that
a research project will succeed – they must select an optimal level of effort.
Determination of Research Effort
The incentive to innovate, E[Vjκj ] affects the effort level of researchers, Zjκj , and
so the probability of innovation, p. We assume that researchers care only about
E[Vjκj ], not about the randomness of its return.
18 The expected reward for pursuing
18Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004) assume that research projects are carried out by ‘syndicates’
to such a degree that even if innovators are individually risk-averse, sufficient diversification will
make the body of researchers act risk-neutrally.
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the κj+1
th innovation is pjκjE[Vj, kj+1]. The expected net return from innovation
is thus Πjκj = pjκjE[Vjκj ]− Zjκj , which, using equations (2.36) and (2.45), can be
expressed as,
Πjκj = Zjκj
φ(κj)LA 11−α (1− α
α
)
α
2
1−α
q
(κj+1)α
(1−α)
(r + pjκj)
− 1
 . (2.46)
Assuming free entry into the research sector, if Zjκj > 0 then Πjκj = 0 must
hold. So the free entry condition requires,
r + pjκj = φ(κj)LA
1
1−α
(
1− α
α
)
α
2
1−α q
(κj+1)α
(1−α) . (2.47)
We can see from equation (2.47) that the probability of innovation for a given rate of
interest depends on κj. The expected flow of income from research success, E[Vjκj ],
is increasing in κj while the resources required to maintain a given probability
of innovation is also increasing in κj, because we have defined φ
′(κj) < 0. The
dominating term will determine the total effect of κj on pjκj . If the first effect
dominates the latter, the rate of technological progress will grow with κj, and
we have some form of increasing returns in the R&D sector. If the second effect
dominates the former, the overall growth rate will fall over time as the technological
frontier advances. If the two forces offset one another, the growth path is balanced
and we have a steady-state growth path that can be compared with other models
of endogenous growth.
To obtain the balanced growth path, we thus specify,
φ(κj) =
1
ζ
q−
(κj+1)α
1−α , (2.48)
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where ζ > 0 is the ‘cost’ of research. The effects of φ and E[V ] thus offset,
r + p =
L
ζ
A
1
1−α
(
1− α
α
)
α
2
1−α , (2.49)
where p = pjκj is invariant to j. As such, if r is constant over time, so is p.
The resources allocated to research, Zjκj = p/φ(κj), are thus,
Zjκj = q
(κj+1)α
1−α
[
LA
1
1−α
(
1− α
α
)
α
2
1−α − rζ
]
, (2.50)
i.e. research input increases as sectors become more advanced, but only enough to
offset the higher effort required to maintain an invariant p.
Aggregate R&D spending is thus,
Z =
N∑
j=1
Zjκj = Qq
α
1−α
[
LA
1
1−α
(
1− α
α
)
α
2
1−α − rζ
]
. (2.51)
The Behaviour of the Aggregate Quality Index
Aggregate output, Y , aggregate resources to R&D, Z, and aggregate spending on
intermediate good, X, are all constant multiples of Q. All will thus grow at the
same rate as Q,
γQ = γX = γY = γZ . (2.52)
Recalling the equation for the aggregate quality index, Q =
∑
j=1Nq
(κjα)/(1−α),
we can see that if innovation in sector j does occur, the growth in quality will be,
q
(κj+1)α
1−α − q
κjα
1−α
q
κjα
1−α
= q
α
1−α − 1. (2.53)
Since this is invariant to sector, and given that the probability of innovation is p,
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the expected growth of the quality index per unit of time is thus,
E
[
∆Q
Q
]
= p
(
q
α
1−α − 1
)
, (2.54)
so,
γQ =
[
L
ζ
A
1
1−α
(
1− α
α
)
α
2
1−α − r
](
q
α
1−α − 1
)
. (2.55)
To derive the growth rate of the economy, therefore, we must find the equilibrium
interest rate.
The Market Value of Firms
Only leading-edge goods are produced. Substituting equation (2.49) into equation
(2.45) we obtain,
E[Vjκj ] = ζq
κjα
(1−α) . (2.56)
Aggregating over N sectors,
V = ζ
N∑
j=1
q
κjα
1−α = ζQ. (2.57)
The total market value of firms is thus a constant multiple of, and so grows at the
same rate as, Q.
2.3.2 Households and Market Equilibrium
Individual households maximise utility,
U =
∫ ∞
0
c1−θ − 1
1− θ e
−ρtdt, (2.58)
where c is per capita consumption, population growth n = 0, θ is the constant
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ρ is the subjective discount rate. The
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Euler equation defines the growth rate of consumption,
γc =
c˙
c
=
r − ρ
θ
. (2.59)
The economy-wide resource constraint is,
C = Y −X − Z. (2.60)
By substituting for Y , X and Z from equations (2.31), (2.33) and (2.51) respectively
we can see that consumption is also a constant multiple of Q,
C =
[
(1− α2)A 11−αLα 2α1−α − ζpq α1−α
]
Q. (2.61)
From the Euler equation, r = θγc + ρ = θγ + ρ. Substituting for the interest rate
into the expression for the growth rate of the quality index, equation (2.55), and
letting γ = γQ,
γ =
[
q
α
1−α
] [
(L/ζ)A
1
1−α
(
1−α
α
)
α
2α
1−α − ρ
]
1 + θ
[
q
α
1−α − 1
] . (2.62)
The interest rate is,
r =
ρ+ θ
[
q
α
1−α
] [
(L/ζ)A
1
1−α
(
1−α
α
)
α
2α
1−α
]
1 + θ
[
q
α
1−α − 1
] . (2.63)
And, from γQ = p
[
q
α
1−α − 1
]
, the equilibrium probability of successful innovation
is,
p =
[
(L/ζ)A
1
1−α
(
1−α
α
)
α
2α
1−α − ρ
]
1 + θ
[
q
α
1−α − 1
] . (2.64)
There are no transitional dynamics, and it can be shown that no other equilibria
are possible. As with a model of expanding product varieties, growth is decreasing
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in ρ and θ and increasing in the technological coefficient A and in the inverse of
the cost of research, (1/ζ). The growth rate in this model is also increasing in the
innovative step, q.
2.3.3 Static Financial Intermediation with Quality Ladders
The following is an exposition of financial intermediation in the spirit of King
and Levine. The financial intermediary here is, again, effectively a venture cap-
italist, operating in two stages. A given entrepreneur can be one of two types,
either capable or incapable of managing a research project. First, the intermediary
possesses a screening technology that allows it to select with certainty only those
entrepreneurs19 capable of managing a given research topic and second, having de-
termined quality, funds the research project which has an uncertain outcome. If the
research project succeeds, the entrepreneur patents the new design, sets up the new
market leader and so acquires monopoly profits less an amount he is contracted to
pay back to the intermediary. This is thus a departure from the King and Levine
model, wherein the intermediary retains the rights to monopoly profits.
The justification derives from the required structure of the financial intermedi-
ary sector. King and Levine cite “competition among such organizations” (p. 518).
Assuming that there is freedom of entry into the intermediation sector, however,
the presence of intermediary monopoly profits is non-sustainable. Competition for
entrepreneurs would drive intermediaries to offer the best feasible contract to the
entrepreneur, that which generate zero expected profits for the intermediary. In
a world of perfect competition however, there can be no co-ordination between
these intermediaries. There is a large literature on venture capitalism, for example
19King and Levine use the term ‘entrepreneur’ to describe the agents that intrinsically possess
the capacity to manage a team of researchers in pursuit of a research goal and who are employed
at a fixed rate and have no influence over the fixed probability of innovation. This model actually
comes closer to the real definition of an entrepreneur, since he selects his effort level, does the
research and sets up the business, acquiring the monopoly profits net of fees to the intermediary.
We refer to entrepreneurs and researchers interchangeably here.
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Gehrig and Stenbacka (2003), which shows that such competition will always gener-
ate regular cyclicality in screening activity as a consequence of a (privately) rejected
entrepreneur being able to apply a second time, to a different venture capitalist.
There are, consequently, ‘pool-worsening’ effects following the screening period and
pool improvements following the period of inactivity, a result was first noted by
Broecker (1990). A monopolistically competitive intermediary who can contract
entrepreneurs to being screened only once, or who publishes records of those re-
jected, satisfies the three main functions of evaluating projects, pooling funds, and
diversifying risk, but more importantly this assumption also obtains the constant
rate of screening denoted by King and Levine’s equation (1).
If we imagine an intermediary, active in sector j and looking for an entrepreneur
to reach technology level κj+1, it must select an entrepreneur capable of managing
the project.20 If, among the pool of potential entrepreneurs a proportion µ is
capable of managing the research project then we have a Binomial distribution in
the probability of finding a capable entrepreneur.
The moment-generating function of Binomial distributions21 shows that mean
number of successes m′ = Np where N is the number of Bernoulli trials and p is
the probability that the result of each Bernoulli trial is “true”. It follows that on
average the entrepreneur must screen 1/µ potential entrepreneurs to find a single
20This ordering, wherein intermediary approaches entrepreneur, is non-trivial. Imagine a po-
tential entrepreneur approaches an intermediary for funding to research a certain technology. The
potential entrepreneur knows with certainty that the intermediary can apply his screening tech-
nology to accurately determine his quality. Why then should an entrepreneur that knows he is
incapable apply to the intermediary for funding, and so why do we not consider that the inter-
mediary accepts everyone who applies, following the well-known result that the threat of perfect
screening will deter bad applicants (see, for example, Laffont and Martimort (2002, pp. 121-30)
for a description of costly state verification results)? The result is that he would not apply, and the
intermediaries’ screening problem would be simplified. As such, if we were to allow entrepreneurs
to approach intermediaries with proposals, we must further require that the entrepreneurs them-
selves are not aware of their own quality or of their capacity to manage a given research project.
This is not an entirely unreasonable assumption if we consider that the potential entrepreneur
does not appreciate the effort required to complete a project, or has a distorted opinion of his
own capacity to innovate.
21Papoulis (1984), p.154.
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capable one. Given that the current state of knowledge in sector j is κj, the cost of
screening a potential entrepreneur is fjκj units of labour at wage rate w, and the
expected return to the intermediary of funding the capable entrepreneur is E[ξjκj ].
In a monopolistically competitive environment, the expected profits must equal
zero, so we have,
E[ξjκj ]−
1
µ
wfjκj = 0, (2.65)
from which we obtain the entrepreneurial selection condition, equation (1) in King
and Levine,
µE[ξjκj ] = wfjκj . (2.66)
Since all intermediaries and entrepreneurs are identical, this condition is invari-
ant to both sector, j, and technological vanguard, κj. We also infer from equation
(2.66) that if the cost of screening increases over time with technological progress, so
must the expected return from research grow at the same rate (assuming a constant
wage and talent pool).
In this model, the financial intermediary does not have the right to own the
patent afterwards, it is the researcher owns the design and becomes the new intermediate-
good producer, paying only an amount, χ, to the intermediary in the case of inno-
vative success, and nothing otherwise.
The probability that a research project is successful in innovating is pjκj and the
cost of funding the research project to reach ladder point κj in sector j is xjκj > 1
22
units of labour, at wage rate w. The expected net return to the intermediary from
a rated entrepreneur is thus,
E[ξjκj ] = pjκjχ− wxjκj , (2.67)
22Imposing xjκj > 1 enforces the need for the entrepreneur to seek intermediary funding, i.e.
a single entrepreneur cannot take on the research project alone and needs the intermediary to
employ others to help him.
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which on average must be positive, but only to the extent that it matches average
screening costs. Upon substitution of equation (2.67) into equation (2.66) we obtain
the following expression for the return to the intermediary in the case of successful
innovation,
χ =
w[µxjκj + fjκj ]
µpjκj
. (2.68)
The rebate to the financial intermediary in the case of research success is thus
decreasing in the quality of the talent pool µ, increasing in both those factors
which raise the costs of finding capable researchers, i.e. in the cost of screening,
fjκj and the wage rate, w, and in those factors which raise the cost of financing
research, w and xjκj . A higher probability of research success (higher pjκj) also
reduces the optimal rebate to intermediation, because it increases the expected net
return by equation (2.67).
If Zjκj is the flow of resources (in units of Y ) expended by the researcher in sector
j when the current state of knowledge is κj, the researcher maximises expected
profits,
E[Π] = pjκj
{
E[Vjκj ]− χ
}− Zjκj , (2.69)
which leads to the determination of the probability of innovation as before. We
can use equation (2.68), with equations (2.36) and (2.45), to give the expected net
return from innovation, Πjκj = pjκjE[Vjκj ]− Zjκj ,
Πjκj = Zjκj
φ(κj)
LA 11−α (1− α
α
)
α
2
1−α
q
(κj+1)α
(1−α)
(r + pjκj)
− w[µx+ f ]
µpjκj
− 1
 .
(2.70)
Again assuming free entry into the research sector, if Zjκj > 0 then Πjκj = 0 must
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hold. So the free entry condition requires,
µp2jκj +
{
µr − φ(κj)µ
[
LA
1
1−α
(
1− α
α
)
α
2
1−α q
(κj+1)α
(1−α)
]
+
+wφ(κj)[µx+ f ]
}
pjκj + φ(κj)w[µx+ f ]r = 0. (2.71)
The equilibrium probability of innovation is thus the positive root of equation
(2.71).
As previously, for a balanced growth path we need to consider the conflicting
pressures of the increasing profit incentive and the increasing difficulty of innovation
as κj grows. Here we also have the need to pay back an amount to the intermediary
which, if fixed, will fall as a proportion of monopoly profit accruing. As such, we
need to offset all three effects in order that a balanced growth path is retained,
φ(κj) =
1
ζφ
q−
(κj+1)α
1−α ; (2.72)
fκj = ζfq
(κj+1)α
1−α ; (2.73)
xκj = ζxq
(κj+1)α
1−α , (2.74)
where ζφ, ζx and ζf are the nonnegative costs of research effort, research funding and
intermediary screening respectively. Although a departure from King and Levine,
this modification is intuitively very reasonable. Equations (2.73) and (2.74) imply
that as the technological frontier advances, so it becomes harder to select researchers
capable of handling the project to design the next patent (f increases), and so the
length of the research project itself, or the resources required for its completion,
becomes longer (x increases). Taken together, Equations (2.73) and (2.74) imply
that financial costs comprise a constant proportion of total output in balanced
growth. With a constant probability of innovation, these conditions imply that
financial depth, by a number of measures, will be constant also.
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Equation (2.71) is now,
µp2 +
{
µr − µ
[
(L/ζφ)A
1
1−α
(
1− α
α
)
α
2
1−α
]
+
+(w/ζφ)[µζx + ζf ]
}
p+ (wr/ζφ)[µζx + ζf ] = 0. (2.75)
So we have a probability of innovation that is invariant to time and sectors,
p = pjκj,∀j, κj, which is the requirement for a stable growth path. As such, equa-
tions (2.73) and (2.74) require that as technology progresses, so the rebate to fi-
nancial intermediation, χ = f(xjκj , fjκj), increases. This increasing rebate thus
accounts for a constant proportion of research income in the case of success, and
allows the intermediary to maintain zero profit in the face of increasing intermedia-
tion costs, resulting at a macroeconomic level in a balanced growth path. Without
this additional effect, as patents continue to be invented, and as profits from the
monopoly on their design grow, a constant rebate to intermediation would make
research exhibit increasing returns to scale, and an increasing growth rate over
time. Moreover, this resolves the proposition that motivated this model: For bal-
anced growth, the size of the financial sector must be a constant proportion of total
output.
The solution to equation (2.71) is,
p =
1
2µ
{µ[r − (L/ζφ)Υ] + (w/ζφ)[µζx + ζf ]}
±
√
1
2µ
{µ[(L/ζφ)Υ− r]− (w/ζφ)[µζx + ζf ]}2 − 2(wr/ζφ)[µζx + ζf ], (2.76)
where Υ = A
1
1−α
(
1−α
α
)
α
2
1−α which is invariant to ζφ, ζf and ζx. Equation (2.3.3)
thus makes clear that the probability of innovation is constant. This is a result of
the constant proportionality of financial depth resulting from equations (2.73) and
(2.74).
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2.4 Concluding Remarks
Can we reasonably expect to be able to explain large deviations in growth rates
in terms of the movements in financial efficiency as described above? And can
reasonable calibrations capture the cross-sectional variations suggested implied by
the empirical literature? This is exactly what the prevailing theoretical finance and
growth literature would suggest. While changes in the coefficient of technological
progress over the period of industrial revolution will soak up much of the implied
fall in efficiency after the peak in growth, implications for financial efficiency and
asymmetric information of the representative model developed above would likely
follow a broadly similar pattern.
One key factor missing from present theory is the relation to financial depth,
and, in turn, the interaction between depth and efficiency at the microeconomic
level. It is likely that further developing models which can account for changing
conditions of both financial depth and financial efficiency will be more open to
comparison with the data. The work of Townsend and Ueda (2006) suggests that
this will, indeed, be the case. In addition, the development of testable quantitative
implications of theories such as Blackburn et al. (2005) will shed greater light on
the importance of the finance-growth nexus in a changing environment.
This Chapter has provided an initial foray into matching the theoretical mech-
anisms of finance and growth with their numerical counterparts. It has shown that
numerical implications can be drawn from major theories of finance and growth,
and that these can be considered in the context of an historical growth path. We
have seen that these numerical implications are not only unrelated to the empirical
research, but also that the two may in fact be contradictory. We developed a sec-
ond model of endogenous growth in which financial efficiency enters into a quality-
ladders set-up, and showed that our simple model is, for our purposes, acceptably
parsimonious. This second model also underlines this disconnection between the
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theory and empirics of finance and growth.
But what do we really learn about finance and growth from even this extended
model? In the context of what we found in Chapter 1, it is abundantly clear that
both the theoretical mechanisms considered and the current data available are in-
sufficient. In Chapter 3 we will focus on developing theory that exhibits more of
a connection with the empirical concept of finance and growth. To do that, we
first take a more detailed looked at historical evidence. Coupled with that, the
construction of a dataset, of the level of detail approaching that in Townsend and
Ueda (2006), will greatly contribute to our understanding of finance and growth.
The work of Shea (2007), we will suggest, can play this part in future research. Mir-
roring the success of the quantitative macroeconomic literature in the economics of
growth will likely improve our ability to account for the persisting global inequalities
in levels of income.
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Chapter 3
Endogenous Financial
Development and Industrial
Takeoff∗
3.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter 1, a plethora of supportive empirical studies and a more
sparse but equally supportive theoretical literature has engendered confidence in
the belief that there is a causal relationship between financial development and the
long run level of economic growth. Indeed, the World Bank, for one, now finds
this relationship to be a near-given. For example, Beck and de la Torre (2006,
p.1), in an introduction to the World Bank’s current research priority, access to
finance, remark that the “causal link running from financial depth to growth has
been rather convincingly established.” Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt (2006) is more circumspect,
but nonetheless looks to lay-out the policies that hasten financial development in
the pursuit of higher economic growth. The tacit message is that the finance-growth
∗Part of this chapter has been released as Trew (2007).
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nexus is close to being resolved.
We demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 2, however, that there are good reasons
for not proclaiming an end to the debate. First, we have argued that empirical
cross-section results are strongly biased toward accepting the finance-causes-growth
hypothesis. Second, much of theory and econometrics considers the question in
only its comparative sense; an understanding of transitional issues is commonly
omitted. This must have implications for policy in regard to the implementation of
any finance-led growth strategy within a country. Third, the connection between
theoretical mechanisms and empirical results in finance and growth has, largely,
been neglected. Specifically, the former typically looks at financial efficiency; the
latter at financial depth. How are efficiency and depth related, and what might a
theory calibrated to data tell us about the quantitative effect of finance on growth?
Fourth, we do not have an understanding of the quantitative significance of any
finance-growth mechanisms. We can build models like those in Chapter 2 but
without an attempt to connect them with an empirical reality we are left without
an understanding of the magnitude of any finance-growth link. Fifth, we have found
indications that aggregation issues play a highly significant role in the relationship
between transitional growth paths and financial matters. Where does the literature
on endogenous financial coalitions and growth impact on contemporary finance and
growth theory? Sixth, we have seen that a dynamic financial intermediation story
can be relevant. Omitting dynamic elements means that the finance-causes-growth
hypothesis is poorly-conceived as a policy tool when applied across heterogenous
economies.
At the heart of this critique is an uncertainty regarding the mapping between
cross-sectional results and the ability to explain time-series growth patterns. Fur-
ther, there is no clear theoretical understanding of the mechanisms by which this
mapping can be accounted for. How then can we view the relationship between
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financial depth, financial efficiency and industrial takeoff within a country? The
remainder of this thesis will strive to address these questions.
As detailed above, in Subsection 1.1.3, recent cliometric research has begun
to consider the long-run time-series relationships between measures of aggregate
financial depth and long-run growth. Additional research on firm-level data has
also been conducted. The findings from these studies suggest to us that the positive
relationship between finance and growth is not entirely driven by selection bias in
cross-sectional estimations. There is a positive correlation between financial depth
and economic growth. But still, aggregative cliometrics and richer cross-sectional
econometrics do not help us to address the more fundamental, theoretical, issues
regarding aggregation and the evolution of financial conditions. Understanding the
dynamic interplay between finance and growth in an economy as it goes through a
period of transition from low to high growth will shed a great deal of light on the
remaining questions.
We intend to do two things in this Chapter: First, given the remaining questions
raised by our critique of empirical results and the paucity of any proper longitu-
dinal understanding, we delve into an examination of the finance-growth relation
based on historical evidence. This entails an analysis of historical accounts of the
finance-growth nexus. We develop a number of key distinctions to be made in
our understanding of finance and growth and introduce a new dataset of financial
coalitions through the industrial revolution in the UK. Restricting our attention to
this evidence means that our findings have a particular implication for countries
going through industrialisation. The role of financial markets in industrially de-
veloped economies going through transition from non-capitalism to capitalism has
been considered elsewhere, e.g., Colombo and Driffill (2003). Second, taking this
historical analysis as a guide, we develop a new theory of finance and growth that
can account for some of the dynamic, disaggregated elements found in our historical
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analysis.
The Chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 presents our historical analysis.
Section 3.3 then constructs an endogenous growth model to account for the stylised
facts on finance and growth from the historical analysis. We then calibrate the
model to data for industrial growth paths and interpret these numerical results.
Section 3.4 concludes the Chapter with a summary of our main findings.
3.2 An Historical Context for Finance
and Growth
Economic historians have long considered the industrial revolution from a macroe-
conomic perspective. The prime example is Landes (1969). More recently, Mokyr
(1990) has stressed many of the same issues. Such studies place the technologi-
cal progress at the heart of the growth mechanic, in concurrence with endogenous
growth theory (though the latter also places emphasis on the accumulation and
technology of human capital). The importance of financial matters in determining
the rate of economic growth has, not least in the economic history literature, taken
a back seat. The proposition that financial constraints do not matter has commonly
been regarded as a truism: In this view, political and economic incentives are such
that impediments to the finance of entrepreneurship are at worst transitory. As we
shall see below, however, there is a great deal of evidence that this proposition is
very far from a truism and that, in fact, financial constraints can have a significant,
if indirect, effect on industrial development. Reconciling these views requires us to
take a more detailed look at the financial history, and this in turn requires more
disaggregated and richer data.
The analysis of the historical evidence below will, no doubt, paint too many
broad brush strokes for the liking of an economic historian. In looking to the
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historical record for answers on any topic of debate a multitude of conflicting pieces
of evidence will always be found. Furthermore, we must, to some extent, generalise
away from historical detail in favour of telling a more cogent macroeconomic story.
This is necessary if we are to begin to place the theories of Chapter 1 into a more
realistic setting. It is hoped that in making these compromises between generality
and specifics we do not move too far away from reflecting what actually happened.
Subsection 3.2.1 considers some commonly-cited historical perspectives. Sub-
section 3.2.2 goes through some historical evidence on the role of finance in en-
trepreneurship and industry. In doing this, we develop the central distinction to
be made between types of finance and the effect of constraints on industrial de-
velopment. Subsection 3.2.3 develops this distinction by drawing on the histori-
cal record of industrial revolution in Europe. Subsection 3.2.4 introduces part of
the new Handbook of 18th and early 19th century British corporate finance. This
Handbook sheds further light on our historical analysis and enables us to draw some
firmer conclusions. Subsection 3.2.5 begins to draw-out some of the lessons from
our historical analysis. Subsection 3.2.6 then looks at these findings in the light of
alternative policy environments, specifically the European experience.
3.2.1 Historical Perspectives
The motivation of finance and growth as a subject for debate is often lent weight
via the views of various prominent figures in political economy. Naturally, these
views have played a part in shaping the way in which modern economists think
about the nexus.
Chief among the oft-cited critics of the view that finance leads growth is Robin-
son (1952, p.86), who famously wrote, “...where enterprise leads, finance follows.”
The impression given by this phrase belies a deeper, more qualified statement on
the importance of financial constraints. Robinson (p. 87) distinguishes between fi-
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nance as a determinant of enterprise-led growth and as a determinant of finance-led
growth; she advocates the view that finance can constrain but only enterprise can
cause growth:
. . . the supply of finance cannot be regarded as a rigid bottleneck limiting
the rate of investment, but must be treated rather as an element in the
general atmosphere encouraging or retarding accumulation.
Lucas (1988) is also frequently cited as a contemporary critic of the view that
financial constraints play any role. But his concern that the part played by financial
matters in determining economic growth might be “over-stressed” does not preclude
the importance of financial ‘institutions’ per se. There is a distinction between
money-neutrality and financial services that might reduce transactions costs. He
writes (ibid., p.6),
. . . insofar as the development of financial institutions is a limiting factor
in development more generally conceived I will be falsifying the picture,
and I have no clear idea as to how badly.
The inadequacy of innovation in creating wealth, and the additional need for
efficient financial systems, was observed by Bagehot (1873). His Lombard Street was
among the first to suggest that a scarcity of finance, “no spare money for new and
great undertakings” (ibid. para. I.6), can be an element in keeping poor countries
poor. Further, it is argued that an ineffectual institutional environment can mean
that in rich countries “the money is too scattered, and clings too close to the hands
of the owners, to be often obtainable in large quantities for new purposes.” He lauds
the London money market of Lombard Street as an “efficient and instantly-ready
organisation,” (ibid. para. I.12). The perceived importance of efficient financial
markets is in allowing those that require it to obtain capital from disparate sources
at reasonable rates.
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There are, for Schumpeter (1934), two agents of economic growth: The first,
and better known, depicts innovation as a search for monopoly, or entrepreneurial,
profit; the second stresses the importance of finance in determining the rate of eco-
nomic growth, not in simply emerging as an albeit necessary sideshow to technologi-
cally-driven growth. The first channel has been adapted into growth theory gener-
ally, such as in Aghion and Howitt (1998). The second channel has latterly come
to support proponents of the finance-causes-growth school. Schumpeter (1934, p.
74) wrote,
He [the banker] stands between those who wish to form new combi-
nations and the possessors of productive means. He is essentially a
phenomenon of development. . . He makes possible the carrying out of
new combinations, authorises people, in the name of society as it were,
to form them. He is the ephor of the exchange economy.
The role of financial intermediaries, according to Schumpeter, is in allowing
entrepreneurs to be entrepreneurs by mobilising scarce savings, evaluating research
projects, managing risk, evaluating future cashflow and facilitating transactions.
This is the familiar list of properties attributed by finance and growth researchers,
such as Levine (2005). For Schumpeter (op. cit., p. 77), an intermediary exists
to mitigate the entanglement of the “entrepreneur’s essential function. . . with other
kinds of activity, which as a rule must be much more conspicuous than the essential
one.”
The idea that finance impacts on growth via inhibiting entrepreneurship, and
so technological progress, has taken hold. Of course, finance is central for a healthy
entrepreneurship and so constraints on finance can have an impact. But what would
cause the banker to not stand as a conduit between savers and investors? In other
words, why does finance not follow enterprise? Schumpeter does not help us on
this: For him, the banker is a phenomenon of development. Robinson and Lucas,
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among others, are only suspicious of arguments based on the exogenous existence,
exogenous persistence, and exogenous impact on entrepreneurship of imperfections
in financial markets. How can we reconcile these views? We must consider why
such constraints arise in the context of economic development, how they persist
and in which economic arenas they act to dampen entrepreneurial spirit.
3.2.2 Historical Evidence
Among the major financial innovations of the industrial revolution in Britain was
the creation of the limited liability joint-stock company in the middle of the nine-
teenth century. Before the Joint Stock Companies Act of 1844, those wishing to
establish a joint stock company had to obtain consent from the crown or through
Parliament. The Limited Liability Act of 1855 then allowed companies to be in-
corporated under the protection of limited liability for its investors. Robinson
(1952) puts the invention of the joint-stock company on a par with that of the
steam-engine. Its formal emergence in England was, according to Hunt (1935a),
the outcome of economic necessity in the face of substantial legislative and judicial
opposition. This resistance was born partly out of lingering memories of the 1720
South Sea Bubble. As The Times of 1833 had it: “if, as a sleeping partner, [an in-
vestor] chooses to be robbed, the public ought not to be robbed because he chooses
to sleep.”23
The belated emergence of joint-stock finance was mirrored by the relatively late
growth of formal stock markets. But this apparent delay in the development of fi-
nancial services did not prevent the emergence over the course of the eighteenth and
early nineteenth century alternative, and efficient, methods of industrial finance.
As Pollins (1954, p.230) succinctly puts it,
One of the commonplaces of English economic history is the fact that
23Quoted in Hunt (1935b), p. 342.
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manufacturing industry has seldom made use of the [London] capital
market machinery for the raising of its capital. In the early period of
industrialization small manufacturers were able to make use of their
own resources, or loans from friends or from banks; later they ploughed
back their profits.
This view is one widely supported in the historical literature. Take Hudson (2002,
p.267): “It has long been accepted that internal self-finance was the dominant form
of industrial finance during the industrial revolution in England.”
Critical of this perspective, Harris (2000, p.289) argues that while Britain was
enjoying the world’s first industrial revolution, the “formal legal framework of busi-
ness organization remained in its preindustrial state.” He argues that this relative
backwardness retarded entrepreneurial growth. He notes also, however, how the
business corporation evolved from its origination in the sixteenth century to legal
acceptance in the first half of the nineteenth. Further, this development “paralleled
the rise of capitalism, in its mercantilist and industrializing phases.” (p. 290, my
emphasis). He also points (p.127) to the number of alternative sources of finance in
eighteenth century England: Short-term credit and long-term personal borrowing
from “banks, merchants and kin” was commonplace. The movement towards the
use of stock issue as a method of finance occurred only gradually towards the end
of the century.
For Landes (1994, p. 641), “Once they [Europeans] caught the whiff of wealth
in their sails, no change in government policy, no want of official support, was going
to stop them.” Cottrell (1980) writes that it is more generally accepted, that “sav-
ings within the economy were not inadequate to support industrialization.” (p.5).
He also argues that profit-ploughback was the principal method of financing early
growth in manufacturing. Some cotton firms even began to borrow money from
their employees before looking to banks for finance. A reliance on bank finance for
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long-term investments only occurred later, when profit margins fell. In other words,
firms chose the method of finance to suit their current situation. Further, he argues
that the Bubble Act and Usury laws did not constitute an institutional barrier
to industrialisation. The later emergence of banking and stock markets reflected
not the release of some legislative or institutional constraint but an acceleration of
demand for them.
The order of financing method also fits in with the ‘pecking-order theory’ follow-
ing Myers (1984). The pecking-order of finance runs as follows: Internal financing is
always preferable, followed, if external finance is unavoidable, by debt then equity.
So, agents were not constrained to use profit ploughback or limited local credit in
the early stages of the industrial revolution: This was their preference.
These sources depict an historical record in which financial constraints did not
have a direct negative effect on the pace of industrialisation. The oft-cited example
of such constraints, the creation of the joint-stock company as an accessible legal
entity, was not central to the finance of the early part of the industrial revolution.
Further, the resistance to its entrance into legislation did not substantially inhibit
the pace of industrial growth. From this standpoint, the pattern of industrial
finance through Britain’s history is the outcome of relatively unconstrained optimal
financing behaviour by firms in response to their desire for expansion under varying
economic conditions.
This we take as the story of the finance of industry, in general. Proponents
of the enterprise-leads-finance school rightly say that inefficiencies in the finance
of industry, per se, have not constrained the economic development of the UK.
The same was true for continental Europe: Milward and Saul (1973) and Mathias
and Postan (1978) tell broadly similar stories in regard to the finance of European
industry. Earlier case studies of banking through industrialisation, such as Cameron
(1967, 1972) also support these conclusions.
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If we consider that most investments in early industry could be small and/or
non-lumpy, then this consistent historical story is perhaps not so surprising: An
individual entrepreneur, especially a good one, could find the little start-up capital
required or use reinvested profits to expand as and when conditions allowed. Even
what we might think of to be a large fixed cost in manufacturing, the factory
premises constructed to house workers and machines, were often rented in arrears
from more wealthy individuals, with multiple tenancy, subletting and power-sharing
prevalent (see Hudson, 2002). This stands at odds with the entrepreneur-centred
channel offered by standard explanations of the finance-growth link.
In order to see where constraints on finance can have a real effect, we need to
make a distinction between the types of activity requiring finance, based on the pro-
portion of the investment which is fixed. Problems in raising finance for investment
largely occur where there is a large fixed cost element. Large-scale infrastructure
projects are thus prime examples of the class of investments in which financial con-
ditions can have a large effect on economic growth. Among contemporary analyses,
Hulten (1996) and Caldero´n and Serve´n (2004) indicate what we would expect: An
effective supply (i.e., one that works efficiently) of infrastructure can have a large
effect on the economic development of an industry that surrounds it. So while
finance does not directly constrain industry, it might inhibit the expansion of mar-
kets along both supply and demand lines via its impact on the growth of fixed-cost
investments such as infrastructure.
In short, it is with regard to investments where fixed costs are high that the
financial system has to work harder. Without either wealthy backers or efficient
financial markets from which to obtain funds, an individual entrepreneur must
either obtain finance from a wide range of sources or forsake the opportunity. Often
even a serious backer could not provide all the start-up capital required, and joint-
stock operations became necessary. Take, for example, Milward and Saul (1973,
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pp. 347–8) on the power of French joint-stock companies in comparison with the
wealth of even the deepest of individual pockets,
No matter how large the private fortune of even a family like the Roth-
schilds it could not hope to bear comparison with a capital fund which
was to be built up by selling shares to the public in relatively small
denominations and thereby mobilising the collected savings of France.
For investments with a large fixed cost component, all those aspects of the policy,
legislative and institutional environment which, we hypothesise, might have an
impact on growth via finance come into sharper relief. We need to explore these
issues in greater depth.
3.2.3 Finance, Industrial Growth and Infrastructure
We have argued that financial constraints did not directly inhibit the pace of indus-
trial growth. We suspect, however, that limitations on the availability of finance
can have an effect on growth via their impact on projects where fixed costs are a
large proportion of the investment.
For Bagehot (1873, para. I.6.), the absence of adequate financial institutions is
directly related to difficulties in infrastructure development,
A citizen of London in Queen Elizabeth’s time could not have imagined
our state of mind. He would have thought that it was of no use inventing
railways (if he could have understood what a railway meant), for you
would not have been able to collect the capital with which to make
them.
How would we characterise an ‘efficient’ market for the finance of infrastructure?
It must be one in which information flows freely between large numbers of savers and
investors. Financial constraints deriving from imperfections in financial markets
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are, in part, a product of both information asymmetry and the politico-institutional
environment. In theory, it has been shown that deviations from the complete
financial markets of Arrow-Debreu can arise as a result of information problems.
For Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), costs to the acquisition of information mean
that information-efficient markets are impossible. In anticipation of Chapter 4,
we might add to the costs of obtaining information the (related) costs of forming
comprehensively complete contracts.
The purpose of this section is to investigate the realities of those information
problems, which costs exist to cause them, and the ways in which they impacted
upon optimal financial systems. We also look at the part played by the institutional
and legislative environment in this context. We are able to see the effect that
fixed costs have on the nature of the financial systems that emerge to cope. We
characterise in detail, using both secondary and primary sources, the nature of the
financial coalitions that emerged to supply infrastructure finance and how these
typically evolved over time. In Section 3.3 we develop a model that can capture
a number of the macroeconomic implications for finance and growth, leaving to
Chapter 4 a deeper theoretical investigation into some of the microeconomic roots
of our findings.
We focus on the finance of physical transport infrastructure for four reasons:
They are a classic example of investment projects in which fixed costs are a large
element; the development of an effective infrastructure is strongly correlated with
industrial development; infrastructures are constructed using both public finance
and private enterprise under public regulations; and, perhaps most importantly,
there is a great deal of historical and cliometric evidence covering the finance of
infrastructure through the period of industrial revolution. We must appreciate
that there are limitations to this focus, however. As described below, much of the
historical observations are based on the nature of financial coalitions that emerged
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to provide the initial finance of transport infrastructures. In the absence of data on
the way that individual coalitions morph over the course of industrial revolution,
we look primarily at the changing initial structures of different coalitions. A further
drawback from concentrating on physical transport infrastructure is the potential
bias towards finance from those that actually use the infrastructure. As users,
firms with high freight costs will naturally benefit from financing infrastructure in
their area. As investors, the firms also benefit from any return on the shares they
purchase. We proceed with these reservations in mind, and draw special attention
when we can to findings that partially address these qualms.
We can broadly date the phases of each of the main forms of transport infras-
tructure in the UK: In the 1750s and 1760s, there was a boom in the number of
turnpike trusts; from the 1760s to the 1850s canals dominated, with a boom in
1792–3; and from the 1830s the ‘Railway Age’ commenced. The first railway ‘ma-
nia’, of 1843–47, saw capital expenditures on railways increase tenfold in the space
of five years (see Kenwood, 1965).
For reference, we replicate in Figure 3.1 these phases of infrastructure develop-
ment against time paths for the per capita volume of industrial production, using
the data in Bairoch (1982). The data (reproduced in Appendix Table B.3) are
normalised relative to 100 in the UK for the year 1900. We can see that the UK
had an early lead in industrial takeoff which was sustained for over a century and
a half.
The recent dispute between Landes (1994, 1995) and Crafts (1995a,b) demon-
strates that there are no simple answers to the question ‘Why Was England First?’
Additionally, we have argued above that underlying shifts in technological progress,
those which are subject to entrepreneurship, have not been significantly dampened
by financial constraints. We are not suggesting a new ‘single-cause’ explanation.
What we wish to understand, however, is whether financial constraints might have
86
Chapter 3. Endogenous Financial Development and Industrial Takeoff
Figure 3.1: Per Capita Industrial Production and UK Infrastructure, 1750–1980
played a part in limiting the growth rate through their effect on the development
of infrastructure.
The early history of the development of physical infrastructure in Britain was
one of private enterprise and local finance. Government practiced its regulatory role
with a light-touch, enforcing only some standards on construction and maintenance.
Except for major disputes over land use, Parliament did not meddle with the layout
of infrastructure.
Along with the standardisation in the construction of infrastructure, the indus-
trial revolution saw a gradual standardisation of the way in which infrastructure
finance was regulated through Parliament. The Bubble Act of 1720 necessitated
that joint-stock companies be authorised by royal charter. Thus, the construction
of any piece of infrastructure required a Bill to be passed in Parliament. Further,
from 1794, after the canal mania, requirements for an infrastructure Bill included
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the need to deposit three things: A map of landholdings in the vicinity of the
project; reference books (linked to the map of landholdings) of landowners and
occupiers as well as their support or opposition to the plan; and, a subscription list
of proposed financial supporters. These deposits enabled Parliament to judge not
only the likely success of the proposed project, but also to consider conflicting local
interests before securing private property rights to a corporation.
Most of the evidence cited on the finance of infrastructure is based on analysis
of these records. As such, it is an excellent source and we can read a great deal
into them with confidence. Using these sources also means, however, that they
often cover only the initial period of any piece of infrastructure and not its perfor-
mance over time after its construction. We pay attention to dynamic analyses of
infrastructure finance wherever possible.
The Emergence of Turnpikes in the UK
A surprising amount of evidence can be drawn upon to characterise the emergence
of turnpike trusts in the early and middle parts of the eighteenth century. Prior
to the enactment of legislation allowing the establishment of turnpike trusts, road
maintenance was carried out by local parishes, funded by levying local taxes. From
the beginning eighteenth century, however, Parliament could approve the establish-
ment of individual turnpike trusts. The trusts could raise finance through issuing
debt and levying tolls on road users. Bogart (2005) suggests that this institutional
innovation brought forth a wider road transport revolution. It is beyond question
that the construction of canals and railways aided industry by reducing the cost of
transporting goods. Bogart shows that, in addition to waterways and railways, the
levying of tolls by turnpikes did not increase freight charges, and may have even
reduced them.
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Buchanan (1986, p.227) notes that most turnpike companies “were run by men
representative of the economic life of the area.” His analysis sheds light on the ex-
istence of a significant regional capital market and demonstrates, using the Ward
(1974) classification scheme, that investors were large in number and from a wide
range of social strata. Further to this, Bogart (2006a) finds regional and network
effects in the diffusion of turnpikes. Turnpike trusts were typically spatially con-
centrated in the vicinity of major economic centres.
Financing the UK Canal Network
Ward (1974) develops a highly detailed analysis of the finance of canal companies
in England through the eighteenth century. A group of industrial and merchant
leaders would see the ‘economic’ motive, in terms of the direct benefit to their
business, of installing a canal in their vicinity. These promoters would then either
call upon a financier, or become financiers themselves, to sell scrip and shares in
a joint-stock canal company under a ‘financial’ motive of potential future returns
on holding the issue. Ward shows that canals were generally financed by those
local to the route of the canal. The financiers would tour local public houses, hold
town meetings, coax relatives and friends, to convince local individuals to invest
in the scheme. Those who invested were by no means uniformly wealthy. Ward
classifies investors by occupation and social status, showing that the majority of
investments came from local landowners, merchants, tradesmen, manufacturers and
professionals – people whose wealth was not only relatively limited but also mostly
tied up in their primary employment.
The spatial concentration was, particularly during and after investment booms,
sometimes a restriction ordered by financiers wishing to avoid speculative invest-
ment. More often, however, the parochial nature of finance was a result of informa-
tional asymmetries: A local familiarity with market conditions, with local industry
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and an affinity with the canal promoters made it more easy to raise finance locally
than on the London market. Ward puts the spatial concentration down to inequal-
ities in the social and geographic distribution of capital. He notes (ibid., p.171–2)
an unwillingness of London creditors to invest in regional infrastructure projects
because “appropriate capital markets did not exist and the scale of investment was
insufficient to support them.”We prefer to interpret this observation in the following
way: The costs of forming spatially concentrated coalitions of small investors was,
under the institutional environs, less than the costs of inducing interest from those
with more investment experience and deeper pockets. We come on to the possible
reasons for this below. This pattern is seen across the country and throughout the
century. Ward notes, however, that through the eighteenth and into the nineteenth
century, centralised stock markets became more willing to support infrastructure
projects; in the process, the problems of finance were gradually relaxed.
Turnbull (1987) finds not only a similar pattern of regional finance of canals
but also a localised pattern in the construction of canals. The importance of an
integrated, national system of waterways gave way to local and regional demands
for routes unconnected to trunk lines. Canals were built as local enterprises first,
and formed part of a national network only later. This was the outcome of mar-
ket forces, and reflects the idea that the industrial revolution itself was regional.
For Cottrell (1980, p.19), the “industrial revolution... was essentially a process
of regional growth.” Recent work, such as O’Brien (2006), continues a growing
revisionist literature on the industrial revolution as a provincial phenomenon.
The Finance of Railways in the UK
There is a great deal of evidence that railways were financed using methods similar
to those employed in turnpikes and canals, namely spatially concentrated coalitions
of local, relatively modest investors. Hunt (1935b) suggests that the English railway
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network was established without the use of the London stock exchange. Pollins
(1954, pp.230–1) describes the establishment of a typical railway during the first
half of the nineteenth century:
Some public-spirited men. . . would recognize the need for improved com-
munication in their locality. They would subscribe among themselves to
finance a survey, or would call public meetings in the locality to arouse
support and obtain subscriptions. Later a definite route would be de-
cided upon, public meetings held to sell scrip, and the committee of the
company would appoint local agents to obtain subscriptions and take
deposits. Those who took scrip would be asked to sign the subscrip-
tion contract (or parliamentary undertaking) required by parliamentary
Standing Orders, and an application would be made to parliament for
an Act of incorporation.
Pollins suggests this process is repeated across the country in the finance of canals,
tunnels, docks and railways. Again, it is observed that companies often reserved
shareholdings for local landowners and occupants of towns along the route of the
railway. He suggests there was also some element of learning to the emergence
of financial coalitions: Before a new form of transport has been tried and tested,
potential investors took more convincing that buying shares was worthwhile. Even
once technologically proven, during boom-periods a proximity to the route of a
proposed railway aided potential investors in deciding over which railway companies
to support. Only after a few years of local finance did companies float on the stock
exchange.
Broadbridge (1955) also finds similar results on the spatially concentrated nature
of early railway capital. That paper also points to the later emergence of regional
centres of finance, particularly in the North of England. A good deal of even Scottish
railway stock was held in Lancashire. He tracks a gradual movement in the second
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half of the nineteenth century away from local subscription toward London. This
did not happen just because the stock market was there, but because conditions
and capital requirements changed: His evidence supports the “conventional view
that railways were drawing their capital from ever-widening sources in the early
1840’s, as compared with previous decades.” (ibid., p.206).
To firm-up our understanding of the financial coalitions formed to finance infras-
tructure projects during the industrial revolution we can draw upon a new dataset
of corporate finance built by Gary Shea. We summarise some of the current find-
ings from Shea (2007) in the next section, and give a concrete example of how these
sorts of findings can be drawn.
3.2.4 The Shea Handbook
We intend to give an indication of the sorts of data that can be drawn upon to
make inferences about the finance of infrastructure. To do so, we present two case
studies from Shea (2007). The full Handbook, once completed, will cover a number
of case studies, for around 20 railways, 80 canals, 20 energy companies, and 40
others over the period 1760-1834.
We include here two examples of how such records, along with other materials,
can be used to illustrate the successful projection of a local infrastructure project.
There is nothing special about the Wigan Branch Railway, constructed in 1830. It
was minor railway company, initially issuing 700 shares, which could be paid up
to £100 each, but it was typical of about another 6 or 7 small railways built in
Lancashire from the late 1820’s and it was typical of how many other early British
railways, canals and gas and water supply were built. In addition, we present
some data one the larger St. Helens and Runcorn Gap Railway, which was first
promoted in 1825 and constructed in the early 1830s. That railway company issued
1200 shares of up to £100 each.
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Figure 3.2: Wigan Branch Railway: Geography
Figure 3.2 maps the route of the Wigan Branch, as well as noting those landown-
ers along the route who also invested in the railway company. These landowners
comprised almost 10% of total capital investment. Figure 3.3 gives a breakdown of
investors under the Ward (1974) classification scheme. Figure 3.4 does the same
for the St. Helens Railway.
A great deal of detail about the railways will, upon its completion, be contained
in Shea (2007). For example, how were the railways promoted; what support or
dissent was offered in Parliament and by private individuals; how was the final
routes of these railways arrived at; and, what was their position within a wider
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Figure 3.3: Wigan Branch Railway: Investors
Figure 3.4: St. Helens and Runcorn Gap Railway: Investors
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context of the construction of major trunk lines? This richness in the dataset will
enable us to eventually develop a fundamental understanding of the evolution of
railways through the eighteenth century. This will aid in the development of a
dynamic theory of the microfoundations of finance and growth.
For the purposes of this thesis, however, we take only a few more salient points,
as illustrative support for the historical arguments based on secondary evidence
above. We can see clearly from these Figures, and from the dataset in Shea (2007),
how investment was heavily financed by share issue, not debt acquisition. They
suggests that shares were not purchased by a small number of very wealthy indi-
viduals, but by a large number of relatively modest local capitalists, manufacturers,
tradesmen and professionals. It also clearly demonstrates how these investors were
spatially concentrated around the location of the railway, and suggests a pattern
for landowners along the path of a railway to also invest in it.
3.2.5 Regional Growth, Spatial Concentrations and
Dynamic Aspects
We can summarise a few stylised facts from the above analysis in relatively short
order. The finance of early infrastructures in Britain generally took the form of
spatially concentrated coalitions of large numbers of relatively modest individuals.
In the early stages, infrastructure development was also nationally disjointed. A
national network emerged later, as the industrial revolution took hold. At the same
time, centralised financial markets became the primary method of raising finance,
and infrastructure projects could raise finance from the stock exchange or large
banks.
How should we interpret both the nature of coalitions and their change over
time? The scale and form of financial intermediation was the key decision in any
entrepreneurs’ attempt to finance an infrastructure project. We need to consider
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how the costs of intermediation are related to its scale; the role played by informa-
tion asymmetries must be central.
In the early stages of development, the cost of obtaining external finance from
central financial markets was greater than the cost of raising it from scratch from
among a relatively modest local populace. Even though the process of raising
local finance in this way was time-consuming and expensive, lesser information
problems at the local level made local markets preferable to seeking finance in more
distant ones. This must have something to do with the cost of forming effective
contracts. For financial coalitions to form, members must be contracted into it:
Payoffs, responsibilities, and other actions must be specified in an environment
where there may be a great deal of uncertainty about the future. The costs of
forming these contracts cannot always be considered to be negligible. And there is
a consequent decision to be made about the quality of that contract (i.e., how well it
specifies party behaviour, how many loopholes are left, how enforceable it is), given
its cost. Moreover, there will be a degree of heterogeneity: Some agents are better
informed, or better educated than others while the level of trust between agents
can also vary. This heterogeneity can be related to the proximity of a potential
investor to an investment project. In addition, the institutional environment can
affect the costs of forming contracts (and so the choice of contract quality) by,
among other things, establishing industry standards, supporting property rights,
easing the gathering of information and enforcing written contracts. We come on
to consider further these issues in Chapter 4.
The very existence of spatially concentrated financial coalitions suggests that the
national financial market was not perfectly efficient in informational and contractual
terms. In the absence of information and contracting problems at the national level,
and given a conducive institutional environment, a national financial market would
have been first-best efficient in terms of the supply of finance. Without such an
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efficient national financial market, financiers’ only alternative was to build financial
coalitions of local investors.
We cannot draw from this that the financial arrangements which emerged to
finance infrastructure were not themselves optimal : Given the costs and benefits
of obtaining information, and the costs and benefits of forming contracts, the fi-
nancial structures observed through the industrial revolution might simply have
equated marginal conditions in information gathering and contract writing. But
this is not just a problem of private arrangements. It is clear that the costs of
obtaining information and forming contracts can be subject to further institutional
and legislative constraints. Moreover, the capacity of the public purse to mitigate
information problems is itself not limitless: Optimal levels of public expenditure,
and so optimal levels of taxation, follow. There is then, in theory at least, an op-
timal combination of private and public behaviour that combines to support the
optimal, private, financial arrangement. We develop a theoretical framework for
understanding these trade-offs in Chapters 4 and 5. For the purposes of the cur-
rent Chapter, we abstract from formalising the existence of optimal information
extraction and optimal contract formation. Our focus is, then, on the institutional
environment as the source of inefficiencies (sub-optimal outcomes) in the finance of
infrastructure. Even where the institutional and legislative environment deviates
from that which was optimal, we consider that rational private arrangements to
mitigate information problems were optimal responses to both the present institu-
tional conditions and the private costs and benefits of obtaining information and
writing contracts.
Despite the spatial concentration that characterised the early industrial period,
there was an institutional and economic learning process. Over time, as infrastruc-
tures became larger, as industrial centres became more evident and as industrial
development began to require more sophisticated external financing, the financial
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systems of London evolved into markets more capable of evaluating distant (and,
increasingly, larger) infrastructure projects. Institutional and legislative changes
played a part in this evolution. It has been argued that the government played a
role in advancing property rights and encouraging the private provision of public
goods. Bogart and Richardson (2006) introduce a large database on the passage
of Acts of Parliament and show that the passage of Acts pertaining to enforcing
property rights and encouraging public good provision were positively correlated
with (and sometimes led) the provision of infrastructure and the rate of economic
growth in the run-up to industrial revolution. That paper also draws attention to
the unique position that Parliament held in acting as a forum for transforming the
structure of landholding into its modern, capitalist form. As they note, in most
other nations this transformation was delayed and, in France and Russia, sowed
the seeds of revolution.
Through the middle of the nineteenth century, centralised and specialised finan-
cial services gained precedence and began to cater for the greater demands of larger
infrastructure projects. The informational problems at the national level began to
wane as the institutional framework for centralised finance developed, and as the
returns on infrastructure investment became more reliable. Eventually, central fi-
nancial markets were such that constructing local and regional coalitions of finance
was the less efficient method of finance.
The pattern in provincial infrastructure development is mirrored by the provin-
cial nature of the industrial revolution. Disjointed local and regional infrastructures
supported a local and regional industrial growth that itself comprised, on the na-
tional level, a disjointed patchwork of regional economies. As the national economy
emerged, so, in parallel, did both the national infrastructure and the national fi-
nancial markets to finance it.
So there are three effects here: First, a learning process in national financial mar-
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kets made them gradually more amenable to the finance of distant infrastructure
projects; second, the development of political and institutional environment had an
impact on the efficiency of centralised financial markets; and third, economic de-
velopment and the growth of the stock of infrastructure made economic integration
and market expansion an additional incentive to build and finance infrastructure
nationally.
We develop in Section 3.3 a model of finance and growth that can capture
a number of the stylised facts we have outlined here. Before that, we look in
Subsection 3.2.6 at whether alternative policy environments, such as a bias toward
public finance and public planning, had an effect on the development and finance
of infrastructure in other countries going through industrial revolution.
3.2.6 Alternative Policy Environments
To appreciate properly the experience of British infrastructural development we
must look at it in the light of a wider context. France is a good example of a
very different approach to that in Britain. We might also look to the emerging
body of cliometric research on the US and Canada to widen the application of
our hypotheses: Wright (2002) draws attention to the importance of information
problems in the emergence of the US financial system over the period 1780–1850;
and, Sylla et al. (2006) track the integration of transatlantic capital markets through
the first half of the nineteenth century. We focus on the Anglo-French contrast
here, since it serves to motivate an understanding of the finance of infrastructure in
what were, at the outset of the industrial revolution in Britain, otherwise relatively
similar economies.
Broadly, the development of British infrastructure was one based on market
forces; that of France was the outcome of public planning and a great deal public
finance. The French industrial revolution occurred much later than in Britain, some
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argue that it began properly as late as the 1850s; this is affirmed by inspection of
Figure 3.1.
Milward and Saul (1973) are among those that put the delay in French economic
development down, in part, to the way in which infrastructure policy was formed.
French governments of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century initiated
a publicly financed, centrally planned and tightly regulated system of canals that,
it was intended, would serve all citizens at no charge. The Becquet plan of 1822
envisioned a public-private partnership: A rational (i.e., centrally planned) water-
way system paid for by private capital. A group of civil engineers, the Corps des
Ponts et Chausse´es, was charged with setting and enforcing the regulations for a
waterway network of sufficient quality. The plans did not come to full fruition. The
routes which did get built quickly were those where local economic demands most
greatly necessitated them.
Le´vy-Leboyer (1978) notes that the centralised nature of infrastructural devel-
opment in France extended beyond canals and covered also railways. There was,
in addition, a great deal of overlap in the plans. The Corps, at first, viewed rail-
roads as ‘dry canals’. Smith (1990, p.665) writes that Becquey and the Corps were
remembered for “committing their country to waterways on the eve of the railroad
age.”
Many of the new railway schemes were in direct competition to the previously
planned canal networks. A solution based on complementarity between railways
and waterways was found: Canals, it was thought, served best the transport of
heavy goods while railways carried light goods and passengers. Indeed, plans for
some stretches of infrastructure specified parallel lines of canal and railway (see
Figure 2 in Smith, 1990).
The Legrand plan of 1838 began to map the national plan for canals to one for
railways. A system of trunk lines emanating from Paris to each of the largest cities
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was envisaged, a so-called Legrand Star. Private companies were restricted from
constructing major routes for fear that it would interfere with the greater plan. Up
till 1837, only three private bids to construct railways were accepted. From 1865,
smaller lines could, at the discretion of local authorities, be appended to the trunk
lines as and when local economic conditions demanded.
By the middle of the nineteenth century, Napoleon III began to promote the
private finance of a dominant railway infrastructure. Private infrastructure devel-
opments were still subject to the layout, location and specifications dictated by
the Corps. Milward and Saul (1973, p. 336) note that government “beset rail-
way building with so many safeguards as to delay its flourishing by a full decade.”
Again, those railway lines that were taken up were those in greatest demand by
local industry.
The French experience of public planning can be contrasted with the experience
of Germany. There, it is argued, the country was able to construct a railway infras-
tructure much more quickly because of less stringent requirements on standards and
a more liberal approach to the granting of private enterprises. Further, the political
fragmentation of mid-nineteenth century Germany allowed separate regions to go
ahead with railway developments in opposition to more central directives: Regional
political units could better coordinate infrastructural development.
In our discussions of previous sections we viewed the finance of infrastructure in
Britain as somewhat inefficient. The experience of France suggests at least that the
encouragement of private finance and a relatively laissez-faire approach to regula-
tion was the right policy approach in terms of the development of infrastructures.
We do not wish to imply (though it is by some) that the retardation of infrastruc-
tural development was the root of the delayed entrance of France into high growth
paths, of course there can be many other reasons.
There is, however, further evidence on the relations between infrastructure de-
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velopment, policy issues and economic growth. Hulten (1996) draws attention to
the importance of maintaining an effective stock of infrastructure. Using World
Bank indices for road condition, locomotive availability, electricity loss and tele-
phone faults, the paper finds a link between the effectiveness of infrastructure and
the rate of economic growth. A large positive impact on growth of improving the
effectiveness of a given stock of infrastructure is found, especially among poor coun-
tries. Bogart (2006b), using cross-country evidence for the nineteenth century, finds
a strong and positive correlation between the level of investment in railways and the
proportion of private ownership. Further, the rate of railway diffusion is positively
related to the extent of private sector involvement.
So policy can have a role to play in the development of infrastructure, and
this role can have implications for financial development. But we do not seek
to draw firm conclusions on the role of policy in the finance of infrastructure.
Counterfactuals can always be found to any argument based on case studies. The
experience of Germany may be one such counterfactual. We rather think of policy,
with apologies to Robinson (1952), as an element in the general atmosphere of
encouraging or retarding the finance of effective infrastructures.
3.3 Some Analytics of Growth, Finance
and Infrastructure
Given what we have learned from the historical analysis above, we now proceed
to construct a theory of finance and growth that can account for a number of the
disaggregated and dynamic aspects observed. This model is something of an inter-
mediate step between the aggregative, cross-sectional finance and growth theories
summarised in Chapter 2 and the fully microfounded models advanced in Chapters
4 and 5. We wish to capture the stylised facts from our historical analysis in a
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relatively transparent model of finance and growth that can be, broadly, matched
to data. Our model is distinct from work such as Acemoglu and Zillibotti (1997)
primarily because an economy in our model can be caught in a low-growth trap. In
the paper of Acemoglu and Zillibotti, industrial takeoff is an inevitability. Though
it might reflect on some levels the relationship between finance and growth in coun-
tries (or regions) that do industrialise, it does not help us to understand why some
countries do and other countries do not enter periods of sustained high growth.
We first describe the structure of our model before presenting it in more formal
terms. We have a closed economy with two major regions. Factors of production
are capital and infrastructure. Following the discussion above, we also consider
that this infrastructure is the product of private enterprise. A local supply of
infrastructure benefits all those firms who pay for it.
Firms have no trouble raising capital; they can use profit-ploughback or sell
claims on future profits. But infrastructure projects are subject to significant fixed
costs; they cannot be funded by individual firms or individual agents alone. En-
trepreneurs exist to see the demand for infrastructure and organise finance via
financial intermediation to construct and lease infrastructure to firms. In this vein,
we account for the interaction between infrastructure and financial intermediation
by thinking of infrastructure as a direct input to production; the efficiency of fi-
nancial intermediation then determines the costliness of raising finance for that
infrastructure. Firm output is determined in part by the level of infrastructure
that the firm is willing to pay for, given the costs of raising finance for that infras-
tructure.
In Chapter 4 we will consider in greater detail the interaction between the
costliness of exchange and the institutional, economic and social environment in
which exchange takes place. The purpose of the remainder of this Chapter, however,
is to lay-out the implications of the discussion from Section 3.2 for a relatively
103
Chapter 3. Endogenous Financial Development and Industrial Takeoff
standard theory of finance and growth. This then serves as a bridge between the
critique of current theory in Chapters 1–2 and a closer look at the fundamentals
driving these interactions in Chapter 4.
So, the employment of infrastructure as a factor of production incurs the costs
of financial intermediation. The economy is populated by agents endowed with a
money income each period. We could otherwise have thought of agents endowed
with a unit of labour earning a money income by renting their labour to firms.
When agents in the economy see the demand for infrastructure they can become
entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs use the services of a financial intermediary to raise
finance for the construction and maintenance of an infrastructure. Entrepreneurs
then rent that infrastructure to the firm.
We do not have to restrict the intermediary, or even the entrepreneur, to being
external to the firm; we simply want to allow for an effect of intermediation costs
on spatial decisions and growth. Of course, it is likely that specialised financial
intermediation will emerge, so we naturally think of the existence of a market for
financial intermediation. Additionally, it may be that the financial intermediary is
also the entrepreneur supplying infrastructure to the firm. For clarity, we think of
firms, entrepreneurs and intermediaries in isolation.
3.3.1 Finance, Productivity and Economic Integration
We found a clear and consistent pattern in the historical evidence discussed above:
In the early stages of development financial coalitions, infrastructure and markets
are, broadly, local; as the economy grows infrastructures grow, financial intermedi-
ation becomes more sophisticated and markets become more national. We wish to
account for and understand these effects: Why do firms choose local markets at low
levels of development? Might an economy be trapped in a spatially disparate, low-
growth trap? What characterises the transition from small, spatially concentrated
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markets to large, national ones? What part does the efficiency of financial inter-
mediation play? What government policies might instigate faster growth paths?
In a set-up with two regions, funds can be raised at the regional level, via
regional financial intermediaries, or at the national level, using national financial
intermediaries. We make two central assumptions: 1) A regional financial interme-
diary can only finance a regional infrastructure; and, 2) a firm can only operate at
the scale of the infrastructure that it employs. The costs of financial intermediation
are subject to scale effects. Specifically, we impose that financial intermediation at
the national level can, ceteris paribus, be more costly.
Part of the incentive for firms to operate at the national level arises from ex-
tensive scale effects, that is, scale effects resulting from the linking of separate
economies. For McDermott (2002, p. 373), extensive scale increases potential in-
come partly by enhancing “the productivity of research and study”. Rivera-Batiz
and Romer (1991) takes a similar perspective in the context of an endogenous
growth theory. In Alesina et al. (2000) productivity is directly related to economic
integration via the imposition of iceberg costs in the trade of intermediate goods. In
our economy, the integration of two regions into a national economy raises firm-level
productivity and can obtain a higher growth rate.
Extensive scale also has a role in financial intermediary conditions. We consider
two types of effect: Fixed information costs and learning costs. The historical
analysis above has indicated that both firms and investors can have a preference
for local finance where markets are small. We have argued that this is the result of a
bias towards exchange and finance with those who are geographically closer which
arises when the returns to centralised finance are outweighed by its costs. This
is what we call the fixed information cost: It is easier for an entrepreneur, E, to
convince an investor, I, to invest if I knows and trusts E personally; if E has a good
local reputation; if I knows the local market conditions well; if institutional factors
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are conducive to I evaluating E; if if I can more easily monitor the activities of E.
We posit that these scale effects are fixed; they hold true no matter what the market
size. What is important, however, is that these information costs can depend on
the legislative and institutional environment within which exchange takes place.
We use this fixed scale effect to capture exogenous changes in the institutional
environment.
We have also seen that a transition from spatially concentrated finance and mar-
kets to economy-wide finance and markets can occur. We have suggested that this
is not entirely the result of exogenous changes in political or institutional factors.
We can, in part, put it down to endogenous changes in financial intermediation con-
ditions. We account for, in addition to the fixed information cost effect, a learning
cost in financial intermediation. We have seen hints of this effect in the historical
analysis. We can think of four separate effects, though there are, no doubt, more.
First, consider a demonstration effect: It is harder to raise finance for the first
national turnpike/canal/railway than it is for the fiftieth because of the initial
newness of a technology or as a result of the unwillingness to risk money when the
demand is uncertain. As a new form infrastructure is tried and tested by those
willing to make initial investments, and as the demand for said infrastructure is
demonstrated, it becomes progressively easier to raise finance. Secondly, a scale
effect in construction can be considered: The first national turnpike/canal/railway
will be more expensive to build than the fiftieth. This can result from technological
improvements in rolling-out an infrastructure as it is used more. Third, there will be
a learning effect in the technology of financial intermediation at the national level.
We have seen that sophisticated financial markets do only emerge gradually, and
that this emergence often parallels the growth of the economy. Fourth, the demand
for major infrastructure projects that require national financial intermediation only
occurs over time, as the economy grows regionally and as regional infrastructure
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networks are contstructed.
Of course, we are abstracting from such market-effects at the regional level for
simplicity. In practice, these learning effects will exist at the regional level. The
difference is that at the regional level these effects can be greatly mitigated because
of the local nature of the investors.
Intermediation at a regional level is thus optimal when learning and fixed costs
are relatively high. As the regional economies grow so learning costs fall (with
the building of a regional infrastructure) and national integration becomes more
feasible. Likewise, if market-invariant information costs fall at a national level, we
can move from an equilibrium with two regions to an equilibrium with one national
economy. If the regional economy lies on the balanced growth path then over time
the learning-cost barrier to integration will become insignificant. There will thus
be three possible outcomes, dependent on both the extent of information costs
of national intermediation and initial infrastructure conditions: Information costs
remain high and regional economies are optimal in the long run; information costs
are low, initial infrastructure is good and economy-wide output is optimal from the
start; or information costs and initial infrastructure are such that we begin with
regional economies and (via falling learning costs or exogenous institutional shifts)
we move endogenously to a national economy.
3.3.2 Formal Model
We have two regions, A and B, in the same closed economy (i.e., there are no
exchange rate complications here). In each region there are #FA and #FB firms,
respectively, and #CA and #CB consumers, respectively. We normalise each of
these cardinalities to unity (though below we leave them in entrepreneurship equa-
tions for generality). One region cannot trade capital or finance with another
without financial intermediation and infrastructure on a national level. There are
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two possible situations at any given point in time: Either the economy operates
as two separate regions with no trade in capital or finance between regions; or we
have a combined national economy with a national output.
Figure 3.5 depicts the flow of resources between consuming agents, intermedi-
aries, entrepreneurs and firms in our model. Agents maintain a money supply (by
dint of a Central Bank) and are given an initial capital endowment. Firms demand
capital and infrastructure. Agents can sell capital direct to firms but infrastructure
is supplied by entrepreneurs who use financial intermediaries to raise the finance
from agents. The costliness of intermediation drives a wedge between savings and
investments that impacts upon what both firms and agents receive. Consumption
optimisation by agents, combined with a specific production function for firms, gen-
erates an endogenous growth based on externalities in the manner of Rebelo (1991).
This story abstracts from any distinctions over integration, so we now proceed to
consider the model depicted in the Figure under both the regional and the national
context.
Regional Growth
Two factors enter the production function: Capital, kt, and infrastructure, It. If we
assume both regions are specified identically and that initial values for capital and
infrastructure, k0 and I0, are identical in both regions then we can find equilibrium
growth for one region knowing that it is equal to growth in the other region. So we
consider region A, in which firms produce a single good,
Y At = A(k
A
t )
α(IAt )
1−α, (3.1)
where 0 < α < 1. Each firm maximises profits,
piAt = Y
A
t − rkAt − iIAt , (3.2)
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Figure 3.5: Financial Intermediation and Growth Schematic
where each takes the rates of return on capital, r, and infrastructure, i, as given,
r = α
Y At
kAt
; (3.3)
i = (1− α)Y
A
t
IAt
. (3.4)
There is a market for the construction of infrastructure. Agents can recognise
the demand for infrastructure by firms but cannot fund it themselves, they must
obtain the services of financial intermediaries to raise the necessary capital. In so
doing, they become entrepreneurs. Suppose that infrastructure is produced with-
out capital, using money alone: It = f(Mt). We could otherwise have thought of
money raised to buy capital or labour for the construction of infrastructure. The
entrepreneurs’ incentive is the rent she can charge for firms’ use of the infrastruc-
ture. Let us suppose that there are a large number, #EA, of agents who wish to
become entrepreneurs. We normalise #EA to unity; i.e., any agent can become
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an entrepreneur. Further let us suppose that there are no costs to becoming an
entrepreneur. Perfectly competitive entrepreneurship will obtain,
#FAiIAt = mf(#C
AMAt ), (3.5)
where m is the rate on finance supplied by the intermediary and MAt is the finance
raised from each agent in region A. If we specify a simple linear production function
for infrastructure, It =Mt, then i = m. This is the perfectly competitive outcome:
If entrepreneurs could develop a monopolistic position with respect to firms or a
monopsonistic position with respect to intermediaries then there would be a surplus
to entrepreneurship in which i > m.
A financial intermediary exists to raise finance from agents and sell it to en-
trepreneurs. Any agent who sees the demand for financial intermediation can be-
come an intermediary. Again, we are being purposefully loose about occupational
choice here: An agent can become an entrepreneur or an intermediary or, indeed,
can do both jobs. The mingling of occupations in this fashion is not contrary to
reality, and so we do not require that agents formally choose between potential
occupations.
We write the profit to an agent from financial intermediation at the regional
level as,
FA = #EA(1− ψ)mMAt −#CA(1 + φ)sMAt , (3.6)
where s is the private return that consuming agents obtain from selling finance to
intermediaries.
Two costs are incurred by the intermediary. First, a cost φ of collecting finance
from agents reflects the costs of communicating the worthiness of investment in
terms of expected risk and return. We have seen from the historical analysis that
this cost can be significant. Second, a cost ψ of distributing finance to entrepreneurs
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reflects the cost of evaluating and monitoring potential entrepreneurs. This follows
on from the issues discussed in setting-up the models of Chapter 2. For the purposes
of this analysis, we do not specify the sources of these costs analytically. We simply
take the view, following both the critique of current methodology and the historical
analysis above, that these costs exist and can be significant. We will take on these
more fundamental issues later: Chapter 4 demonstrates that basing these costs in
firm microeconomic foundations is not a straightforward matter. Our purpose here
is to capture the broad implications of our critique of current finance and growth
theory. As such, we first construct a model in which these costs are exogenous and
think about their microeconomic roots later.
We take the view that the market for financial intermediation is also perfectly
competitive: Given a large number of firms, agents and entrepreneurs, and given
no fixed costs to becoming an intermediary, any profits from intermediation are
competed away. From equation (3.6), with FA = 0 under perfect competition, we
have the following relationship between the rates of return on finance,
m =
(1 + φ)
(1− ψ)s. (3.7)
Equation (3.7) reflects the wedge between saving and investment: The more efficient
the financial intermediation, the lower are the costs of collecting and disseminating
finance, and the closer are the rates of return on saving and investment.
Substituting the demand function for infrastructure from equation (3.4) into
the production function, and given i = m, we have,
Y At =
[
A
(
(1− α)(1− ψ)
(1 + φ)s
)1−α] 1α
kAt , (3.8)
which is a simple form of Ak production which we know will generate endogenous
growth. The relation to the parsimonious model of Chapter 2 is clear.
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To close the model we specify conditions of consumer optimisation. Infinitely-
lived consumers maximise their expected discounted income stream,
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρtu(ct)dt, (3.9)
where we define instantaneous utility as have constant elasticity of substitution,
u(ct) =
c1−θt − 1
1− θ . (3.10)
Agents maintain an idiosyncratic stock of finance that is controlled by, for example,
a central bank. The central bank ensures that aggregate money supply is a constant
proportion of aggregate output. The consumer chooses how much capital to sell to
firms, how much finance to sell to intermediaries and how much to consume.
The Euler equation in consumption is obtained,
˙cAt
cAt
=
1
θ
(r − ρ), (3.11)
which is equal to the balanced growth rate of the economy, γ. From the production
function, equation (3.8), we can derive r,
r =
[
A
(
(1− α)(1− ψ)
(1 + φ)s
)1−α] 1α
. (3.12)
Assume that a second market for finance exists that can give agents the same return
as that on capital: Let us impose, equivalently, that agents are able to convert their
money endowment into capital. If the return on finance is greater than the return
on capital all finance will be sold to the intermediary. If the return to agents from
selling finance to intermediaries is less than the return on capital, the finance could
be sold directly to firms as capital. Competitive intermediation thus ensures s = r
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and so, from equation (3.12),
s = r = A
(
(1− α)(1− ψ)
(1 + φ)
)1−α
. (3.13)
As such, from the Euler equation and this expression for the interest rate we have
in both regions the growth rate,
γA = γB =
1
θ
[
A
(
(1− α)(1− ψ)
(1 + φ)
)1−α
− ρ
]
. (3.14)
National Growth
In the light of the historical evidence discussed above, it is reasonable to allow
for the possibility that there are significant scale-effects in the costs of financial
intermediation; historically we have seen an initial pattern of regional industrial
takeoff in industry financed by local agents. Only once a local infrastructure is
built and the regional economy becomes mature do financial intermediaries begin
to operate on a country-wide basis. Additionally, information problems inhibit
one region’s ability to obtain finance from another, so there is a higher cost of
coordinating investment on a national level relative to the regional level. So we
might define the national financial intermediary conditions to be,
F∗t = (#EA +#EB)(1− ψ∗)i∗Mt − (#CA +#CB)(1 + φ∗)s∗Mt, (3.15)
where ψ∗ = Ψ + 2ω
It
and φ∗ = Φ + 2ν
It
, ω, ν ≥ 0. The parameters Ψ and Φ reflect
exogenous political and institutional factors. At early stages of development, or
if fixed costs are always high, a financial intermediary incurs additional costs to
operate at the national level, and to maintain zero-profit requires a higher return on
finance sold to firms. The fixed cost premia, Ψ−ψ and Φ−φ, reflect the difference in
underlying efficiency of the regional cf. the national financial intermediary given the
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institutional environment. The non-fixed costs, parameterised by ω and ν, reflect
the learning costs of establishing an infrastructure in order to operate an economy
at the larger level. As regional markets grow, so a regional markets gradually
mature. Proxying for the size of regional markets by the level of local infrastructure
demand, IAt = I
B
t =
1
2
It, we effectively have that the cost raising finance to build a
national infrastructure is decreasing in the size of regional markets. In the long-run,
therefore, these costs become insignificant.
Given an extensive scale effect on productivity, we make the assumption that
the the coefficient of technological progress at a national level is higher than that
at the regional level. The national production function is thus,
Y ∗t = A¯k
α
t I
1−α
t , (3.16)
where A¯ > A, i.e. the incentive for agents to want to fund projects at a national
level is the higher productivity of their capital and finance driven by the higher
coefficient of technological progress, but this must be tempered by the cost of
funding financial intermediation to facilitate that production. As in the case of the
regions, we can find an analogous expression for the rate of interest to consumers
on capital and finance in the case of integration,
r∗ = A¯
(
(1− α)(1− ψ∗)
(1 + φ∗)
)1−α
. (3.17)
It should be clear that r∗ will not be constant so long as ν, ω > 0. We will still
obtain a balanced growth path in the long run, but we approach it from below as
It →∞. The long-run growth rate of the national economy is,
γ∗LR =
1
θ
[
A¯
(
(1− α)(1−Ψ)
(1 + Φ)
)1−α
− ρ
]
. (3.18)
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The transition to this asymptotic growth rate follows,
γ∗SR =
1
θ
A¯((1− α)(1−Ψ− 2ωIt )
(1 + Φ + 2ν
It
)
)1−α
− ρ
 . (3.19)
We will need to re-formulate this expression for any numerical simulation but, for
the moment, the transitional growth dynamics should be clear: The rate of growth
of consumption and infrastructure is inversely related to the level of infrastructure.
The rate of change of economic growth is at first positive and reduces to zero as
time goes to infinity: For an integrated national economy, limt→∞ γSR = γLR.
This growth rate will only be realised if the regional economies integrate. The
rate of interest at the national level, equation (3.17), reflects the combination of
increased productivity and increased cost of integrating the two regional economies.
Integration thus takes place if r∗ > r, where r is the rate of interest in the regional
economies. This condition is satisfied where,
A¯
A
>
(
(1− ψ)(1 + Φ + 2ν
It
)
(1−Ψ− 2ω
It
)(1 + φ)
)1−α
. (3.20)
Once this occurs, regional finance and capital supplies are combined and we have
the national production function of equation (3.16) and no separate regional output,
i.e. no agent would prefer to operate regionally when national output is possible. At
the point where r∗ = r the growth rate at the national level is equal to that at the
level of the regions. By equation (3.20), the feasibility of integrating is decreasing
in both the relative additional costs of intermediating at a national level and the
ratio of coefficients of technological progress.
The timing and transition to national integration here is, save exogenous insti-
tutional change, wholly endogenous to the model. This contrasts with work such
as McDermott (2002) and Parente and Prescott (2005) where transition from one
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growth path to another is exogenously imposed.
Equilibria
There are three possible equilibria for the economy, dependent on both parame-
ter values and the initial demand for infrastructure, I0. We either have regional
separation, national integration, or a transition from the former to the latter.
Given that over time the learning costs diminish into insignificance, the only
thing that will prevent integration in the long-run are high fixed information costs
relative to the productivity improvement, i.e. if,
A¯
A
≤
(
(1− ψ)(1 + Φ)
(1−Ψ)(1 + φ)
)1−α
. (3.21)
So it is possible that in the presence of either a low effect of integration on produc-
tivity ( A¯
A
is close to unity) or persistent high premia of pooling and coordinating
savings over the larger economy (Φ and Ψ are significantly higher than φ and ψ)
then we can be caught in a low growth trap. As such, there is, in this case, room
for exogenous intervention to make integration feasible, i.e. we could mitigate in-
formation problems by for example legislating for contract rights. Government
intervention to build a public infrastructure will have no effect on the feasibility of
integration so long as equation (3.21) holds because they will not overcome infor-
mation costs this way; this result thus falls nicely into the category of France vs.
UK industrial growth with regard to the different attitudes to public infrastructure.
A second equilibrium will occur where initial infrastructure supply, I0 is such
that we begin with an integrated economy in the first instance, if,
A¯
A
>
(
(1− ψ)(1 + Φ + 2ν
I0
)
(1−Ψ− 2ω
I0
)(1 + φ)
)1−α
. (3.22)
In this case, either a high productivity increase from integration or very low fixed
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information cost can mean that a low initial infrastructure supply and low learning
cost effects (low ν and ω) could create conditions such that the economy is always
integrated.
The most interesting case in terms of endogenous growth is the intermediate one,
where the economy begins in its disintegrated form and endogenously integrates
when conditions become right. This requires,
(
(1− ψ)(1 + Φ)
(1−Ψ)(1 + φ)
)1−α
<
A¯
A
≤
(
(1− ψ)(1 + Φ + 2ν
I0
)
(1−Ψ− 2ω
I0
)(1 + φ)
)1−α
. (3.23)
Of the three equilibria, this case perhaps comes closest to reflecting the actual
pattern of industrial growth. In time zero, scale costs mean that it is optimal for
financial intermediaries operate on a small scale, using local finance to fund the
construction of a regional infrastructure. In this initial phase, growth is low. Over
time, regional markets grow and a local infrastructure is constructed to support
local output. This also lessens the cost of raising finance to build infrastructure
and integrate at a national level. At a critical value of local market size we have
national integration and a smooth takeoff in growth, approaching γ∗ over time as
the economy matures. We thus have an acceleration in industrial output growth as
determined by endogenously improving conditions for financial intermediation. In
this case there is room for exogenous action bring forward the takeoff point. The
critical value of infrastructure, at which we integrate, is the positive root of,
(1−Ψ)(1+Φ)I2t+
[(
A¯
A
) 1
1−α (1 + φ)
(1− ψ)2ω(1−Ψ)− (1 + Φ)2ω − (1−Ψ)2ν
]
It−4ων = 0.
(3.24)
So there is a potential role for accelerating development by reducing the costs of
information problems, as in the disintegrated equilibrium, but also here we can bring
forward the point at which we integrate via the public funding of infrastructure
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technology and improving awareness. We can, therefore, draw comparisons here to
the ‘big-push’ literature of the type espoused by Murphy et al. (1989); while on a
collective basis agents could gain by integrating at the same time, individually they
face financial intermediary costs related to the size of the entire economy, which
they cannot significantly influence by their individual action.
3.3.3 Numerical Solutions
Consumption, money, capital and infrastructure all grow, in continuous time, at
the rate γ = max{γA, γ∗SR}. For the purposes of a numerical extension we need
to consider the growth rate of the economy in a discrete-time form, so γh = (xt −
xt−h)/hxt−h for all growth variables x in the economy where h is the length of each
discrete time increment. So if we want to think of an annual growth rate while
taking quarterly increments then we let h = 1
4
. In the limit as h → 0 we have
that γh → γ. In the regional economy, and in the long-run integrated economy, the
growth rate is constant. The transitional growth rate, equation (3.19), is dependent
on the stock of infrastructure at time t, however. We can re-write the transitional
growth rate as,
It − It−h
hIt−h
=
1
θ
A¯((1− α)(1−Ψ− 2ωIt )
(1 + Φ + 2ν
It
)
)1−α
− ρ
 . (3.25)
We can solve for It in terms of It−h and obtain a solution for the growth rate of
the economy that can be solved numerically. (MATLAB code is reproduced in
Appendix Section A.1.) Let It = I(It−h) be the solution to,
(
1 + Φ +
2ν
It
){
A¯−1
[
ρ+ θ
(
It − It−h
hIt−h
)]} 1
1−α
= (1− α)
(
1−Ψ− 2ω
It
)
. (3.26)
Of course, we need to check first that there is only one finite and real solution to
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equation (3.26).24 Then we can write equation (3.19) as,
γ∗hSR =
1
θ
A¯((1− α)(1−Ψ− 2ωI(It−h))
(1 + Φ + 2νI(It−h))
)1−α
− ρ
 . (3.27)
Table 3.1 gives a benchmark calibration with which we can demonstrate some of the
growth dynamics. Figure 3.6 plots the course of the economy with an initial money
stock of M0 = 20 and initial capital stock of k0 = 40. This economy is one which
begins regionally separated and integrates as endogenous financial intermediation
costs drop over time. As can be seen, the rate of growth of the regional economy
is constant at around γA = 0.054. That of the integrated economy begins low and
climbs to a long-run rate of around γ∗ = 0.064. The thick black line indicates the
equilibrium growth rate at any point in time, with national integration occurring at
t = 23 and a smooth transition towards the long-run growth rate of the integrated
economy.
Table 3.1: Calibration for Finance, Integration and Growth
initial capital k0 40
initial finance M0 20
capital share α 2/3
subjective discount rate ρ 0.02
elasticity of substitution θ 5
regional coefficient of technological progress A 0.5
national coefficient of technological progress A¯ 0.6
fixed cost parameter on regional intermediation ψ 0.25
fixed cost parameter on regional intermediation φ 0.25
fixed cost parameter on national intermediation Ψ 0.3
fixed cost parameter on national intermediation Φ 0.3
scale cost parameter on national intermediation ν 5
scale cost parameter on national intermediation ω 5
We can embark on a calibration of this model to the data of Bairoch (1982).
24This is generally the case. The exact solution method is straightforward, so we leave it to
Appendix Section A.2.
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Figure 3.6: Example Growth Path
There are too many free parameters to be able to pin-down a full calibration
based on the evolution of financial efficiency, national integration and technological
progress. We can, however, more generally consider whether the sorts of growth
path implied by our model can capture historical trends. Table 3.2 gives an in-
dicative calibration to US and UK data. Figure 3.7 depicts the numerical results.
There are three things that we wish to capture from the data: First, the different
levels of income in 1750; second, the different rates of growth through the period
of industrial revolution; and, third, the different levels of income at the end of
the period. We do not make any mid-period exogenous changes to the financial
intermediation conditions; all growth effects here are endogenous.
Of course, this is one of many stories that we can tell; a different parameter-
isation might match the data equally well. There are two main differences that
cause the numerical growth path: First, the US has a higher level of productivity
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Table 3.2: Calibration for UK and US Growth Paths
UK US
initial capital k0 10 4
initial finance M0 5 2
capital share α 2/3 2/3
subjective discount rate ρ 0.02 0.02
elasticity of substitution θ 5 5
regional coefficient of technological progress A 0.15 0.15
national coefficient of technological progress A¯ 0.2 0.32
fixed cost parameter on regional intermediation ψ 0.25 0.275
fixed cost parameter on regional intermediation φ 0.25 0.275
fixed cost parameter on national intermediation Ψ 0.35 0.35
fixed cost parameter on national intermediation Φ 0.35 0.35
scale cost parameter on national intermediation ν 2 1.25
scale cost parameter on national intermediation ω 2 1.25
Figure 3.7: Calibrated US and UK Growth Paths
at the national level, A¯; second, the learning element of national intermediation is,
in the US, substantially more rapid, i.e., the ν and ω are lower. This means that,
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despite beginning with a lower initial capital endowment, the US economy catches
up and overtakes the UK one. In the US, integration occurs earlier and proceeds to
a higher long-run growth path at a faster rate. These distinctions appear to match
the historical growth patterns relatively well.
Of course, this interpretation is based on a very loose calibration. If we had data
on, say, the endogenous or exogenous evolution of financial efficiency throughout
the industrial revolution then we could make substantially firmer conclusions. The
emerging time-series cliometric analyses of industrial takeoff are likely to help us
in this regard. Tieing these data with an analysis of the evolution of disaggregated
coalitions would further restrict the range of possible calibrations. Moving towards
the completion of rich datasets such as Shea (2007) is likely to prove invaluable in
helping us to do this.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
We have demonstrated that by conceiving of finance and growth in a static and ag-
gregative way we lose an understanding of the underlying transmission mechanisms.
As a consequence, we are poorly armed to consider any policy implications. By look-
ing at evidence from history, we have been able to identify a greater complexity
in the transmission between entrepreneurial finance and industrial growth. Given
an appreciation of the importance of fixed costs in the finance of any investment
project, we identified the financial structures which supported the development of
physical transport infrastructure.
Further to the historical analysis, we developed a theory of finance and growth
that can capture some of the interrelations between scale, finance and infrastruc-
tural development. The quantitative aspects of our theory can broadly replicate
some observed historical growth paths. The theory laid-out above has a number of
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shortcomings, however. In terms of matching the stylised facts of aggregate finance
and growth, we do not observe an increase in financial depth over time. More-
over, the upward trend in the interest rate on capital does not reflect the historical
record. There is obviously room for improvement in the theory. A number of the
problems cannot be addressed in such a top-down model, and we shall see in the
next Chapter that generating such disaggregated macroeconomic phenomena from
microeconomic foundations is not straightforward. The model presented here, we
hope, at least at least places stress on those aspects of the finance and growth
mechanism that we believe are most important. The emergence of the literature
on the industrial revolution as a regional phenomenon has the potential to greatly
benefit theories such as that developed here, and leads us to the first potential ex-
tension to the theory we developed above. If we had data for regional and provincial
estimates of economic growth, we could compare our eventual estimates from the
Handbook on the emergence and gradual centralisation of financial coalitions. Our
ability to account for industrial takeoff in a model of endogenous growth that can
be calibrated to disaggregated data would promise an interesting avenue for future
research. We could shed light on a number of important questions.
A second advance in the theory would be to make optimal government behaviour
endogenous to the model. We can outline in broad terms how this might be done:
In the early period of industrialisation, when scale costs in financial intermediation
are very large, a government might be tempted to promote the accumulation of in-
frastructure by allocating resources to the amelioration of economy-wide financial
constraints. Of course, there is a trade-off between the marginal positive impact
of spending on mitigating information and contracting problems and the marginal
negative impact of taxation on welfare. On the basis of this simple model, when
coalitions are spatially concentrated the marginal impact of government spending
in promoting centralised financial markets is minimal. The conclusion, then, is that
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in the early stages of growth, a government ought to behave with a relatively light
touch, allowing private enterprise to form efficient financial structures that them-
selves mitigate information and contracting problems. The role of the government
in the early phase of industrialisation seems to be the support of private enterprise
by forming institutions that make it easier to write enforceable contracts. This has
come out of both our historical analysis and the theoretical model we constructed
to match our stylised facts.
We turn to a more formal analysis of these propositions in the next Chapter.
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Endogenous Exchange Costs in
General Equilibrium
We have seen in Chapters 1–3 that the existence of financial market imperfections
are central to the connection between finance and economic growth. The nature
of these imperfections gives rise to spatial and dynamic elements in the existence
of financial coalitions. In this chapter, we capture these imperfections at the mi-
croeconomic level by considering the endogenous determination of exchange costs.
In Chapter 5 we place the findings of this analysis into the context of finance and
growth, and identify a large and exciting agenda for establishing the microfounda-
tions of finance and growth.
Exchange costs are central to a great deal of economic theory. Typically, how-
ever, they are an exogenously fixed component of a wider model. It is our view that
such costs are more usefully thought of as the endogenous outcomes of individual
behaviour. Indeed, as noted by Coase (1992, p. 716) in his Nobel lecture,
a large part of what we think of as economic activity is designed to
accomplish what high transaction costs would otherwise prevent.
A wide range of literatures have exchange costs at their heart. These are gen-
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erally intended to reflect frictions caused at the microeconomic level: Think of the
exchange costs invoked by, among others, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), to sup-
port the existence of financial structures; the trade friction models of Obstfeld and
Rogoff (2000); the core-periphery work on globalisation by Krugman and Venables
(1995); and the new institutional economics, surveyed in Williamson (2000), wholly
founded on the existence of transactions costs. In addition, the work of Dixit (1996)
on political economics is based on a transaction-cost politics perspective. Each of
these contributions has demonstrated that exchange costs have a huge impact on
theoretical outcomes. But in each of these contributions, those exchange costs are
not explicitly related to the technologies of exchange.
Making Exchange Costs Endogenous
Why should we bother to endogenise exchange costs? Take, for example, the theo-
retical works on finance and development of Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and
Townsend and Ueda (2006). The answer is clear: If, in the process of development,
the conditions that give rise to markets change then the conditions that give rise
to exchange costs also change. It may be that agents in economies of different lev-
els of wealth allocate different portions of their endowments to the amelioration of
exchange costs. Central to the nature of economic development, then, is a decision
over amelioration which in turn determines exchange costs and, as a consequence,
optimal diversification and market size. Considering development when the ex-
change cost is exogenously fixed detracts from the potential richness of any theory
of finance and growth. Boyd and Prescott (1985) also note this in the context of
models of financial coalitions: “[T]ransaction costs are assumed to exist and are
not explicitly related to exchange technologies nor differentiated between types of
trade,” (p.212).
Agents in our economy wish to diversify against a stochastic technology shock.
126
Chapter 4. Endogenous Exchange Costs in General Equilibrium
The key decision that agents make regards the formulation of ex ante arrangements
to ameliorate ex post exchange costs. If the ex ante arrangement is not perfectly
“effective”, then ex post exchange is, we impose, costly. The less effective the ex
ante arrangement, the more costly is ex post exchange. In general, we see both
private and public arrangements to ameliorate exchange costs. Therefore, in our
model we distinguish between two forms of ex ante arrangements. Efforts such
as organizational choices, private infrastructure or learning about property rights
– activities specific to the transaction being made – are local and excludable. We
label these activities as “specific amelioration”. The legal enforcement of contracts,
fiduciary duties, public infrastructures or competition policy also act to reduce ex-
change costs but are, by contrast, public goods; this we call “general amelioration”.
Each type of arrangement benefits the other: Without a public institution to sup-
port them, private arrangements are more costly; without private arrangements,
there is little an institution can do.
It is the coordination of these ameliorating arrangements which can give rise
to a richer framework of exchange costs. We are led to ask: How can institutional
arrangements which ameliorate the costs of private exchange be supported by a
decentralised economy populated by self-interested agents?
The result of this general-specific distinction in large economies is a coordination
failure at the economy-wide level in the provision of general amelioration (i.e., in the
existence of institutions). Voluntary contributions to the public good under perfect
information are zero, and only specific amelioration emerges. In the presence of
‘compulsion’, a combination of specific and general amelioration arrangements is
optimal. In an heterogeneous agent economy, however, we face political economy
questions regarding power and influence of certain groups in the provision of such
public goods. Within this simple general equilibrium framework, therefore, ineffec-
tive ex ante arrangements can account for the coalitional structures of exchange,
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the existence and optimality of institutions and an optimal taxation policy in which
a public institution emerges to facilitate private exchange.
The Sources of Costly Exchange
North (1990, p.27) puts transactions costs down to “the costs of measuring the
valuable attributes of what is being exchanged and the costs of protecting rights
and policing and enforcing arrangements.” Why do these costs exist ex post? And
is there scope for agents to ameliorate them by allocating resources to some ex ante
technology? The costs listed by North must, to some degree, be the result of an,
at least partial, incompleteness of the ex ante contract. That is, contracts written
ahead of the state of the world being fully known do not detail specific actions in
every possible state of nature; there are, ex post, costs of measuring attributes and
of enforcing, protecting and policing ex ante arrangements. But the exchange cost
is not the cost of writing the partially complete contract, it must be its complement:
Contracts do not simply emerge to cope with pre-existing exchange costs; the two
concepts are irretrievably connected, in a sense two sides of the same coin.
This relates to what is, we believe, a general misconception of exchange costs
as an exogenous fundamental to the general equilibrium framework. Townsend
(1983b, p.259) is representative of the standard view of exchange costs as the “costs
of bookkeeping, the cost of enforcement, the cost of monitoring. . . ”. The costs of
exchange are, in this view, the costs of forming and applying effective contracts
through both private behaviour and public institutions. But, taken literally, this
implies that the greater the resources allocated to contracts, the greater are the
exchange costs. Why then do agents carry out bookkeeping, etc., at all? There is
not some fixed amount of bookkeeping, enforcement and monitoring that facilitates
any given transaction. The exchange cost is the cost of not allocating resources
to bookkeeping, etc. We prefer to think of agents choosing the extent to which
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such contractual procedures are carried out. Given preferences, technologies and
endowments, then, exchange costs are an endogenous result of the marginal costs
and benefits of carrying out the formation, writing and enforcement of complex
contracts.
This derives from a trade-off underpinning the determination of exchange costs.
A ‘cost’ of bookkeeping, etc., implies that forming contracts is a costly process.
Further, agents can choose to not form a comprehensively complete contract if
the costs are large relative to the gains from doing so. In making exchange costs
endogenous, we are able to rationalise, in some senses, the existence of the opti-
mally [in]complete contracts subject to constraints noted in Hart and Moore (1999).
Boyd and Prescott (1985) stress the importance of contracting to the formation of
intermediary-coalitions (under conditions of asymmetric information). In their in-
terpretation, an intermediary can be thought of as announcing a complex system of
group rules, to which potential coalition members can choose to attach themselves.
Despite their complexity, however, these contracts are not costly to form in the
Boyd-Prescott economy. And yet, following on from the remarks by Coase noted
at the beginning of this Chapter, it seems desirable to have these costs reflected
in the allocations that are feasible. Indeed, by making exchange costs endogenous
within a numerically tractable model we are able to capture, in a quantitative way,
the argument that resources directed at reducing transactions costs can comprise
a large portion of economy activity.
Of course, there is more to exchange costs than incomplete contracts. In addi-
tion, the existence of physical barriers to exchange (such as inadequate transporta-
tion networks), human capital shortcomings (too few trained lawyers, for example)
and problems in communication (such as a language barrier) can add to costs of
physical exchange. None of these can necessarily be considered to constitute an
incomplete ex ante contract, but they are problems which can be ameliorated with
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the allocation of resources. Furthermore, we are not offering here a microeconomic
model linking contractual incompleteness with the existence of costly exchange.
As such, we leave a fuller discussion of this incomplete contract interpretation to
Section 4.7. For the moment, we concentrate on the central feature of our model:
An agent not only chooses the market into which she will diversify but also the re-
sources to be allocated to the amelioration of ex post exchange costs and, as such,
the effectiveness of the ex ante arrangement.
Outline of this Chapter
The rest of this Chapter is set out as follows. In Section 4.1 we set out the basic
structure of our economy. In Section 4.2 we examine cooperative equilibria, of a
particular sort, and examine feasibility. We turn to the issue of decentralizing our
cooperative solution in Section 4.3. In Sections 4.4 and 4.5 we begin to address
some political economy issues. First, we discuss the feasibility of economy-wide
institutions emerging in our simple set-up, and then in Section 4.5 we turn to the
issue of heterogeneity. Section 4.6 discusses some detailed numerical simulations of
our model that shed light on some important issues that we refer to. Section 4.7
discusses the model in the light of the incomplete contract literature and concludes
with some implications for future work.
4.1 The Economy
Our basic set-up is inspired by Townsend (1978). A virtue of that work over a
number of other transaction cost general equilibrium models is that it allows us
to consider, in a tractable fashion, a non-convex technology of exchange that gives
rise to specialisation. In our economy, there is a countable infinity of agents, i ∈ I.
Each agent i receives an endowment, ei = {ki, λi} . Capital ki ∈ <+ can be used
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in conjunction with a stochastic linear production technology, λi ∈ Λ ⊆ <+, which
is i.i.d. across agents. Agent i produces consumption good, λiyi, where yi is the
amount of capital used in production. We assume that all agents receive the same
k.25 Agents can also use their endowment to buy shares in a consumption bundle
of other agents’ output. All agents have the same (CRRA) utility function, ui (c),
so we typically drop the superscript i. The probability of receiving some λ ∈ Λ
is p (λ) ∈ (0, 1), ∑λ∈Λ p (λ) = 1. The average technology in the economy is then
λ¯ =
∑
λ∈Λ p (λ)λ. Agents know p (λ) for all λ ∈ Λ, so they also observe λ¯. Let ω
represent the state of nature, i.e., a list of λi for all i ∈ I where the ith element
of ω, denoted ωi, is λi. Let Ω be the set of all possible states of nature, and
p (ω) = p(ω1) × p(ω2) × · · · × p(ωI) the probability of some ω ∈ Ω. An agent’s
expected utility is V =
∑
ω∈Ω p(ω)u (c (ω)).
Agents are risk-averse and so they have an incentive ex ante to invest in a
diversified consumption bundle, a portfolio, if one is available. They can do so
by forming markets in which agents meet to share risk before the realisation of
ω. The diversification between agents is naturally subject to the formation of ex
ante arrangements. In a world in which ex ante arrangements are what we term
‘perfectly effective’, the ex post exchange is free; there are no costs to the exchange
and diversification takes place across all agents. Agents have formed securities
that allow them to diversify against all idiosyncratic risk. If, however, ex ante
arrangements are only partially effective there are expected to be some associated
losses, which we think of as a simple ‘ex post exchange cost’. In the event that ex
ante arrangements do not specify actions for all ω ∈ Ω, ex post costs to exchange
are greater than zero.
In the manner of Hart and Moore (2006), there can exist ex ante perfect com-
25An alternative procedure suggested to us was to dispense with the technology endowment and
have stochastic endowments. Though technically possible, agents would have no ex ante resources
with which to form costly arrangements. Ex post, then, there would be no sharing of endowments;
risk sharing in our model is a costly process and requires that agents have some resources ex ante.
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petition and ex post bilateral monopoly in exchange arrangements; so agents who
form an ex ante arrangement under competitive conditions can be said to be locked-
in to that arrangement ex post.26 So agents choose to form an ex ante agreement
that ties themselves to both ex post exchange and the cost of that exchange. The
degree of effectiveness of an arrangement between agents is indexed on Π = [0, 1].
We let piij ∈ Π be the effectiveness of some arrangement between two agents i ∈ I
and j ∈ I with j 6= i. Of course, piij = 1 if i = j. Since the null arrangement is
Πnull = {0}, partially effective and perfectly effective arrangements are denoted by
pi ∈ Π\Πnull.
τ is ∈ [0, 1] and τ ig ∈ [0, 1] are the proportions of the endowment agent i con-
tributes to specific and general amelioration respectively, where τ is + τ
i
g ≤ 1. Let
τ i =
{
τ is, τ
i
g
}
.
piij is determined by the following mapping,
piij = F (Sij, G),
where,
Sij ≤ S ij = 1
2
(
τ is + τ
j
s
)
k;
G ≤ G = 1
#I
∑
i∈I
τ igk.
G reflects the general ameliorating capital in the economy, that is public amelio-
rating arrangements, and G total ameliorating capital raised. Sij reflects specific,
excludable ameliorating capital between agents i and j. (We have let Sij ≤ S ij
and G ≤ G to allow for the possibility of rents to intermediation or the provision
of institutions, respectively.) F (., .) is continuous, increasing, strictly concave and
26And, indeed, in a general equilibrium sense it might be optimal for agents to choose to tie
themselves down in this way, if there is some penalty against deviation.
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separable in its arguments, mapping from ameliorating capital into arrangement
effectiveness. We assume further Inada-type conditions. First, the limits of the
function are defined as F (0, 0) = 0 and F (Sij, G)→ 1 as {Sij, G} → {∞,∞}. Let
us define F n(Sij, G) as the first derivative of the function F with respect to its nth
argument, xn. So, second, first derivatives with respect to each variable approach
F n(Sij, G) → ∞ as xn → 0, and F n(Sij, G) → 0 as xn → {∞}, for n ∈ {1, 2}. If
agents do not allocate resources to amelioration, the null arrangement obtains. If
the F function varies across agents, then issues of power and political influence will
come into sharper relief. For now, we assume homogeneity across agents in this
respect. We outline some of these further issues in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
We let αij be the cost of a single exchange between agent i and j,
αij =
(
1− piij) k. (4.1)
So, the more effective the arrangement, the lower the exchange cost. Further, the
exchange cost is zero when arrangements are perfectly effective (piij = 1), and
exchange costs are equal to k under the null arrangement, (piij = 0). Therefore,
if agents devote no resources to forming an arrangement, they cannot gain from
diversification unless amelioration is costless.
4.1.1 Intermediation
A coalition is a set of agents C ⊆ I with cardinality #C. The set of agents with
whom agent i ∈ I exchanges directly is denoted N i. A coalition C constitutes a
market M if #C < ℵ0 = #I and for all i ∈ C, N i ⊆ C and where there is no
coalition B ⊂ C for which, for all i ∈ B, N i ⊆ B. We can think about the size
of the market M in terms of its cardinality, #M . Where #M < ℵ0 we call M
finite-sized. The set of all markets in the economy is A, so ⋃M∈AM = I.
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Agent h is said to act as an intermediary if N i = h for i ∈M\h and Nh =M\h.
So markets are disjoint; agents only exchange with one intermediary. Where H is
the set of all intermediaries in the economy, let Mh be the market intermediated
by agent h ∈ H ⊆ I. Agents exchange their endowment of capital on a one-for-one
basis for shares in the portfolio put together by the intermediary, subject to their
contribution to amelioration and their being able to meet their share of the ex post
exchange cost.
We think of an intermediary as forming a single multilateral arrangement of
effectiveness level pih ∈ Π that defines the exchange costs for transactions between
each market participant and the intermediary, αh =
(
1− pih) k. In an homogeneous
set-up, this generalisation loses us nothing. In some ways, we may think of an
intermediary specializing by forming a multilateral arrangement. We denote specific
ameliorating capital in a market M intermediated by agent h as Sh. For example,
if,
Sh = g
(
#Mh
) ∑
i∈Mh
τ isk,
then the function g(#Mh) determines the effect of increasing the number of agents
in the arrangement on the aggregation of ameliorating capital. We could, for exam-
ple, let g (#M) = (#M)−1; this would correspond to taking ameliorating capital
as the average contribution from agents in a market. This is what we (must) do
in the general capital formulation, otherwise economy-wide amelioration would be
priced at either infinity or zero, so we typically allow g to take this form for sym-
metry.27 It follows that exchange costs for an agent in a market intermediated by
agent h is αh =
(
1− pih) k where pih = F (Sh, G) is the degree of effectiveness of
the multilateral arrangement. To diversify in a market of size #M intermediated
27Perhaps, this is a natural modelling choice: A multilateral arrangement with some level of
ameliorating capital per person has the same level of effectiveness as a bilateral arrangement
with the same level of ameliorating capital per person. Otherwise, we could have let g (#M) =
(#M)−2; this would make larger arrangements (ones covering more agents) progressively harder
to write. Letting g (#M) = 1 would make larger arrangements progressively easier to write.
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by agent h, each agent thus pays 2αh (#M−1)
#M
in per capita bilateral exchange costs.
4.2 Cooperative equilibrium
Definition 4.1 An allocation xh = {ci, yi, τ i; i ∈ Mh} is feasible for market Mh
intermediated by agent h if, for all ω ∈ Ω,
∑
i∈Mh
(
1− τ is − τ ig
)
k − yi ≥ 2αh (#Mh − 1) ; (4.2)∑
i∈Mh
λi(ω)yi ≥
∑
i∈Mh
ci(ω); (4.3)
G ≤ G = 1
#I
∑
i∈I
τ igk; (4.4)
Sh ≤ Sh = 1
#Mh
∑
i∈Mh
τ isk; (4.5)
αh = (1− pih)k; (4.6)
pih = F (Sh, G). (4.7)
The composition, C(Mh), of a market intermediated by h is denoted by the
n-tuple: C(Mh) = {#Mh; {τ i}i∈Mh ;SMh ;αh; pih}.
Before looking at a decentralised case, we first examine a cooperative version of
the model where we designate agents at random to set up a market. We characterise
the equilibrium of the model and then show, under certain conditions, that it is in
the core.
The intermediary’s problem can be characterised as follows in a way that ensures
feasibility of the resulting allocation:
max
C(Mh)
EU
[{(
1− τ is − τ ig
)
k −
(
#Mh − 1
#Mh
)
2αh
}(
#Mh
)−1 ∑
i∈Mh
λi
]
|{τ i}i∈I .
(4.8)
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The expected utility of an agent i ∈Mh is contingent on the behaviour of agents i ∈
A\Mh because of the public-good nature of the general amelioration. If the market
to which agent i belongs is finite-sized, its contributions to the institution will not
cause changes in general amelioration unless agents in other markets contribute
also. We assume that some commitment technology exists such that intermediaries
across markets can cooperate. We deal with decentralization later.
Equation (4.8) may be written as,
E
[
u
(
ci
)]
=
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω)u
{[
(1− τs − τg) k −
2αh
(
#Mh − 1)
#Mh
]
λ¯
(
ω,Mh
)}
,
=
∑
ω∈Ω
p (ω)u
{[
(1− τs − τg) k − 2
[
1− F (Sh, G)] k(#Mh − 1)
#Mh
]
λ¯
(
ω,Mh
)}
, (4.9)
where λ¯
(
ω,Mh
)
is the average technology in market Mh given the state of nature
ω. Optimality in each market Mh with #Mh ≥ 1 requires,
2
(
#Mh − 1
#Mh
)
k
∂F
(
Sh, G
)
∂Sh
= 1; (4.10)
2
(
#Mh − 1
#Mh
)
k
∂F
(
Sh, G
)
∂G
= 1. (4.11)
The number of technologies, so long as there are two or more, does not matter;
the optimal arrangement for a given market size will always have to satisfy these
conditions. Propositions 4.1–4.3 will help us characterise the core of this econ-
omy. Before that, Lemma 4.1 will help us to establish the uniqueness of optimal
outcomes.
Lemma 4.1 The solution to equations (4.10) and (4.11) for a given market size
#M > 1 and endowment k is a unique pair of contributions, τ#M =
{
τ#Ms , τ
#M
g
}
where τ#Ms > 0 and τ
#M
g > 0 for #M > 1. For #M = 1 we have τ
#M
s = 0 and
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τ#Mg = 0.
Proof. This is a proof by contradiction. Fix #M > 1. Suppose for a given k there
is a unique optimal specific contribution τ ′s but two optimal general contributions,
τ ′g and τ
′′
g 6= τ ′g. By the strict concavity of F in G, it cannot be the case that (4.10)
and (4.11) are satisfied for both
{
τ ′s, τ
′
g
}
and
{
τ ′s, τ
′′
g
}
. Likewise for a unique τ ′g and
two specific contributions τ ′s and τ
′′
s 6= τ ′s. There is thus some unique pair of optimal
contributions for any given market size τ#M =
{
τ#Ms , τ
#M
g
}
. From the properties
of F (.) we know that these unique solutions to equations (4.10) and (4.11) require
τ#Ms > 0 and τ
#M
g > 0. For #M = 1, we require by equations (4.10) and (4.11)
that F x =∞ for x = {s, g}, which happens only when τ#Ms = 0 and τ#Mg = 0.
So, if an agent trades with at least one other agent, some amount of specific and
general amelioration is jointly optimal. In the current set-up, all agents in all mar-
kets contribute the same. The relative efficacy of general and specific amelioration
determines the equilibrium balance between each form of arrangement.
We wish to consider the behaviour of the economy as the level of wealth changes.
Three propositions can be formalised.
Proposition 4.1 For a given endowment, optimal contributions rise, ex ante ar-
rangements become more effective and exchange costs fall as the market size in-
creases.
Proof. Since 2
(
#M−1
#M
)
is increasing in #M , F ′s and F
′
g must fall to satisfy opti-
mality. So for a given k, τ#Mg and τ
#M
s rise in #M . As pi
h = F (Sh, G), the optimal
degree of arrangement effectiveness increases in market size. Since αh =
(
1− pih) k,
exchange costs decrease as the market size increases.
So we know that as agents further diversify, ceteris paribus, ex ante ameliorating
costs rise, arrangements become more effective and exchange costs fall. To consider
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the behaviour of the economy as the level of the endowment increases, we first
consider the optimal choices over amelioration for a given market size.
Proposition 4.2 For a given market size greater than one, optimal contributions
can rise, ex ante arrangements become more effective and the exchange cost either
rises or falls with the endowment.
Proof. A corollary of Lemma 4.1 is that for a given market size greater than one
and given the level of the endowment, the optimizing choice of
{
Sh, G
}
is unique
and positive.
We can re-write the optimisation problem as,
max
S,G
{k − S −G− θk[1− F (S,G)]} , (4.12)
where θ = 2
(
#M−1
#M
)
. The first-order conditions are,
θk
∂F
∂S
= 1 (4.13)
θk
∂F
∂G
= 1 (4.14)
It is clear by the concavity of F that S and G are increasing in k; but it is unclear
whether this means that τs and τg are also increasing in k since we have that τs(k) =
S(k)
k
. Under some further restrictions on F , let us assume that τs is increasing in k.
We know that pi is rising, that is, the optimal degree of arrangement effectiveness
increases as the economy becomes richer. This means, however, that the effect on
exchange cost, α = (1− pi) k is ambiguous. We require ∂α
∂k
= 1− pi∗ (k)− ∂pi
∂k
k < 0
for the case in which the exchange cost falls in the level of the endowment. We have
that ∂α
∂k
= 1 − pi − k [∂F
∂S
∂S
∂k
+ ∂F
∂G
∂G
∂k
]
. Using the marginal conditions, this reduces
to θ ∂α
∂k
= θ(1 − pi) −
[
τs + τg + k
(
∂τs
∂k
+ ∂τg
∂k
)]
. Given our assumption on F , as k
becomes large (and as pi approaches unity) so exchange costs will fall in k. As k
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approaches zero, however, though ∂τs
∂k
and ∂τg
∂k
may become very large we cannot
without further restriction on F know that ∂α
∂k
will not be positive. It may be that
exchange costs at first rise in the endowment, before falling.
Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 characterise the behaviour of the economy in only
a partial equilibrium way; either as the market size changes holding endowment
constant or as the endowment changes holding market size constant. We wish to
be able to speak of the behaviour of the economy as the endowment increases given
an optimal choice of market size.
We may characterise more formally the intermediary’s problem. We know the
optimal arrangement for every k and #M . Preferences and scale effects in ame-
lioration then determine the optimal level of diversification. The choice facing the
intermediary is to optimise over market size, given knowledge of the optimal ar-
rangement for each market size. Let Γ be the set of integers that maximise expected
utility,
Γ = argmax
#M
EU
{[(
1− τ#Ms − τ#Mg
)
k
− 2 [1− F (Sh, G)] k(#M − 1
#M
)]
(#M)−1
∑
i∈M
λi
}
, (4.15)
where
{
τ#Ms , τ
#M
g
}
are the solutions to equations (4.10) and (4.11). We may also
deduce that Γ, assuming Γ 6= {Ø} , can have at most two elements. This is a
corollary of Proposition 4.3.
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Proposition 4.3 Expected utility is continuous and strictly increasing in the en-
dowment; market size is weakly increasing in the endowment.
Proof. Where #M = 1 it is clear from equation (4.9) that expected utility is
increasing in k. We can see from the equation for exchange costs that limk→0 α = k.
As such, EU#M=1 > EUany #M>1 for some k > 0 must hold. Given that τ (and so
also α) is continuous in k for a given market size, expected utility is also continuous
in k for a given #M . Let κ = (k − y) /k = τs + τg + 2
(
#M−1
#M
)
(1− pi) be the
proportional cost of optimal amelioration and exchange, itself continuous in k. The
parameter κ is, then, the extent of per capita non-production costs. The choice of
optimal market size will be determined by κ and the risk aversion parameter; i.e.,
agents are keen to diversify but will only do so when the marginal cost of doing so
meets the marginal benefit. We know that as κ→ 1, no diversification is optimal.
If diversification to some market size #M ′ > 1 takes place, it must be that ∂κ
∂k
=
∂τs
∂k
+ ∂τg
∂k
− 2
(
#M ′−1
#M ′
)
∂pi
∂k
< 0 at some k#M ′ > 0 at which EU#M=1 = EU#M=#M ′ ,
i.e., that the share allocated to production, and so expected utility, is increasing in
k before and beyond k#M ′ .
∂κ
∂k
=
∂τs
∂k
+
∂τg
∂k
− θ
[
∂F
∂S
(
k
∂τs
∂k
+ τs
)
+
∂F
∂G
(
k
∂τg
∂k
+ τg
)]
;
= −
(
θk
∂F
∂S
− 1
)
∂τs
∂k
−
(
θk
∂F
∂G
− 1
)
∂τg
∂k
− θ
(
τs
∂F
∂S
+ τg
∂F
∂G
)
,
which, using the optimality conditions, becomes,
∂κ
∂k
= −(τs + τg)/k < 0. (4.16)
As k increases the same argument follows for further diversification: For diver-
sification to #M ′′ > #M ′, it must be that expected utility is sufficiently increasing
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before and after some k#M ′′ > k#M ′ at which EU#M ′ = EU#M ′′ . Globally, ex-
pected utility is the envelope of expected utility for each market size.
In other words, for some finite market size #M ′ to be an equilibrium, it must
be that #M ′ + i, for i = 1, 2, ..., exhibits a greater degree of non-production costs
and that those larger production costs are not sufficiently compensated by addi-
tional risk insurance. As k increases κ falls across all #M , so the addition to
non-production costs from diversifying further becomes equal to the marginal util-
ity gain from diversification.
Even in where exchange costs are rising in k, then, diversification is possible
if the share of the endowment spent on amelioration and exchange is decreasing
fast enough and if agents value diversification enough. When exchange costs fall
as the level of the endowment increases further, for a given market size, optimal
contributions rise but exchange costs fall. Under some conditions on F , expected
utility will be strictly concave in k.
The above serves as a description of the mechanics of our model: As the endow-
ment increases, contributions to amelioration rise while also increasing expected
utility. As the proportional cost of diversifying further falls, so the optimal market
size increases.
A further implication of Proposition 4.3 is that Γ can be comprised of two
elements. We make the simplifying, but not unrealistic, assertion that there exists
some arbitrarily small exchange cost, ε, to coordinating general amelioration; we
could think of the cost of collecting taxes, for example. As such, the institution
would wish to minimise the measure of intermediaries from which it had to receive
a contribution to general amelioration. If, in the case that ε = 0, optimal market
size is not unique, i.e., that Γ = {#M ′,#M ′ + 1}, then a positive ε would cause
the larger of the two optimal market sizes to be selected. In general we allow this
arbitrarily small ε to approach zero. Let us suppose that an institution can enforce
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intermediary choice of the supremum. As such, we do not formally model it, but still
select max {Γ} as the solution to equation (4.15). We are then in a position to define
the unique first-best allocation. Given this concept, and following Propositions
4.1–4.3 and Lemma 4.1, we have that the endowment and optimal contributions
are bijective: For any k there is a unique pair of τ ∗; for any τ ∗ there can be only
one k.
The relative sizes of τs and τ, as well as the interaction between them, will
depend on the form of F . We develop a tractable analysis for a CES amelioration
technology in Section 4.6 below.
4.2.1 Core and equilibrium
Definition 4.2 The first-best allocation, given technologies, preferences and en-
dowments, is a unique composition for each market M ∈ A, comprising a feasible
choice of market size for each h ∈ H, #M∗ = max {Γ}, and the unique optimal
allocations {τ i} = {τ ∗} for all i ∈ I which are the solutions to equations (4.10)
and (4.11) with #Mh = #M∗. It follows that there is an unique optimal level of
general ameliorating capital, G∗ = τ ∗g k, and unique optimal specific ameliorating
capital, SM
∗
= S∗ = τ ∗s k, for each market M ∈ A, and, as such, a unique opti-
mal degree of ex ante arrangement effectiveness pi∗ = F (S∗, G∗) and exchange cost
α∗ = (1− pi∗) k.
Clearly, this definition relies on us stretching in a somewhat unappealing way
the notion of “cooperation”; it requires all other intermediaries to allocate resources
to general amelioration. We return to this issue below.
Proposition 4.4 The core of a cooperative economy can support the first-best al-
location.
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Proof. Consider the proposed allocation: xh = {c∗, y∗, τ ∗,#M∗; i ∈ Mh} for all
h ∈ H. This n-tuple determines F (S∗, G∗), pi∗ and hence α∗. Let us suppose a
strict subset of agents in the market intermediated by h, B ⊂ Mh, can form a
blocking coalition. We may view this set of agents as a market. Our notion of the
cooperative equilibrium across intermediaries necessitates that the blocking coali-
tion cannot deviate from contributing τ ∗g on average. (Otherwise, as demonstrated
in Proposition 4.5 an allocation with τ ig = 0 for all i ∈ I would block the first-best
allocation. We reserve these questions for the purely non-cooperative case.)
So, the blocking intermediary is choosing τBs given the market size #B < #M
h.
These agents are better off with the following program which implies an alternative,
unique allocation, xB:
ci = c¯, τ ig = τ
∗
g , ∀i ∈ B;
1 = 2
(
#B − 1
#B
)
F ′s
(
SB, G∗
)
.
The consumption profile follows from optimizing over CRRA utility functions and
the second condition was derived above. By Proposition 4.1 we note that taxes
are strictly lower, arrangements strictly more ineffective and exchange costs strictly
higher. There are fewer transactions in this proposed market but each is more
costly. In addition, the investment portfolio is less diversified. By Proposition
4.3, and given that market size and contributions deviate from first-best, it must
be that the higher exchange cost and less diversification is not compensated for by
the fewer transactions, and must cause expected utility to be lower. Now consider
the case B ⊃ M. The same logic follows: In this proposed market, exchange costs
are strictly lower, taxes higher and arrangements more ineffective. The deviation
from first-best means that expected utility must be lower than in market M . We
conclude that the cooperative allocation is in the core. Further, if Γ 6= Ø the core
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is non-empty and #M is the unique, optimal market size; hence core allocations
are allocations of the cooperative economy. If Γ = Ø core allocations do not exist.
4.3 Non-cooperative equilibrium
We need to consider whether the cooperative equilibria characterised in the previous
Subsection can be supported as equilibrium outcomes in a non-cooperative economy.
We suggested above that voluntary contributions to general amelioration will be
zero in the absence of inter-coalition cooperation; here we see that outcome in a
fully non-cooperative set-up. Given this result, we need to look at mechanisms that
can support some level of general amelioration, and whether this level is optimal.
Proposition 4.5 In the core, voluntary contributions to general amelioration are
zero.
Proof. Consider an equilibrium in which τ ig = 0 ∀ i ∈ I, so that G = 0. We
can find a level of specific amelioration that is optimal, with τ is = τ
∗∗
s , ∀ i ∈ I.
Let expected utility for each agent i ∈ I be EU i = EU0. Suppose there exists
a blocking coalition B such that an agent b ∈ B proposes τ bg > 0 for i ∈ B. If
#B < ℵ0, then G = 0 obtains. As such, it follows that EU i < EU0 for all i ∈ B.
Suppose, however that #B = ℵ0 and that an agent b ∈ B proposes τ bg > 0 for
i ∈ B. In this case G = Gb > 0. It follows from Lemma 4.1 that some positive
level of G is optimal, so we can have EU i > EU0 for each i ∈ B. But there exists
a blocking coalition B′ ⊂ B in which some agent b′ ∈ B′ proposes τ b′g = 0 for each
i ∈ B′. Since #B′ < ℵ0 we still have G = Gb. For each i ∈ B′, EU i must be
greater than or equal to that for each i ∈ B. So while there can exist blocking
coalitions which propose τ bg > 0 for some i ∈ B, they themselves are not in the
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core. Core equilibria can only be strategies in which τ ig = 0 for all i ∈ I. Voluntary
contributions to general amelioration are zero.
As we suggested in the previous Section, Proposition 4.5 can also be proven
using a weakened cooperative concept of the core, i.e., one with intra- but not inter-
coalitional cooperation. This result is invariant to the level of specific amelioration:
Any intermediation strategy in which the allocation to general amelioration is non-
zero will be blocked. We have seen that some cooperative equilibrium concepts
can retrieve optimal outcomes in both specific and general amelioration. Given the
failure of general amelioration under weaker definitions of cooperative equilibrium
we must also consider a different equilibrium concept to resurrect the existence of
the public good features of our setup. We must proceed to see whether the optimal
non-cooperative strategies of both intermediating and non-intermediating agents
can be supported in some forms of decentralised, non-cooperative strategies.
Noncooperative Strategies following Townsend (1978)
We now develop an understanding of the non-cooperative equilibria of our economy.
We proceed, first with optimisation for a given market size, and, second, optimal
choice of market size. The first step is substantially more involved than the second.
Townsend (1978) has demonstrated that cooperative equilibria in a special case of
the economy we have developed can be decentralised. In our set-up things are less
straightforward because of both the public good aspect of general amelioration and
the decision to ameliorate, but we follow his general procedure for decentralisation.
Let any agent h ∈ I propose strategy P h for intermediating in a market. This
strategy has eight components: Mh is the market proposed by agent h; P h1 is the
yield in terms of the consumption good for one share in the portfolio of agent h;
P h2 is the price in terms of the capital good at which agent h is willing to buy an
unlimited number of shares in any project i of Mh; P h3 is a fixed fee in terms of
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the capital good for the purchase of shares in the portfolio of agent h by i ∈ Mh;
P h4 is the price in terms of the capital good at which agent h is willing to sell an
unlimited number of shares in her portfolio to agents i of Mh; τhs is the proportion
of the capital endowment that agent h proposes to use in improving the excludable
transactions technology; τhg is the proportion of the capital endowment that agent
h proposes to use to contribute to the public good transactions technology. Finally,
αh(pi) is the choice as to the overall effectiveness of transactions technology, our ex
post exchange cost. Of course, it is not strictly necessary to include αh(pi) in the
definition of the strategy space. However, it aids intuition, we think, to do so. For
example, it is useful to think of an intermediary optimizing over αh(pi) and then
optimizing over the pair
{
τhs , τ
h
g
}
. In what follows QihD is the quantity of shares
purchased by i in h’s portfolio, whilst QhiS is the quantity of shares sold by i to h.
Aih is a switching function, where Aih = 1 if agent i buys shares in the portfolio of
intermediary h, and Aih = 0 otherwise.
Step 1: Optimisation for a given #M. Optimisation by a non-intermediary
entails the maximisation of expected utility by choice of
{
QihD , Q
hi
S , y
i, Aih
}
,
∑
h:i∈Mh
[
Aih
] [
EU
(
QihDP
h
1 + y
iλi −QhiS λi
)]
, (4.17)
subject to the following contraints regarding feasibility and participation,
[ ∑
h:i∈Mh
(
Aih
) (
(1− τhs − τhg )ki +QhiS P h2 −QihDP h4 − P h3 − α(pih)− yi
)] ≥ 0; (4.18)
ci(ω) =
[ ∑
h:i∈Mh
(
Aih
) (
QihDP
h
1 (ω) + y
iλi(ω)−QhiS λi(ω)
)] ≥ 0,∀ω ∈ Ω; (4.19)
Aih = 1⇒ Aij = 0,∀i such that i ∈M j,∀j 6= h. (4.20)
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An intermediary chooses strategies to maximise,
EU
(
yhλh +
∑
i∈Mh
[
QhiS λ
i −QihDP h1
])
, (4.21)
subject to,
[
(1− τhs − τhg )kh − α(pih) (#M − 1)− yh +
∑
i∈Mh
[
QihDP
h
4 + P
h
3 −QhiS P h2
]] ≥ 0; (4.22)
ch(ω) =
[∑
i∈Mh
[
QhiS λ
i(ω)−QihDP h1 (ω)
]
+ yhλh(ω)
]
≥ 0,∀ω ∈ Ω; (4.23)
G ≤ G = 1
#I
∑
i∈I
τ igk; (4.24)
Sh ≤ Sh = 1
#Mh
∑
i∈Mh
τ isk; (4.25)
αh = (1− pih)k; (4.26)
pih = F (Sh, G); (4.27)∑
i∈Mh
P h3 − α (#M − 1) = −2α
(#M − 1)
#M
; (4.28)
P h3 =
α (#M − 2)
#M
. (4.29)
An equilibrium of this non-cooperative game is a set of actions
{
QijS∗, Q
ji
D∗, A
ij
∗
}
and a strategy P i∗ =
{
M i∗, P
i
1∗, P
i
2∗, P
i
3∗, P
i
4∗, τ
i
s∗, τ
i
g∗, α
i
∗(pi)
}
for each agent i ∈ I
(where for any variable x, we use the following convention: xii = 0), an allocation
{ci∗, yi∗; i ∈ I} and a set of markets which satisfy:
1. If agent i is not an intermediary (QjiD∗ = 0,∀j ∈ I) then
{
yi∗, Q
ij
S∗, Q
ji
D∗, A
ih
∗ , τ
hi
s∗ , τ
hi
g∗ , α
hi
∗ (pi)
}
maximises (4.17) subject to (4.18), (4.19) and (4.20) and P h = P h∗ ∀h 6= i. ci∗
is given by (4.19).
2. All agents participate in one market, M , the union of which covers the popu-
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lation. In each market there is one intermediary such that h ∈M, Mh∗ =M,
and
{
τ ihs , τ
ih
g , α
ih(pi)
}
=
{
τ ihs∗ , τ
ih
g∗ , α
ih
∗ (pi)
}
. For each i ∈ M − h, Aih = 1. For
every such h, P h is feasible, with yh chosen to maximise (4.21) subject to
(4.22) and (4.23). ch∗ is given by (4.23).
3. There exist no blocking strategies for any agent of I.
For solutions in the core, we know that contributions to general amelioration
are zero; we demonstrated that in Proposition 4.5 and so by Property 3 above
such contributions are not part of the equilibrium.
In the same way as with the cooperative case, we can characterise the optimal
strategies for intermediaries and non-intermediaries for a given market size. As
such, the following unconstrained optimization delivers the supporting price vector
holding #M constant. In a sense, agents carry out the optimisation for a sufficiently
large range of #M and each optimally selects that #M which maximises expected
utility. In what follows we reduce notational clutter by noting that when we write
x we really mean x(ω).
The Lagrangian for agents in an economy who are not an intermediary is given
by,
LNI = EU (QihDP h1 + yiλi −QhiS λi) (4.30)
−φ [(1− τhs − τhg )ki +QhiS P h2 −QihDP h4 − P h3 − α(pih)− yi]
+µ
[
QihDP
h
1 (ω) + y
iλi(ω)−QhiS λi(ω)− c(ω)
]
.
First-order necessary conditions for non-intermediaries include,
U ′(·)λi + φ+ µλi = 0; (4.31)
−U ′(·)λi − P h2 φ− µλi = 0; (4.32)
U ′(·)P h1 + φP h4 + µP h1 = 0. (4.33)
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Equations (4.31) and (4.32) together imply that P h2 = 1, and so it follows that
P h4 = 1.
We can write down an intermediary’s problem in a similar way. The Lagrangian
follows,
LI = EU
(
yhλh +
∑
i∈Mh
[
QhiS λ
i −QihDP h1
])
(4.34)
−φh
[
(1− τhs − τhg )kh − α(pih) (#M − 1)− yh +
∑
i∈Mh
[
QihDP
h
4 + P
h
3 −QhiS P h2
]]
+µh
[∑
i∈Mh
[
QhiS λ
i(ω)−QihDP h1 (ω)
]
+ yhλh(ω)− c(ω)
]
−ηh
[∑
i∈Mh
P h3 − (1− F (Sh, G))k (#M − 1) + 2(1− F (Sh, G))k
(#M − 1)
#M
]
By Proposition 4.5 we know that the shadow price of general amelioration will
be zero, so G = 0 holds. The first-order necessary conditions simplify, and include:
U ′(·)
∑
i∈Mh
λi + φh (#M)P h2 + µ
h
∑
i∈Mh
λi = 0; (4.35)
−U ′(·) (#M)P h1 − φh (#M)P h4 − µh (#M)P h1 = 0; (4.36)
U ′(·)λh + φh + µhλh = 0; (4.37)
φhk−φhF ′(Sh, 0)(#M−1)k−ηhF ′(Sh, 0)(#M−1)k+2ηhF ′(Sh, 0)k (#M − 1)
#M
= 0.
(4.38)
Using P2 = P4 = 1, it follows that,
P h1 = −
φh
U ′(·) + µh , (4.39)
and,
U ′(·) = −φ
h (#M)P h2∑
i∈Mh
λi
− µh. (4.40)
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Therefore,
P h1 =
(
1
#M
) ∑
i∈Mh
λi. (4.41)
Finally, we have,
P h3 = [1− F (Sh, 0)k]
(#M − 2)
#M
. (4.42)
Since they are the shadow prices of dual constraints we have φh = −ηh, so then
(4.38) implies,
1 = 2F ′(Sh, 0)
(#M − 1)
#M
. (4.43)
This expression, when evaluated, is the same as equation (4.10), in the absence of
general amelioration. Equation (4.43) determines the unique optimal contribution
to specific amelioration, τ#Ms , for a given market size, #M . This completes the
characterisation of the optimal strategy for all agents in a market intermediated by
agent h as,
P i∗ =
{
Mh,
(
1
#Mh
) ∑
i∈Mh
λi, 1, [1− F (Sh, 0)k] (#M − 2)
#M
,
1, τs∗, 0,
(
1− F (Sh, 0)k)} ,∀i ∈Mh,∀h ∈ H.
Proposition 4.6 In the core, specific amelioration is optimal and intermediary
rents are zero.
Proof. Consider some level of endowments, preferences and technologies such that
SˆM is the optimal level of specific amelioration for each M ∈ A. There is no
general amelioration. The optimal average allocation for each market is, therefore,
τˆ ∗∗s = Sˆ
M/kˆ and utility is denoted by EU∗∗. For some market M ∈ A, let B ⊆ M
be a blocking strategy in which an agent b ∈ B proposes allocations in which
τ ib 6= τˆ ∗∗s such that SB 6= SˆM . By definition of the optimality of SˆM it must be
that for some i ∈ B, EU i < EU∗∗. This is the relevant contradiction.
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Step 2: Optimisation over #M. An optimal choice of #M then maximises ex-
pected utility. By Proposition 4.3 we know that this optimal #M∗ will be unique
and our second best equilibrium is well-defined by P i∗ where #M
h = #M∗ for all
h ∈ H. We have thus managed to retrieve one of the main cooperative outcomes
in a non-cooperative setting. Townsend (1978) demonstrates that non-cooperative
equilibria of this sort are in the core, and that all core allocations can be supported
by such non-cooperative equilibria.
4.4 Economy-wide institutions
We have seen that in the absence of cooperation between intermediaries, general
amelioration cannot be in the core. What is required is some government or in-
stitution that has the power to tax and spend. If somehow the “government is
an exogenous, benevolent economic agent”28 then perhaps the first-best, analyzed
in Section 4.2, is attainable. The exogeneity of benevolent governance is a useful
sidestep. But how stable is such governance? How might an heterogeneous case be
resolved? Can a government be formed to represent the median voter, or could it
represent the interests with most to gain from a policy that suits a minority?
Questions of public goods, redistribution and governance in general equilibrium
have been addressed in Aumann and Kurz (1977), among others.29 The key moti-
vating notion there is that a government must reflect in its policies the forces that
keep it in power. This literature has shown that the distribution of voter power
can matter if the task of the government is a redistribution of income. Agents in
a sense can make side-payments to ‘buy’ the votes of other agents. Since in the
homogeneous case there is one public good and one type of agent, we do not need
to worry about these effects in this Section. However, we introduce here a form of
28Aumann and Kurz (1977), p. 1137.
29Also there is Becker (1983) and Lindbeck (1985).
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‘non-cooperative democracy’, and outline its application to an heterogeneous case
in Section 4.5.
In the process of electioneering,30 a group of agents V ⊆ I offer manifestos to
be voted upon. The manifesto Mg = {{Gig}i∈I , G} of each agent g ∈ V includes
taxation levels Gig for each agent i ∈ I as well as promised general amelioration
level G ≤ 1
#M
∑
i∈I G
igki. We assume that there is no deception here; agents who
promise a manifesto follow through with it to the letter. Agent i ∈ I votes for the
manifesto of the agent that will deliver her the highest expected utility where EU i|g′
is the expected utility to agent i if agent g′ forms the government. We let V g
′
denote
the set of agents who vote for the manifesto of agent g′. So, if #V g
′
> #V g
′′
for every
g′′ ∈ V\g′, then agent g′ forms the government, imposes taxation levels and delivers
general amelioration. It is simple to show that core equilibria can be characterised
by each agent i ∈ I being taxed equally and where there is no rent from governing,
i.e., G = 1
#I
∑
i∈I τ
i
gk. Consider the alternative to this. If an agent g
′ ∈ V offers
a manifesto Mg′ = {{Gig′ = τ ′g}i∈I , G′} in which 1#I
∑
i∈I τ
′
gk > G
′ there is some
other agent g′′ ∈ V who offers a manifesto Mg′′ = {{Gig′′ = τ ′g}i∈I , G′′} in which
1
#I
∑
i∈I τ
′
gk > G
′′ > G′ which delivers #V g
′′
> #V g
′
. Given perfect competition
in the political process, the rent from governing is driven to zero.
Proposition 4.7 General and specific amelioration are jointly-optimal and in the
core of an economy with a non-cooperative democracy.
Proof. This is a straightforward corollary of Proposition 4.4.
30In what we are describing here, there is a relation to the work of Besley and Coate (1997) but,
for our analysis, the findings of Aumann, et al., are more directly related. For Besley and Coate,
a candidate possesses a preferred policy and seeks a mandate from citizens to carry through only
that policy; in our economy, agents seek to form a government for purely selfish reasons. Our
model, with a countable infinity of agents and a single (purely) public good, fits more easily into
an economy in which agents bid strategies for governance; the prevailing policy need not be any
individual agent’s idiosyncratic preference. Moreover, a central assumption of Besley and Coate
is that a ‘representative democracy’ exists; if no candidate prevails, the ‘default policy’ does. In
our model, and in reality, the absence of governance is anarchy, i.e., no policy.
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We have demonstrated that some forms of decentralised behaviour can capture
the equilibria of the cooperative environment described in Section 4.2.
4.5 Heterogeneous Agents and Political Economy
The existence of authority and power in bilateral or multilateral contracting under-
lies a considerable amount of contract theory. In the context of general equilibrium
the existence of a power imbalance will be reflected in a stable equilibrium in which
one party extracts rents from another party or group of parties. The analysis above
demonstrated that such rents cannot exist in large and homogeneous economies of
general equilibrium: Specifically, there can be no equilibrium in which one agent
extracts a rent from her market since there is free-entry to the establishment of
markets. Exogenously distinguishing between types of agents along, for example,
employer/employee lines does not easily fit into our concept of exchange, even
though we are looking at similar problems to those involving such differences. An
economy populated by agents differentiated by their ability to form arrangements
might give us more interesting results, however, particularly given that agents of
different type will share the public good. The outcomes of a democratic procedure
in an heterogeneous economy might be expected to differ from the homogeneous
case: In the words of Aumann and Kurz (1977, p. 1137),
the actions of the government, and in particular its tax policies,
can be understood only as an endogenous consequences of the political
forces that enable it to maintain power.
Extensions of our basic model to an heterogenous economy follow, but we leave the
majority of this extension to future work in Nolan and Trew (Forthcoming).
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4.5.1 The Heterogeneous Set-up
Consider that, before agents make any decisions, there is an exogenous and random
allocation of agents to ‘Type’. Agents can be one of a finite number of Types,
indexed on q ∈ Q = {1, ..., n}. We denote the Type of agent i by qi. For any agent
i ∈ I, the probability of being Type q′ ∈ Q, Pr [qi = q′] ∈ (0, 1), is the same for all
q′ ∈ Q and for all i ∈ I. So each agent has the same probability of being any Type.
This necessitates, of course, that Pr [qi = q] = n−1 for all i ∈ I and all q ∈ Q. Let
Iq ⊂ I be the set of all Type q agents, so ∪q∈QIq = I. Since n is finite each set
of Types comprises a countable infinity of agents. There is complete information
following the realisation of Type; every agent i ∈ I knows the Type of any agent
j ∈ I.
Let us restrict heterogeneity to enter only with different specific ameliorating
functions; all other aspects, the general ameliorating function, the degree of risk
aversion and the endowment, are all homogeneous across agents. In other words, for
reasons of education, status, geographic location, intrinsic ability, etc., some agents
in the economy are better able31 to form private and excludable arrangements
that concern the conduct of exchange. An agent of Type 1 is better able to form
arrangements than an agent of Type 2, who is in turn better able than a Type 3
agent, etc.
In Section 4.1 the cost of exchange is determined by the degree of effective-
ness of the ex ante arrangement formed by agents, αij = (1− piij) k, which in the
homogeneous environment is independent of {i, j}. Furthermore, in an interme-
diated market, the exchange cost in a market intermediated by agent h is simply
αh =
(
1− pih) k. Again, this concept is symmetric across all agents. If different
agents have different production technologies over specific arrangements then piij,
31We mean better able in the following sense: An agent a can form an arrangement of effective-
ness pˆi at a lower cost than can an agent b of lesser ability.
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and so αij, is not independent of {i, j}. We can make a simple departure from the
homogeneous case by viewing the agent Type as something akin to a production
parameter. Suppose that ameliorating technologies are additively separable, such
that the degree of effectiveness of an arrangement written between two agents, i
and j, is, where q˜ij is some increasing function of qi and qj,
piij = F q˜
ij
S
(
Sij
)
+ FG (G) .
Suppose also that F q˜
ij
S (S
ij) is strictly decreasing and strictly concave in q˜ij =
(qi + qj) /2. So, for a given S¯ij = S¯lm, we have that F q˜
ij
S
(
S¯ij
)
> F q˜
lm
S
(
S¯lm
)
for
all {i, j, l,m} ∈ ×4I iff q˜ij < q˜lm. As such, the first derivative, ∂F q˜ijS /∂τs is also
decreasing in q˜ij. By the conditions for optimality, equations (4.10) and (4.11),
we know also that as q˜ij rises, so τ ∗s falls for a given market size. As such, since
piij = F q˜
ij
S (S
ij)+FG (G) is decreasing, we know that α
ij = (1− piij) k is increasing in
q˜ij: Ex ante arrangements become more effective as the average Type falls. So long
as market size is constant, changing q˜ does not affect τ ∗g , the optimal contribution to
general amelioration. Type 1 agents possess the most efficient specific amelioration
technology; Type 2 agents possess the second most, etc. And a combination of
Type 1 and Type 2 agents can be more efficient at forming arrangements than two
Type 2 agents.
The extension to an intermediated environment follows: pih = F q˜
h
S
(
Sh
)
+FG (G),
where the production technology FS is strictly decreasing and strictly concave in
q˜h = 1
#Mh
∑
i∈Mh q
i. For a given market size, what happens to expected utility
will depend on its effect on the extent of non-production costs, κ = (k − y) /k =
τs + τg + 2
(
#M−1
#M
)
(1− pi). Suppose that q can take on a continuum of values.
Given that piij is additively separable, we can take the total derivative of pi with
respect to q and show, using also ∂τg
∂q
|#M = 0, that,
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dκ
dq
=
dτs
dq
− 2
(
#M − 1
#M
)(
∂FS
∂q
dq
dq
+ k
∂FS
∂S
dτs
dq
)
;
= −2
(
#M − 1
#M
)
∂FS
∂q
−
[
2
(
#M − 1
#M
)
k
∂FS
∂S
− 1
]
dτs
dq
,
which, using equation (4.10), leaves,
dκ
dq
= −2
(
#M − 1
#M
)
∂FS
∂q
. (4.44)
Since we have that ∂FS
∂q
< 0, it follows that dκ
dq
> 0 where #M > 1; by ∂
2FS
∂q2
> 0, we
have d
2κ
dq2
< 0. For a given market size, arrangements formed by agents with a higher
average Type spend more of their endowment on exchange and amelioration. So,
for a given market size greater than one, arrangements formed by agents of lower
Type have strictly greater expected utility. Of course, we must also consider the
effect of q˜ on optimal market size. If changing q˜ induces a change in optimal #M
then it must be in the direction of reducing optimal market size with increasing
average Type. This not only further reduces expected utility but, by equation
(4.44), also increases the the rate at which κ changes. Proposition 4.8 develops
a useful simplification that we can make.
Proposition 4.8 Agents of different Type do not exchange and have different op-
timal strategies.
Proof. Suppose that it is an equilibrium for agent i to write an ex ante arrangement
with agent j, and for no further diversification to take place. Suppose also that
qi < qj. If costs are equally shared, agent i could do strictly better by forming an
arrangement with any other agent of type q′ < qj. But agent j has an incentive
to make compensating side-payments to i in order to induce her into forming an
ex ante arrangement. It can only be feasible to do so if the gain in utility for
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the agent j is greater than the loss in utility for agent i, and this is ruled-out by
the strict concavity of the function FS in q˜. Expected utility can be written as
EU i =
∑
ω∈Ω p (ω)u
{
[(1− κ) k] λ¯ (ω,Mh)}. For a given market size, then, EU i is
also strictly decreasing and strictly concave in q˜. Consider EU iM ij to be the expected
utility to agent i from diversifying into a market composed of agents i and j. Let
us loosely denote then EU iM ii the expected utility to i from diversifying into a
market with another agent of her own Type32, and EU j
Mjj
likewise. So it is only
feasible for agent j to make any side-payments if EU j
M ij
−EU j
Mjj
> EU iM ii−EU iM ii .
By the strict concavity of FS in q˜, we know that this cannot be the case since
2EUM ij < EU
i
M ii +EU
j
M ii
. This argument continues to hold good with more than
two agents, and is made stronger if the inclusion of the less able agent causes a
reduction in the optimal market size.
For the arrangement to be an equilibrium, then, it must be that qi ≥ qj. Suppose
then that qi > qj. This too is a contradiction since it cannot be feasible for agent
i to make sufficient side-payments: It must be that, in equilibrium, all ex ante
relationships are formed between agents of the same Type, i.e., qi = qj.
Moreover, each agent Type will always have different optimal specific contri-
butions, and will have different optimal general contributions iff optimal market
sizes differ. Specifically, the ‘better’ an agent’s specific amelioration technology,
the greater will be her optimal contributions to each form of amelioration. This
is a straightforward corollary of the conditions for optimality in the homogeneous
case, equations (4.10) and (4.11).
Agents do not mix Type in the formation of ex ante arrangements, and so do
not mix Type when it comes to exchange. Different agent Types essentially operate
in economies joined only by the public good.
32We must remember that we are in a world in which a countable infinity of agents of the same
Type as agent i exist.
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4.5.2 A Two-Type Case and Democratic Outcomes
Suppose there are two Types of agents, Q = {1, 2}. Each agent of Type q has a
first-best strategy P iq . This is the strategy that would be optimal if the economy
was comprised of only agents of type q. Let us suppose that the agent Types are
such that #Mh1 > #M
h
2 > 1 always holds, so we know that τ
1
x > τ
2
x > 0 for
x ∈ {s, g}. In other words, agents of Type 1 tend to favour larger markets and
higher taxes than those of Type 2. Which tax rate, or compromise, prevails?
Agents wish to decide the flat rate of tax, τg, by means of a majority vote. Could
a coalition D of voters comprising slightly greater than a half of the population
tax the complement of D their whole endowment and redistribute it? Following
Aumann and Kurz (1977), we consider an environment in which any agent can, if
she wishes, destroy her endowment in the face of what she perceives to be unfair
taxation. So the majority coalition D cannot pillage those in I\D with abandon; it
must consider the credible threat of agents in I\D to destroy their own endowments.
The procedure is a cooperative one in the sense that threats are credible and that
each agent agrees to abide by the democratic result. The resultant allocations are
competitive, however, in that they can be supported by a vector of prices.
Can the resultant tax differ from one which a benevolent dictator would impose?
Aggregate social welfare is, put simply,
W =
∑
i∈I
θiE
[
ui (τg)
]
, (4.45)
where each θi is a weight on the utility of each individual i ∈ I. The choice of
weights is evidently critical to the tax chosen by the benevolent dictator. Consider
the standard in which the utility of each agent is valued equally, θi = θˆ, ∀i ∈ I.
The solution to (4.45), τˆg = argmaxτg W , is then the socially optimal level of tax
in a purely egalitarian sense. But where agents can vote upon taxation regimes,
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the weights on utility themselves become endogenous; they reflect the power of
each agent. Aumann and Kurz (1977) develop these ideas in the context of a value
allocation following Shapley (1953). We very briefly introduce the concept of the
Shapley value before going on to its implications for political economy.
The Shapley (1953) Value
The Shapley-value allocation in cooperative games reflects the marginal contribu-
tion of each agent to aggregate utility. The classic exposition in a general equi-
librium context is Aumann (1975). Let N be a finite set of players, indexed by i;
subsets of N are coalitions. A game is a function ν that associates with a coalition,
S, its worth, ν(S). The value of a game ν is given by a payoff vector ϕν where ϕ
is a function satisfying conditions of, among other things, efficiency, symmetry and
additivity. The central result is as follows:
Proposition 4.9 There is a unique value ϕ given by the following equation,
(ϕν)({i}) = E(ν(Si ∪ {i})− ν(Si)), (4.46)
where Si is the set of all players preceding i ordered randomly and E is the expec-
tations operator when all |N |! such orders are assigned equal probability.
Proof. See Shapley (1953).
The intuition behind equation (4.46) is that the value of each agent is pro-
portional to the expected marginal contribution that she makes to the coalition.
Allocations work at the margin. Applications include that of Hart and Moore
(1990) in the context of optimal firm structures. Aumann (1975) shows that a
central result follows in a competitive (non-atomic) continuum market economy:
Every value allocation is competitive; and, under some conditions on preferences,
every competitive allocation is a value allocation. This is the Value Equivalence
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Theorem.
For our purposes, the most important interpretation of the Shapley value is as
an index for measuring the power of agents in a game.
Power and Political Outcomes
Aumann and Kurz (1977) develop the Shapley value allocations in the context of
power and taxes in an income redistribution game. Political outcomes depend on
both voting resources and economic resources.
This contrasts with the standard political economy setting in which each agent
has one vote and maximises her own utility. In a sense, we have two concepts of
‘optimality’: An individually rational, power, approach that incorporates the power
of each agents into weighting; and an egalitarian approach, in which the optimal
tax is that which maximises the welfare of every agent given equal weighting. The
former is that which results endogenously from competition among interest groups
in an economy, in a sense ‘might is right’; the latter is what we would normally
consider to be optimal, an aggregate utility with weights equal regardless of the
relative power of agents.
We can think of a political economy game as one of competing coalitions of
agents, each of whom attempts to maximise their own surplus by winning in a
majority-vote procedure. As noted above, the key threat that agents in the minority
can make is to destroy their own endowment.
What is the aggregate utility of a political coalition and what power does that
political coalition have relative to other political coalitions with whom it is com-
peting to set taxes and reallocate resources. In the income-redistribution game of
Aumann and Kurz (1977), if a coalition S is the whole economy T = S then it
maximises aggregate utility given a vector of weights, θ = {θi} on each agent i.33
33Aumann and Kurz (1977) employ a continuum economy, so {i} here is not an individual agent
but an infinitesimally small subset di of the ocean of all agents.
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Given endowments e, equilibrium allocations x are those that solve,
νθ(S) = max
{∫
θu(x) :
∫
x =
∫
e
}
. (4.47)
There may be, however, gains to be made for a coalition S ⊂ T to allocate
resources amongst itself, bargaining as a whole with agents in T\S. There are two
problems: First, the vector of weights for finding the worth of each coalition can be
chosen arbitrarily; second, the worth of the coalition with respect to its complement
plays a central role in its bargaining position. The insight of Aumann and Kurz
(1977) is that, by using the Shapley value, these two problems solve each other.
The detailed procedure is given in that paper. Consider for now a simple opti-
misation problem terms of the following Lagrangian,
L =
∫
θu(x) + p
(∫
e−
∫
x
)
. (4.48)
The first-partial with respect to x obtains θu′(x) = p. This relates to the Value
Equivalence Theorem: x is the Walrasian allocation corresponding to the price
system p. The problem in a world where coalitions form to decide on political
outcomes is that the allocations determined by this partial condition are rarely
feasible. Aumann and Kurz (1977) demonstrate that the unique feasible allocation
corresponds to weights determined by the Shapley value.
So, in the final compromise of the income redistribution game, the weight upon
an individual agent is θi = p/u′ (xi) where p is some constant. This results from the
efficiency axiom: Marginal utility, θiu′ (xi) given an ex post allocation xi is equal
for all agents i with positive income.
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Power and Taxes with Endogenous Exchange Costs
In the context of the model presented above, we need to view these resulting al-
locations in a slightly different way. For feasibility, it must be that the vector of
weights θ across the whole economy is feasible given the resultant socially optimal
tax rate τg and vector of net incomes x. Since our game is not one of direct income
redistribution, but instead of redistribution via the choice of τ ∗, we must find,
τ ∗g = argmax
τg
W =
∑
q∈Q
∑
i∈Iq
θiqE
[
uiq (τg)
]
, (4.49)
such that,
θ1 = 1/u
′
1
(
τ ∗g
)
; (4.50)
θ2 = 1/u
′
2
(
τ ∗g
)
. (4.51)
The problem in the context of our exchange cost economy is simplified by the fact
that the ‘government’ is not directly redistributing resources between agents. It is
enough for the tax rate to satisfy equations (4.49)–(4.51); the resulting ‘allocation’
will always be feasible.
Given a strictly concave utility function, the power approach will, following
Aumann and Kurz (1977) mean that a strictly higher weight is placed on those
agents whose Type is lower; as such, the socially optimal tax in a power world
would be strictly higher. Given that, in equilibrium, markets formed by Type 1
agents are larger than those formed by Type 2 agents, the ‘measure’34 of Type 1
intermediaries is lower than the measure of Type 2 intermediaries. In a sense, the
smaller group of relatively more adept intermediaries form a political elite in the
economy and are able to shape the tax regime to suit themselves better. Such
a result suggests deeper foundations for the work, such as that of Acemoglu and
34And, of course, we are being loose in our terminology here.
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Johnson (2006), which appeals to the existence of elites to deliver institutional
outcomes. We develop some preliminary numerical implications in Section 4.6, but
further pursue most of these deeper issues in Nolan and Trew (Forthcoming).
4.6 A Numerical Application with a CES
Production Technology
We began this Chapter with a quote from Coase (1992). It asserted that a large
portion of what we consider to be economic activity is actually aimed at achiev-
ing what high transactions costs would otherwise prevent. We have developed a
framework in which we can consider the validity of this assertion: Under a rea-
sonable specification, can the extent of non-production costs in our economy be
‘large’? Furthermore, we might ask whether the implied levels of taxation can be
reconciled with what we know about the size of governments in modern developed
and under-developed economies. Moreover, what might the interactions between
wealth, taxation and market size look like in quantitative terms?
To examine the quantitative implications of the exchange cost model laid out
above we first return to the case in which agents are homogeneous. We use
MATLAB to compute equilibria; code is reproduced in Appendix Section A.3.
Consider a general CES technology for the production of ex ante arrangements,
F
(
Sh, G
)
=
[
δFs
(
Sh
)σ
+ (1− δ)Fg (G)σ
]1/σ
, (4.52)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) and s = 1/ (1− σ) is the constant elasticity of substitution. Func-
tions Fx are for both x = s and x = g continuous, decreasing and strictly concave
in its only argument; with F ′x > 0, F
′′
x < 0, Fx(0) = 0, Fx (y) → 1 as y → ∞,
F ′x(y) → 0 as y → ∞ and F ′x(0) = ∞ for x ∈ {s, g}. We need not require that Fg
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and Fs are identical. Let us impose simply,
Fs = [1− exp (−βτsk)]γs ;
Fg = [1− exp (−βτsk)]γg ,
which, with β, γs, γg ∈ (0, 1), satisfy our requirements. These functions have a
number of useful properties that both satisfy our requirements on arrangement
technologies and aid us in the numerical exercise. Taking the first partial of Fs
with respect to τs we obtain,
F ′s = βkγs exp (−βτsk) [1− exp (−βτsk)]γs−1
Our Inada-type requirements, that Fs (0) = 0, that Fs (τsk) → 1 as τsk → ∞,
F ′s (τsk)→∞ as τsk → 0 and F ′s (τsk)→ 0 as τsk →∞, thus hold. In addition, the
parameters β, γs, γg ∈ (0, 1) allow us to control numerical results with some ease.
Calibrating the model is difficult: There are a large number of equilibria in which
optimal market size is infinite, and a large number in which the optimal market size
is unity. Further, computational limitations mean that even with a small number
of potential technologies the combinatorial numbers reach the limit of floating-
point accuracy quickly. Finding a calibration which results in optimally finite-sized
markets that is also numerically computable using MATLAB v.7 requires us to
choose parameter values with care. Roughly speaking, β impacts upon the level of
the exchange cost; γs, γg impact upon the level of the proportional contributions.
We use the parameters γs, γg to make distinctions between the relative efficiency
of specific and general amelioration. Of course, we could also have done this with
separate βs and βg. Because Fx ∈ [0, 1] for x ∈ {s, g} we know that ∂Fx∂γx ≤ 0. So we
can take agent Types of ‘better ability’ to have a strictly lower γs.
Let us define a CRRA utility function as U (x) = [x1−γ − 1] / (1− γ) with γ > 0
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being the coefficient of relative risk aversion. We must also restrict the space of
technologies. For numerical tractability, we reduce to a two-state case in which the
set of technologies is restricted to Λ = {λ1, λ2} where λ1 < λ2 and p(λ1) = ρ so
p(λ2) = 1− ρ.
The expected average technology for a market of size #M , denoted λ¯#M =∑
i∈M λ
i
#M
, is invariant to market size, namely E[λ¯#M ] = ρλ1 + (1 − ρ)λ2,∀#M .
The benefit from increasing the market size is in increasing the distribution of
expected average technologies. In the case where #M = 1, the average technology
for the market can be λ1 or λ2 with probabilities ρ and (1 − ρ). With #M = 2,
technologies can be {λ1, λ1}, {λ1, λ2}, {λ2, λ1} or {λ2, λ2}. In this case the average
technology can in addition be (λ1 + λ2)/2 with probability 2ρ(1 − ρ). With a
strictly concave utility function (and with an abuse of notation), U [(λ1 + λ2)/2] >
{U [λ1]+U [λ2]}/2. The logic follows that as #M increases, so the range of expected
average technologies fill out the range [λ1, λ2], and so expected utility increases.
So while expected average technology will be constant, the range of average
technology differs. The expected average technology for a market of size #M is
given by the following,
E
[
λ¯#M
]
=
#M∑
i=0
{(
#M
i
)
ρ#M−i(1− ρ)i [(#M − i)λ1 + iλ2]
}
/#M, (4.53)
which, as described above, is invariant to #M . What is important, is the effect
this has on expected utility. The optimisation problem becomes,
Γ = argmax
#M
#M∑
i=0
(
#M
i
)
ρ#M−i(1− ρ)iU

{
(1− τs − τg) k − (2α)(#M−1)#M
}
×
× [(#M − i)λ1 + iλ2] /#M

subject to,
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2
(
#M − 1
#M
)
[δ [1− exp (−βτsk)]γsσ + (1− δ) [1− exp (−βτgk)]γgσ]
1−σ
σ × (4.54)
×δβkγs exp (−βτsk) [1− exp (−βτsk)]γsσ−1 = 1,
2
(
#M − 1
#M
)
{δ [1− exp (−βτsk)]γsσ + (1− δ) [1− exp (−βτgk)]γgσ}
1−σ
σ × (4.55)
× (1− δ) βkγg exp (−βτgk) [1− exp (−βτgk)]γgσ−1 = 1,
where α =
{
1− [δ [1− exp (−βτsk)]γsσ + (1− δ) [1− exp (−βτgk)]γgσ]1/σ
}
k and
where we select sup {Γ} for a unique solution.
The relative shares of each form of amelioration will be determined by,
F ′g (τgk)
F ′s (τsk)
=
[
(1− δ)
δ
]s
. (4.56)
We can solve equation (4.54) for τg,
τg = − 1
βk
ln
1−

(
1
1− δ
)
[
2
(
#M−1
#M
)
γsδβk exp (−βτsk) [1− exp (−βτsk)]γsσ−1
] σ
σ−1
−δ [1− exp (−βτsk)]γsσ


1
γgσ
 ,
(4.57)
and then substitute for τg in equation (4.55) to find a closed-form solution for
τ ∗s . This can then be used in equation (4.57) to find the unique optimal pair of
contributions τ ∗ =
{
τ ∗s , τ
∗
g
}
. Equation (4.57) also makes plain that our requirement
on F , for τs and τg are increasing in k, will hold.
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4.6.1 Amelioration, Diversification and Utility with a Fixed
Endowment
As an example, we can run a baseline calibration of the choices over differing levels
of specific and general amelioration. For a given pair {τs, τg} agents choose #M
to maximise expected utility. Table 4.1 gives the parameter values in the baseline
case.
Table 4.1: Baseline Calibration for Endogenous Exchange Costs
endowment k 25
coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 3
specific amelioration curvature γs 0.065
general amelioration curvature γg 0.085
ameliorating capital factor β 0.03
weight on specific amelioration δ 0.5
CES coefficient s, 1− 1
s
= σ 0.5
low technology λ1 1
high technology λ2 5
probability of low technology ρ 0.5
Our baseline case supposes a difference in the technology of specific and general
amelioration: Since γg > γs we have imposed that, relative to specific, general
amelioration is a less efficient ameliorator of exchange costs: For a given level
of ameliorating capital, general amelioration obtains a lesser degree of ex post
arrangement effectiveness than does specific amelioration.
First we consider the effect on market choices and expected utility from differ-
ent levels of ameliorating allocations: τ ∈ {τs, τg|τs ∈ [0, 1] , τg ∈ [0, 1] , τs + τg < 1}.
This is something of a brute-force method of finding optimal combinations of
{τs, τg}, but it helps us to see the workings of our model more clearly. We consider
in this first simulation allocations of amelioration costs, so even if agents do not
diversify, the cost of the allocated contribution is still deducted from their endow-
ment. The problem of agents is simply to form optimally-sized markets given the
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combination of {τs, τg}. In other words, if an agent is not going to diversify at some
pair of contributions, then she is better off not making any contributions. Figure
4.1 reflects this, and gives the expected utility of decisions over optimal market size
for a grid of pairs within this range of τ .
The figure demonstrates optimal responses in terms of choices over diversifica-
tion; for each allocated {τs, τg} pair, agents choose how far (if at all) to diversify
given their residual endowment and given exchange costs resulting from the ame-
lioration determined by that {τs, τg} pair. We draw the picture twice: The upper
panel depicts in three dimensions the interaction between expected utility and both
amelioration allocations but does not clearly show a peak in utility for some non-
zero pair of {τs, τg}; the lower panel shows in two dimensions that this pair exists.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the choice over diversification more explicitly by giving the
underlying choice of market size against allocations of {τs, τg} pairs.
We can see from Figures 4.1 and 4.2 that over some convex combinations of the
{τs, τg} pairs, expected utility from diversification is higher than from not diversi-
fying.
There is a peak in expected utility at some unique combination of τs and τg.
Using a grid search for maximum expected utility with steps every 0.002 of τs
and τg, the numerical maximum expected utility is obtained with diversification
to a market size of 13 with optimal amelioration expenditure of τˆ ∗s k = 1.15 and
τˆ ∗g k = 1.5. This can be seen in Figure 4.1 as an optimal pair τˆ
∗ = {0.046, 0.06}.
The optimal arrangements have a degree of effectiveness of pˆi∗ = 0.7846, with an
exchange cost of αˆ∗ = 5.3854. We begin to interpret the relatively low optimal
tax rate in the next Subsection, once we have seen that it holds over a range of
endowments.
Interestingly, market size does not peak at the peak of expected utility: Sub-
optimal allocations can induce larger markets as a second-best. If, for example,
168
Chapter 4. Endogenous Exchange Costs in General Equilibrium
Figure 4.1: Expected Utility and Amelioration Allocations
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Figure 4.2: Optimal Market Size and Amelioration Allocations
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the level of τg is, for whatever reason, forced higher than an agent would choose
optimally, then we can see by the distribution of colour in the lower panel of Figure
4.1 that a constrained optimal response (i.e., one that maximises expected util-
ity holding τg fixed) can be to choose a higher τs. So agents are, in second best,
spending much larger amounts on non-production costs. Exchange costs are con-
sequently much lower, and so agents diversify more. Further, there is a limit to
this positive relationship: The market size does peak in Figure 4.2, it begins to fall
after τg ≈ 0.16. There is, then, a hump-shaped response in both market size and
τs to increases in τg. If, conversely, τg is forced lower than its optimal level, agents
choose a lower τs, exchange costs are higher and diversification is always (weakly)
diminished. This will become an important observation later, when we come to
look at economies with heterogeneous agents.
An alternative solution method can evaluate the marginal conditions using equa-
tion (4.57) find Γ = {#M∗}. Naturally, this yields similar, but improved, results. It
also serves to check our brute-force method. A market size of 13 and optimal ame-
lioration expenditure of τ ∗s k = 1.1703 and τ
∗
g k = 1.4874 (τ = {0.046811, 0.059497}).
Of course, in solving the marginal conditions numerically the method using
marginal conditions also invokes something like a grid search to find optimal pairs
of contributions. The brute-force method, however, searches over the entire range of
τ ∈ {τs, τg|τs ∈ [0, 1] , τg ∈ [0, 1] , τs + τg < 1} for each market size under considera-
tion, while the second only searches over solutions to equation (4.55) with equation
(4.57) substituted into it.
The simulation code is such that for each τ on the search grid we consider a
range of market sizes,
{
1, 2, ...,#M¯
}
, to which agents could diversify. The optimal
market size for that τ is the one in the range
{
1, 2, ...,#M¯ − 1} which maximises
expected utility. If expected utility is maximised at #M¯ , we must re-run the
experiment with a higher #M¯ . So, consider the calibration in Table 1 with a
171
Chapter 4. Endogenous Exchange Costs in General Equilibrium
triangular grid search with steps every 0.005 and maximum market size of 25;
we have to carry out M¯ calculations for
∑n
i=1 (n− i) pairs of τ which for n =
1 + (1/0.005) = 201 and #M¯ = 25, is 502,500 calculations in all. By contrast,
in the numerical solution to the analytical method, we only need to carry out the
search over only one pair of τ for each market size, i.e., only 25 calculations. It is
therefore vastly more efficient and, generally, more accurate. We provide MATLAB
code in Appendix Section A.3.
4.6.2 Amelioration, Diversification and Utility over a Range
of Endowments
We can consider the nature of optimal amelioration in economies with different
attributes. Our analytical results above, specifically Propositions 4.1–4.3, have
formalised a number of interactions in the model. But we can get a handle of
the magnitude of these interactions by simulating the economy over a range of
endowment levels.
Using the parameter values given in Table 1, but allowing k to vary over the
range [20, 38], we solve the marginal conditions for the optimal amelioration alloca-
tions for a range of market sizes and select the diversification level that maximises
expected utility, following the procedure laid-out in Section 4.2. Figures 4.3 gives
results for these simulations.
The previous numerical simulation is of course nested here: Where k = 25,
τ = {0.046811, 0.059497} is shown by the dotted lines. Propositions 4.1–4.3
are confirmed numerically. For a given endowment, optimal contributions rise, ex
ante arrangements become more effective and exchange costs fall as the market
size increases. For a given market size, optimal contributions rise and ex ante ar-
rangements become more effective as the endowment increases. Moreover, expected
utility is continuous, strictly increasing and strictly concave in the endowment.
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Figure 4.3: Amelioration, Diversification, Utility and the Endowment
Interpreted literally, these numerical results suggest that the optimal tax rate
over a range of endowments is quite low. A modern developed economy might
expect the level of taxation as a percentage of GDP to be around 30–45%; OECD
(2005) have, for 2002, tax receipts as a percentage of GDP ranging from 18.1%
in Mexico to 50.2% in Sweden. The OECD average was 36.3%. In a sense, our
numbers are then too small. But our set-up and its calibration are restricted by
two things: The desire to maintain a realistic degree of relative risk aversion; and,
computational limits. We can see from Figure 4.3 that the level of the optimal
tax is not rising sharply in the level of the endowment. Tax rates will not quickly
reach those observed in developed economies, so we need not be too concerned
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that computational limitations are driving these results. Further, deviating from a
reasonable degree of risk aversion, while it will have an impact (as we will see below),
would only allow us to match realistic tax levels at the expense of unrealistically
risk averse agents. But perhaps these numbers are realistic: The governments of
modern economies have (at their minimum) both efficiency and equity aims. The
numbers coming out of this exchange cost model reflect only taxes which fund
institutions that improve the efficiency of the market. It may be that, of the tax
burden imposed by modern governments, only between 5 and 10 percentage points,
around a quarter of the take, are ‘efficiency taxes’.
A few additional remarks can be made. Market size increases slowly at low levels
of the endowment, and more quickly as the endowment becomes larger: There is a
take-off effect in regard to the non-linearity between wealth and market size. The
extent of non-production costs also follows the pattern we expected, falling in k for
a given #M and increasing in #M for a given k. Here the former effect outweighs
the latter: As the endowment becomes larger so the share of non-production costs
trends downwards. What is interesting, though, is the extent of non-production
costs that induce finite-sized coalitions of agents to form. Here, agents can prefer
to forsake half of their endowment in order to diversify, most of which comes in
the form of the ex post exchange cost. As the economy becomes richer, so agents
shift their non-production spending toward higher ameliorating contributions and
greater ex ante arrangement effectiveness. We cannot yet say whether these sorts of
numbers are realistic, but they are the product of reasonable parameterisation and
are, as we shall see below, not worryingly sensitive to alternative parameter values.
As Coase noted, a lot of what we might think of as market activity is designed to
achieve what high transactions costs would otherwise prevent. Here we see that
behaviour played out in a general equilibrium framework.
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4.6.3 Robustness to Risk Aversion and Ameliorating Tech-
nologies
Each of the numerical findings discussed above arise out of reasonable calibrations of
quite general functional forms. But we need to say something about the sensitivity
of these results to the choice of different parameter values. We have already noted
that some sensitivity exists, but a lot of this can be put down to computational
limitations. MATLAB v.7, for example, will only calculate up to 170!. As can
be seen in the bottom-left panel of Figure 4.3, this will quickly become a limiting
problem.
Regardless, we can see the effect of relatively small changes in both the risk
aversion parameter and the technological parameters. Figures 4.4 and 4.5 give
results for different parameter values. In each, the grey-coloured, central case is
that resulting from the parameterisation in Table 4.1. Variations on the coefficient
of relative risk aversion, γ, and on the ameliorating technology, β, are Table 4.1
values multiplied by 1± 1
6
.
Figure 4.4 shows some variation in optimal behaviour in regard to risk aversion.
Higher risk aversion means that agents are more keen to diversify. The level of the
endowment at which any diversification becomes optimal is decreasing in the level
of risk aversion. For a given technology, this means that as risk aversion increases,
optimal market size for a given endowment level weakly increases. Further, agents
are willing to spend more on diversification, as can be seen by the extent of non-
production costs in each case.
Figure 4.5 demonstrates the effect of varying the coefficient on ameliorating
capital in the exchange technology. Making exchange arrangements less costly, by
reducing β, means that agents can diversify with much lower endowments. The
extent of non-production costs is lower for a given endowment, but unchanged for
a given market size. The effect of changing the exchange technology is primarily
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Figure 4.4: Risk Aversion and Endogenous Exchange
to make it feasible for agents to diversify with a lower endowment: The nature of
that diversification is little affected.
So there is some sensitivity to parameter values but, as discussed above, this
causes difficulties largely because of the computational limitations on market size. It
is not the case that the model parameterisations are what would normally be termed
“knife-edge” – the model behaves in the ways we can expect over a reasonably large
range of parameterisations.
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Figure 4.5: Ameliorating Technology and Endogenous Exchange
4.6.4 Heterogeneity and Taxes
We can consider the numerical implications of Shapley-allocations in determining
the equilibrium tax rates in an heterogeneous environment. Consider the set-up
in Subsection 4.5.2, in which two Types of agent exist, so Q = {1, 2}. Agents
are differentiated by their ability to ameliorate exchange costs using specific ame-
lioration; suppose that Type 1 agents have a more efficient technology of specific
amelioration. By Proposition 4.8, we know that agents of different Type will not
form into the same coalition. Further, if agents are sufficiently different we found
that they will wish to diversify into coalitions of different size; agents of Type 1 will
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seek to form larger markets. This will mean that optimal general amelioration will
be greater for the Type 1 agents.
In terms of the functional forms introduced above, equation (4.52), this can be
captured by letting γ1s < γ
2
s . The effect of changing γs is not trivial, as we shall see in
the calibration below. In general, we can say that agent Types with better specific
amelioration will always weakly prefer to diversify into larger markets. By the
homogeneity of the general amelioration technology, their optimal τg will be weakly
greater. The impact on optimal τs is ambiguous, however: Greater diversification
induces a higher τ ∗s while the better technology allows a lower τ
∗
s .
We wish to solve for the equilibrium tax rate following Aumann and Kurz (1977).
The tax rate must satisfy equations (4.49)–(4.51). First, the weight on each agent
Type yields a welfare-maximising tax rate; second, each Type’s inverse marginal
utility resulting from that tax rate must be proportional to those weights. We can
think of a general iterative algorithm for the two-Type case as follows:
1. Solve for equilibrium behaviour and expected utility over the range of τg ∈ [τ 2g , τ 1g ];
2. For each τ g ∈ [τ 2g , τ 1g ] find the implied power of each agent Type, 1/u′1
(
τ g
)
and 1/u′2
(
τ g
)
;
3. Solve for τ ∗g to maximise equation (4.49) given weights θ
1 = 1/u′1
(
τ g
)
and
θ2 = 1/u′2
(
τ g
)
;
4. If the solution τ ∗g from 3. coincides with the τ

g that resulted in the ex post
marginal utilities then we have satisfied equations (4.49)–(4.51).
Our procedure for finding the marginal utilities is by using two-sided differences:
Calculate utility with (1 ± h)k (where h is the step size), holding #M constant
but allowing τs to change, and then use the formula for the first derivative; i.e.,
f ′(x) .= [f(x+ h)− f(x− h)]/(2h) which, for sufficiently small h, will be accurate
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enough for our purposes (see Judd, 1998 §7.7, for a full description). MATLAB
code is reproduced in Appendix Section A.3. In general, we have found that an
exact and unique solution will exist.
Table 4.2 gives our baseline calibration for the heterogeneous case. Table 4.3
gives preliminary results for four cases: Full weighting given to each Type; an
egalitarian case in which each Type is weighted equally; and, a case in which the
tax is set according to Aumann-Kurz power allocations using the algorithm above.
Table 4.2: Calibration for Endogenous Exchange Costs with Heterogeneity
endowment k 25
coefficient of relative risk aversion γ 3
specific amelioration curvature for Type 1 agents γ1s 0.065
specific amelioration curvature for Type 2 agents γ2s 0.100
general amelioration curvature γg 0.085
ameliorating capital factor β 0.03
weight on specific amelioration δ 0.5
CES coefficient s, 1− 1
s
= σ 0.5
low technology λ1 1
high technology λ2 5
probability of low technology ρ 0.5
Table 4.3: Results for Endogenous Exchange Costs with Heterogeneity
θ1 θ2 #M
1 #M2 τ 1∗s τ
2∗
s τ
∗
g κ
1 κ2
1. Type 1 1 0 13 17 0.0470 0.0708 0.0595 0.5037 0.5916
2. Type 2 0 1 6 7 0.0667 0.0625 0.0538 0.4696 0.5496
3. Egalitarian 1 1 7 8 0.0432 0.0638 0.0550 0.4750 0.5587
4. Power 590.9 354.8 9 11 0.0467 0.0622 0.0572 0.4889 0.5758
By favouring only Type 1 agents in welfare maximisation, Case 1 demonstrates
that our heterogeneous economy nests the homogeneous economy from Subsection
4.6.1. The optimal market size of Type 1 agents, and their optimal {τs, τg} pair, is
that from the homogeneous economy (there is a slight rounding error apparent in
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τs because τg is not solved using the marginal conditions. This is the unconstrained
optimal behaviour of Type 1 agents, with an optimal tax level of 6.0%. Type 2
agents respond by diversifying more, and by allocating more resources to specific
amelioration. We developed an understanding of this phenomenon in Subsection
by inspecting Figure 4.2. Case 2 depicts the unconstrained optimal behaviour of
Type 2 agents: Smaller markets and a lower tax of 5.4%. The optimal response
of Type 1 agents is to reduce their optimal market size but increase the level of
specific amelioration. As can be seen by the extent of non-production costs, despite
this increase in τ 1s , κ
1 falls markedly. Agents with better ability to form specific
arrangements, when allocated a lower than optimal τg, respond by allocating more
resources to the amelioration with which they have a comparative advantage.
Most general equilibrium welfare analysis takes the weight on all agents to be
equal. An egalitarian welfare maximisation obtains Case 3. We see that the equi-
librium is somewhat closer to the Type 2 optimum, with a tax of 5.5%, and market
sizes only slightly greater than those in Case 2. This follows from the strict con-
cavity utility function: The marginal gain to agents of Type 1 of some increase in
τg is less than the marginal loss for agents of Type 2, so an equal weighting will
tend towards reproducing Case 2.
Case 4 incorporates power allocations, following the Aumann-Kurz develop-
ments of the Shapley value. Type 1 agents, as a result of their greater expected
contribution to aggregate utility, hold a greater weight in welfare maximisation,
equivalent to around θ1 =
5
8
and θ2 =
3
8
. The optimal tax level is, given this
weighting, 5.7%. This is still sub-optimal for agents of each Type but, relative
to the egalitarian arrangement, Type 1 agents gain in expected utility terms, and
Type 2 agents lose out. So, in an economy where powerful agents can have greater
say over political economy outcomes, we can deviate from the efficient outcomes of
a traditional welfare-maximising equilibrium. Private activity is, in some senses,
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less efficient in an economy in which institutions are dominated by a powerful elite.
The results from the numerical analysis of the heterogeneous economy are in-
triguing. They also shed light on a number of unexplored theoretical phenomena.
We observe that agents of the Type with less power can actually form into larger
markets than those agents of the Type with greater power. Agents who have less
ability to form effective arrangements are, relative to the egalitarian case normally
addressed in welfare analysis, worse-off. There is a great deal of interesting work to
be done in understanding these interactions. How does the power allocation relate
to the formation of markets? Can these power allocations be supported in a fully
non-cooperative environment? What is the relation between the level of wealth and
the power of the better able agents? Can we say something more general about the
relationship between market efficiency and the power of elites in the formation of
institutions? We leave a fuller analysis to Nolan and Trew (Forthcoming).
4.7 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Of course, given the highly abstract nature of our set-up, it is difficult to pin any
specific interpretation on our results. We suggested in the introduction, however,
that our framework could be interpreted in the light of the recent literature on
incomplete and partially complete contracts.35 In many ways, the microeconomic
frictions invoked by a large range of the macroeconomic literatures can be seen in
this light.
4.7.1 Incomplete Contracting and Exchange
Maskin and Tirole (1999) argue that incomplete contracts are poorly motivated
in models where agents are otherwise fully rational. On the other hand Hart and
35See the very recent Hart and Moore (2004, 2006) work on partial contracts.
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Moore (1999) have argued that writing comprehensively complete contracts is “pro-
hibitively expensive”. There seems little disagreement that bounded rationality of
some sort may well provide a motivation for incomplete contracts. However, there
is no widely agreed upon way of modelling this bounded rationality. We could in-
terpret our framework by distinguishing between the costs of forming contracts of
some degree of completeness, and the costs of that degree of contract completeness
in terms of a residual costly exchange. So, although it may be possible to form
comprehensively complete contracts, doing so may involve some exorbitant cost.
The standard view of contractual incompleteness is one in which a contract is
incomplete if there are certain choice variables that cannot be contracted on. This
is termed a “limitation in contractual language” by Bolton and Dewatripont (2005,
pp.489–90). We believe that the concept of contractual incompleteness in terms
of limited contractual language is overly restrictive. What we wish to consider,
however, is some choice regarding the detail of a contract. In the Hart and Moore
(2006) set-up, the “broad outlines of ex post trade are contractible, but finer points
are not.” A contract that specifies actions for all states is not unique. Take the state
of nature space Ω in the framework above. It is fully observed ex post and so can
be contracted over ex ante. Suppose two contracts: The first lists a single action
to be carried out regardless of the realised state ω ∈ Ω; the second lists a specific
action for each specific ω ∈ Ω. Both contracts are, in a strict sense, contingent on
all choice variables. But it is our view that we can call the former contract more
incomplete than the latter. Suppose now that contracting costs bias the contracts
that agents write away from the second form of contract. This sort of relation
between complexity costs and incomplete contracts was identified in Anderlini and
Felli (1999).
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Ex ante contracting and ex post exchange
The general equilibrium framework laid-out above can be interpreted in these in-
complete contracting terms. An ex ante contract which defines broad outlines of
trade is one in which ranges of actions are defined over ranges of possible outcomes.
Ex post, there are costs to fill in the detail of the finer points. Or the ex post
exchange cost reflects some expected loss from having not written a complete con-
tract. For Hart and Moore (2006) the costs from partial incompleteness can take
the form of a deadweight loss.
So in a world in which the formation of contracts is a costly process, there can
be both ex ante contracts to commit to exchange and ex post contracts (or renego-
tiations) to specify the details of exchange. Ex ante, there is perfect competition in
the provision of, to some degree incomplete, contracts concerning future exchange;
ex post there are further costs within a monopolistic bilateral exchange. In a sense,
our exchange cost is then also a pure deadweight loss.
A definition of a complete contract follows:
Definition 4.3 A complete contract is an ex ante arrangement that yields no
ex post exchange cost.
This is our working definition. We provide below a number of real-world examples
that can fit into this more general concept of contractual incompleteness.
Some Examples
Here we provide some simple examples of the contracting process. Agents in our
model always wish to commit to diversifying ex ante by writing an initial contract;
the further question is whether agents choose to formalise all potential ex post
interactions in the ex ante contract or whether the ex ante contract is optimally
incomplete with positive exchange costs left to be incurred ex post. These examples
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go through situations in which these types of arrangements do exist in reality,
though not all are examples of diversification and exchange per se.
i) Bookkeeping. Suppose that the nature of any realised investment output is
sufficiently complex such that communication between agents in the conduct of
exchange is not easy. In such circumstances, agents can carry out bookkeeping
since this enables information to flow more smoothly. The bookkeeping requires
the expenditure of resources, let’s say in fees to an accountant. For each bilateral
exchange, accounts must be drawn up between the exchanging parties. Given the
large number of possible contingencies, it is too expensive to write an ex ante con-
tract that specifies accounts for transactions between each agent for every state of
nature. As such, the ex ante contract commits each agent to diversifying but is not
comprehensively complete. In defining the market, however, resources can also be
allocated to constructing a market-specific standard for the reporting of accounts;
this is essentially a code of conduct for the market. The code of conduct reduces
the cost of writing accounts for each ex post exchange. Additional resources can be
allocated to a public institution that upholds, for example, corporate governance
standards or minimum requirements on accounting standards. After the realisation
of outputs, exchange takes place with additional costs that reflect the completeness
of the ex ante contract.
ii) Housing Market. A number of specialised private agencies, in addition to
public institutions, are involved in housing transactions. There are legislated re-
quirements covering the process of house-buying, and in addition local groups of
agencies can come together to form specific standards to suit local requirements.
Each of these arrangements require resources to construct ex ante and enforce ex
post a framework for the purchase of housing. Consequently, for any given pair
of agents, there is then a ready-made template through which the transaction can
take place. Even using this template requires the additional expenditure of re-
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sources; but this additional expenditure, the exchange cost, is diminished by the
specific and general arrangements established ex ante. In Scotland, for example,
the highest bidder in a one-shot game obtains the property under sale. There is an
informal agreement that submitting a bid is a commitment to purchase in the event
of having entered the winning bid. Of course, this is open to abuse from individuals
that, after submitting a winning bid, find a better deal and renege. A local solution
emerged in Edinburgh: A group of property lawyers formed a specific contract that
committed each of their clients to not reneging. Here, a partially incomplete ex
ante contract was made more complete by private and excludable action.
iii) Sporting Rules and The Law. A Premiership football player was recently
alleged to have bitten (“just a nibble”) one of his opponents. The Football Asso-
ciation was not sure what to do, because there was no specific law about biting.
It was reported that the behaviour came under violent misconduct, for which a
range of penalties could be imposed, and that the FA would clarify the law for the
future. (In the end they did nothing.) In a sense, the FA laws were, ex ante, partly
incomplete here. Here, an unwritten contingency is considered ex post in relation
to the broad outlines of the ex ante laws. This example is not uncommon, and nor
even is it specific to sport: Law often defines only the broad outlines within which
specific behaviours are included. When some specific and unprecedented something
happens, it goes to court, judgements are handed down, the law evolves. In the
terms of our setup, an ex ante contract does not necessarily define specific contin-
gencies and specific actions but ranges of contingencies and ranges of actions. Our
range of contingency would be “violent misconduct”, the unspecified detail includes
such things as “just a nibble”. So the decision is over how detailed your ex ante
contract is; how many broad categories there are in your ex ante framework of law
and hence how much work you have to do ex post to fill in the additional detail.
iv) Infrastructure. We do not wish to confuse the exchange costs that cause
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coalitions to form with exchange (i.e., freight) costs ameliorated by better infras-
tructure. Rather, the latter are, largely, internal to the firm and can be thought of
as reflected in the prices of its goods. The former can be the product of contracting
costs. Infrastructures are a good example of where the contracting conditions come
into sharper relief, and this is why we spent time on them in Chapter 3. We saw
that local, excludable arrangements can emerge to finance (and benefit from the
return on) investment in infrastructure. Public works can plan, build and maintain
an infrastructure for the facilitation of private exchange but local arrangements
such as turnpike trusts, canal and railway companies can further employ local re-
sources to improve the standard of infrastructure. The local financial coalitions act
to form the behavioural rules of the coalition, and we argued that this was, rela-
tive to full public planning, an efficient outcome. Moreover, the ease with which
local coalitions can form is related to the provision of pure public goods such as
the quality of the legislative environment. In other words, a combination of local
and public arrangements facilitate the contracting of local agents into a financial
coalition.
Relation to Other Work
Our notion of incompleteness is close in spirit to Hart and Moore (1999, p. 116)
who suggest that “the degree of partial incompleteness depends on the parties’
ability to describe the nature of trade.” However, we also consider, in addition to
an agent’s ability to describe the nature of trade, her willingness to do so, given the
costs of contracting. The greater the complexity of the private contract, the more
costly it is to write; agents choose the degree of complexity given technologies and
resources. From the perspective of our framework, the contractual incompleteness
is manifested in contracts that favour broad outlines over finer detail, rather than
one which leaves out specified actions for behaviour under every contingency. The
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general-specific distinction then follows in the context of ex ante contracts: We
have both private and social contracts.
By looking at the macroeconomic implications of incomplete contracting, and
since this perspective allows us an understanding of the endogenous existence of
institutions, this framework might also be seen as an attempt to bridge the gap
between contract theory and institutional economics. Boyd and Prescott (1985,
fn.2) also reflect this: “Our intermediary-coalitions could also be viewed as a nexus
of contracts... or as an arrangement to economise on transactions costs...” In looking
at the implications of this framework from a macroeconomic perspective, it can also
have implications for the recent work on the underpinnings of political economy as
in Acemoglu and Johnson (2006). We come onto some of these issues in the next
Chapter.
4.7.2 Further Work
Given the large range of literatures whose theoretical results are based on the exis-
tence of frictions to exchange, we considered a stylised method of introducing the
concept of an endogenous exchange cost. We have made an initial foray into estab-
lishing a framework within which we can model exchange costs in a more acceptable
manner. A great deal is left to future work, however: A full exposition of politi-
cal economy issues in the heterogeneous environment; an investigation of optimal
taxation and regulation; the relation to a theory of institutions; and, not least, a
consideration of the dynamic elements in the context of, for example, a theory of
finance and growth. Indeed, we noted in Chapter 1 the finding of Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt
and Levine (2001) that institutions that affect contracts and property rights were
found to be central in an empirical sense. We turn to consider in more detail some
of these extensions in Chapter 5.
187
Chapter 5
Towards the Microfoundations of
Finance and Growth
We developed in Chapter 4 a framework model that can account for the existence,
extent and consequences of costly exchange in general equilibrium. The framework
touched upon a wide range of subjects: The size of markets, financial interme-
diation, the partial incompleteness of contracts and political economy outcomes.
We have made each of these aspects endogenous to the distribution of resources,
technologies and preferences among rational economic agents.
But what relation does this framework and its implications have to our central
thesis on finance and growth? How does it relate to the critique of Chapters 1 and
2? Further, in which ways does it lead towards a model capable of accounting for
the rich story of finance and growth described in Chapter 3? In other words, how
might it be extended to develop more fully the finance and growth implications?
In this short Chapter we intend to tie-together some of our findings. We can
then think about directions for future work, i.e., what we need to do before we can
speak of the microfoundations of finance and growth with any confidence. Section
5.1 goes over the central messages coming from Chapters 1–3. Section 5.2 then folds
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the framework of Chapter 4 into the wider context of our perspective on finance
and growth, as well as sketching directions for future research.
5.1 Finance and Growth Orthodoxy
The orthodox treatment of the connection between the extent of financial devel-
opment and the level of economic growth has neglected a number of important
aspects. We placed stress in the critique of Chapter 1 on the disconnection be-
tween the empirical and theoretical literatures. Chapter 2 then firmed-up some of
the more intuitive criticisms by developing a representative, parsimonious finance
and growth theory that could be calibrated to some historical data. Chapter 3 took
a step away from the standard approach to finance and growth and instead took
the historical literature as a guide to the development of a more realistic theory of
finance and growth.
In the context of the early stages of industrial development, we observed strongly
spatially concentrated elements in the finance of investments where fixed costs were
high. We needed to consider why these coalitions emerged in this way, and argued
that it had to do with conditions of information asymmetry and, by consequence,
the costly formation of financial contracts. We also observed a dynamic aspect.
These spatially concentrated coalitions changed over the course of the industrial
revolution. In the early stages, small coalitions were highly spatially concentrated,
and formed the basis of almost disjointed regional components of a larger national
economy. As the economy took hold, coalitions became larger, more centralised,
and more specialised.
Of course, this story is one stylised by a macroeconomist seeking to fit a nice
model to intuitive historical trends. But the historical evidence consistently sup-
ports the general story. There were disaggregated patterns to financial coalitions
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and their nature did change over the course of industrial development.
This means that there is something missing both from empirical analyses of
the aggregate and from theoretical conceptions of static efficiency. We sought to
reconcile our more qualified interpretation of the macroeconomics of finance and
growth with the microeconomic phenomena that might underly them by considering
the role that costly exchange can play. Townsend (1978) established that financial
coalitions of finite-size could be part of an equilibrium in economies with costly
bilateral exchange. These exchange costs are, in that work, taken to be fixed
and exogenous. The omission, that has carried through to recent work, is some
foundation for these exchange costs.
That omission is, from the perspective of this thesis, a stark one. Given that
exchange costs underlie financial structures, and given also that we observe dra-
matically changing financial structures over the course of an industrial revolution,
it is surely not sufficient for a finance and growth story to hold exchange costs to
be exogenous and fixed. Our view must be, then, that exchange costs are not a
fundamental.
The purpose of Chapter 4 was to develop a general equilibrium theory that could
capture a number of these stylised elements in the process of making exchange costs
endogenous. The next Section goes through some of the implications of this model
in the context of our study of finance and growth.
5.2 The Microfoundations of Finance and Growth
What steps in research will be required before we can speak of the microfounda-
tions of finance and growth with confidence? First, a dynamic version of the model
in Chapter 4 will look at the implications of endogenous exchange costs in the
context of economic growth: Can we capture the dynamic and disaggregated ele-
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ments of the finance and growth story? Second, we ought to specify more fully the
political economy implications, specifically in the context of incomplete contracts,
institutions and political outcomes. Each of these research avenues will be major
undertakings, but we sketch their structure and potential implications below.
5.2.1 Dynamic Spatial Coalitions and Growth
The model of Chapter 4 can, in some regards, be seen in the light of the story of
finance and growth developed through Chapters 1–3.
Consider a model of endogenous exchange costs like that in Chapter 4 but in
which agents are spatially separated. We could think, for example, of a countable
infinity of agents equidistantly ordered on the real line. Suppose, further, that the
costs of forming an arrangement is increasing in the distance between agents. This
reflects what we observed in Chapter 3: The costs of excessive informational asym-
metry can be mitigated by trading only with those within a limited proximity. In
some ways, an agent ‘knows’ and ‘trusts’ her neighbour better than someone from
far away. This has obvious interpretations in terms of contracts. So, the costs of
forming optimal arrangements is increasing in the sum of the distances involved
in the intermediated exchange among agents of a coalition. This happens for two
reasons: The cost of arrangements of a given degree arrangement effectiveness is
higher; and, the arrangement will, optimally, be less effective. These are implica-
tions of the heterogeneous extension to the exchange cost model. In this setting,
then, we would observe finite-sized coalitions that are also spatially concentrated.
Further, economies with a higher endowment will observe larger coalitions, both in
terms of the number of agents and in terms of their greater spatial dispersion.
So risk averse agents do still have the incentive to contract into a diversification
strategy, but now they compose strategies that include the spatial decision in ad-
dition to everything else. We can interpret the model in Chapter 3 in some limited
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directions. Let us think of a simple exogenous growth story in which there are no
dynamic interactions, i.e, suppose that our cross-sectional results from Chapter 4
can broadly reflect a dynamic story. Townsend (1983a), Boyd and Prescott (1985)
and Prescott and Boyd (1987) show ways of introducing some forms of exogenous
growth into simple general equilibrium models related to that presented here.
We have seen from both the analytical and numerical results coming out of our
exchange cost model that exchange costs, market size and optimal institutions vary
as the endowment increases. In the early stages of growth, exchange costs are high,
and financial coalitions are small and spatially concentrated. Here we capture, in
some senses, the high levels of trust in the ‘village economies’ intimated by Kiyotaki
and Moore (2006). As the economy develops, the level of wealth grows and so the
extent of non-production costs falls. As this happens, agents can, at intervals,
diversify into coalitions of both greater number and wider geography. As they do
so, the level of financial depth in the economy increases. Within our framework
model of endogenous exchange costs, extended to capture spatial effects, we are
thus able to capture a number of the observed finance and growth phenomena.
But further to demonstrating that a static equilibrium with spatial elements
exists, formalising this extension in a dynamic setting is not necessarily straight-
forward. There are interesting games being played in such a dynamic setup. To
note a few: The ordering of development and finance; the choice along the pecking
order of finance; the linking together of small coalitions/infrastructures into larger
ones; and, the movement towards centralised (and specialised) financial markets.
We can look toward a large literature on sequential games, the optimal contract
literature engendered by Townsend (1979), as well as work such as Prescott and
Vischer (1977) on the location of firms in general equilibrium, for clues as to how
to proceed in this regard.
This is still a story of exogenous growth. We might support growth within
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an endogenous growth framework in the manner of the new growth literature fol-
lowing Lucas (1988), Romer (1990) and Rebelo (1991). But we should not view
an exogenous growth model as inferior by definition. Parente (2001) provides a
powerful critique of the applied success of the endogenous growth literature. The
important work of Parente and Prescott (2000) extends this critique by forming an
alternative paradigm for our understanding of growth and convergence. Here, bar-
riers to growth are caused by firms with monopoly power who have an interest in
maintaining inferior technologies. The microeconomic foundations of the existence
and persistence of these barriers are lacking, however. Parente and Prescott largely
put them down to insider power, vested interests and a lack of accountability in
political institutions. In other words, inappropriate institutions supported by an
inequitable distribution of power among agents mean that technological diffusion
does not occur as it would under perfect competition. The coalitions that form in
our exchange cost economy are, in some regards, reminiscent of imperfectly com-
petitive markets. Further, our analysis of political outcomes that reflect underlying
power structures might also be interpreted in these terms. A major objective of
the work coming out of this thesis is to map the aggregate output in a dynamic
version of our exchange cost economy into a neoclassical production function, and
link this with a theory of TFP in the manner of Parente and Prescott (2000).
5.2.2 Contracts, Institutions and Growth
If we believe that exchange costs can be the product of the partial incompleteness
of contracts, as argued in Chapter 4, then institutions, contracts and economic
growth can be related via the costliness of exchange. This connection has long been
hinted-at by, among others, Boyd and Prescott (1985), Dixit (1996) and Williamson
(2000). The incompleteness of contracts is said to be mitigated by the existence of
institutions. Further, institutions are often supported by the invocation of transac-
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tion costs. If we can rigorously define a connection between incomplete contracts
and institutions via the costliness of exchange then we will have moved a long way
towards articulating, in an economically meaningful way, the interaction between
private contracts and institutions (or social contracts). With an extension to a
growth model, this would also provide a framework for the study of appropriate
institutions in the context of economic development. As Bolton and Dewatripont
(2005, p.489) point out,
The analysis of institutions is clearly of fundamental importance,
and an incomplete-contracting approach offers a vehicle to explore these
issues systematically. The fourth stage of research in contract theory is
thus a natural development, which should eventually produce an eco-
nomic theory of institutions as rich as the theory of incentives developed
in the last three decades.
Of course, there is a great deal to be done in making these interactions rigorous,
and even more to make them convincing. Primarily, the link between incomplete
contracts and exchange costs needs to be formalised at the microeconomic level.
The recent work on partial contracts of Hart and Moore (2004, 2006) suggests
that this might be possible. But how precisely does incomplete contracting relate
to optimal institutions; what do we mean by institutions; what are the optimal
arrangements at a micro level; what policies can be implemented to most efficiently
combat contract incompleteness; how does the interaction between contracts and
institutions change as the economy moves through a period of industrialisation?
It has been suggested that we might incorporate Shapley allocations into the
individual payoffs to individuals within a given market, something which can lead
to a form of contractual incompleteness. The consequent losses could potentially
be mapped into the exchange costs introduced in Chapter 4. Doing so, we would
be able to think of contractual incompleteness on a more fundamental level and at
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the same time retain the larger implications of our general equilibrium framework.
Further to these more fundamental questions, there are interesting technical
problems to resolve. In invoking the Shapley value to support power-based political
outcomes on top of the core-equilibrium concept that captures market equilibria we
are mixing solution concepts in a single model. If we could simultaneously model
market and political economy decisions with a single solution concept then the
implications of the model could be trusted more. This may require us to develop a
continuum-economy version of our exchange cost economy.
We leave all of these extensions to future work.
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Conclusions
Chapter 5 has covered much of what would normally comprise a section of conclud-
ing remarks so I will make this brief.
This thesis has offered a critique of the standard approach to the connection
between financial development and economic growth in the context of economies
going through industrial revolution. We found approaches to this classic question to
be evidence of the dangers of neglecting the interface between theory and evidence.
By looking at the question from an historical perspective we were able quickly to
recognise the inadequacies in current thinking. In doing so, we also managed to
draw-out clear implications for the actual disaggregated and dynamic elements of
a more appropriate story of finance and growth. By matching these implications
to a general equilibrium theory of exchange costs, we took a few steps towards a
proper understanding of the microfoundations of finance and growth.
In this sense, Landes (1969) was right: History can indeed be the laboratory
of the social sciences. It is hoped that with the conclusion of Shea’s Handbook of
Corporate Finance, we can further improve our understanding of a wide range of
contemporary questions in economics. We will have hard data that is disaggregated
to the point of biography on the existence, constitution and development of actual
financial coalitions right across the most important period of the economic devel-
opment of the UK. The potential for developments coming out of this dataset is
very great.
196
Conclusions
We have been through a number of potential extensions of this work. It seems
that a great deal of exciting research remains to be done. The challenge of un-
derstanding financial development and economic takeoff at a microeconomic level,
via the formation of contracts and the setting of the institutional environment, is
a potentially very fruitful one.
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Appendix A
MATLAB Code
Below is enough code to enable the reader to replicate the simulations carried out
in the thesis. This code has been successfully compiled in MATLAB v.7(R14). Ear-
lier versions may not accept the ‘anonymous functions’ of the form U=@(W)W^gamma.
Otherwise, the code should be compatible with most earlier versions. Unintended
line breaks are denoted “...”. Hard copies of the code files, and of simulation output
used to draw Figures, are available from the author by email at alex.trew@dunelm.org.uk.
A.1 Code for Chapter 2
The following is the file morhazgrowth.m. This calls the growth estimates in
gamma(:,1) to find implied financial efficiency under a range of parameters for
moral hazard. The data for these estimates are given in Appendix Table B.2.
morhazgrowth.m
1 global kappa
2 global etaf
3 global etax
4 global alpha
5 global rho
6 global theta
7 global A
8 global h
9 global s
10 global varphi1
11 global varphi2
13 kappa=1
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14 etaf=.1
15 etax=.01
16 s=10
17 varphi1=.4
18 varphi2=.2
19 alpha=.67
20 rho=.02
21 theta=5
22 A=30
24 setaf=zeros
25 betaf=zeros
26 for i=1:213
27 gamma(i,2)=(1-(((theta*gamma(i,1)+rho)/A)^(1/(1-alpha)))*...
28 (1/(1-alpha))); %first find the associated t*
29 t=gamma(i,2)
30 j=0;
31 i
32 for s=0.5:0.5:8
33 j=j+1;
34 y = @(etaf)((((2/3)*(kappa*(1-t))+((((kappa*(1-t))^2)/9)+(2/3)*s*t)...
35 ^(1/2))*(2*s*t-(((2/3)*(kappa*(1-t))+((((kappa*(1-t))^2)/9)+(2/3)...
36 *s*t)^(1/2))-(kappa*(1-t)))^2))-2*s*(etax+(varphi2/(1-varphi1))...
37 *etaf));
38 if sign(y(-5))~=sign(y(5));
39 etaf=fzero(y, [-50 50]);
40 setaf(i,j,1)=i;
41 setaf(i,j,2)=s;
42 setaf(i,j,3)=(etaf);
43 setaf(i,j,4)=1/etaf;
44 betanought=kappa*(1-t);
45 betastar=(2/3)*betanought+(((betanought^2)/9)+(2/3)*s*t)^(1/2);
46 betaf(i,j,1)=i;
47 betaf(i,j,2)=t;
48 betaf(i,j,3)=s;
49 betaf(i,j,4)=(etaf);
50 betaf(i,j,5)=betanought; %min effort level
51 betaf(i,j,6)=betastar; %optimal effort forced
52 betaf(i,j,7)=((betastar-betanought)^2)/(2*s); %total monitoring spend
53 end
54 end
55 end
57 figure; surf (setaf(:,:,1), setaf(:,:,2), 1-setaf(:,:,3)); figure(gcf)
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A.2 Code for Chapter 3
This code is relatively self-explanatory. The file findev.m solves for both regional
and national growth rates using the function infsolve.m, then chooses the optimal
growth rate and tracks prevailing levels of capital and infrastructure.
findev.m
58 global theta
59 global A
60 global Ahat
61 global alpha
62 global psi
63 global Psi
64 global phi
65 global Phi
66 global rho
67 global nu
68 global omega
70 global i
71 global infdev
73 theta=5;
74 A=.2;
75 Ahat=.35;
76 alpha=2/3;
77 psi=.4;
78 Psi=.6;
79 phi=.4;
80 Phi=.6;
81 rho=.02;
82 nu=5;
83 omega=5;
85 infdev=zeros;
87 I0=20; %initial condition for infrastructure
88 K0=I0/alpha;
90 reggrowthlim=(1/theta)*(A*((((1-alpha)*(1-psi))/(1+phi))^(1-alpha))-rho);
91 natgrowthlim=(1/theta)*(Ahat*((((1-alpha)*(1-Psi))/(1+Phi))^(1-alpha))-rho);
93 infdev(1,1)=I0;
94 infdev(1,6)=K0;
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96 for i=2:200;
97 Iguess=infdev(i-1,1)*1.05;
98 if isreal(infsolve(Iguess))
99 infdev(i,1)=fzero(@infsolve,Iguess); %make a starting guess for fzero
100 infdev(i,2)=(infdev(i,1)-infdev(i-1,1))/(infdev(i-1,1));
101 infdev(i,3)=natgrowthlim;
102 infdev(i,4)=reggrowthlim;
103 infdev(i,5)=max(infdev(i,4),infdev(i,2)); %prevailing growth rate
104 infdev(i,6)=infdev(i-1,6)*(1+infdev(i,5));
105 infdev(i,1)=infdev(i-1,1)*(1+infdev(i,5));
106 else
107 infdev(i,2)=NaN;
108 infdev(i,3)=natgrowthlim;
109 infdev(i,4)=reggrowthlim;
110 infdev(i,5)=infdev(i,4);
111 infdev(i,6)=infdev(i-1,6)*(1+infdev(i,5));
112 infdev(i,1)=infdev(i-1,1)*(1+infdev(i,5));
113 end
114 end
116 infdev(1,:)=NaN;
118 figure;plot(infdev(:,2:5));
infsolve.m
120 function y=infsolve(I)
122 global theta
123 global A
124 global Ahat
125 global alpha
126 global psi
127 global Psi
128 global phi
129 global Phi
130 global rho
131 global nu
132 global omega
134 global i
135 global infdev
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137 Ih=infdev(i-1,1);
139 y=(1+Phi+((2*nu)/I))*(((Ahat^(-1))*(rho+theta*((I-Ih)/(Ih))))^...
140 (1/(1-alpha)))-(1-alpha)*(1-Psi-((2*omega)/I));
A.3 Code for Chapter 4
Printed below is code for three simulations described in Chapter 4. Three .m-files
contain the core models. The first, taurange.m, solves for optimal market size and
expected utility for a triangular grid of {τs, τg} pairs. The second, opttau.m, solves
for optimal {τs, τg} using the marginal conditions over a range of parameterisations
(in this case, over a range of k). The third, taxes.m, develops the numerical impli-
cations of power and taxes in our model. Two functions, alpha.m and tausolve.m
solve respectively for equilibrium α and, using the marginal conditions, optimal
{τs, τg}.
taurange.m
141 global beta %weight on ameliorating capital
142 global delta %weight on specific contracting
143 global sigma %elasticity of substitution
144 global gamma %exponent on utility function
145 global rho %probability of low tech
146 global lambda1 %low tech
147 global lambda2 %high tech
148 global curves %gamma_s
149 global curveg %gamma_g
150 global taus %specific tau
151 global taug %general tau
152 global k %endowment level
153 global noM %market size
154 global b %agent Type
155 global incomp %"incompleteness"
156 global alph %exchange cost
158 k=25;
159 beta=.03;
160 curves=.065;
161 curveg=.085;
162 delta=.5;
163 sigma=0.5;
164 rho=.5;
165 lambda1=1;
166 lambda2=5;
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167 ro=3;
168 U=@(W)(((W)^(1-ro)-1)/(1-ro));
169 b=1;
170 top=30; %set the top of the range of coalition sizes through which we
171 index for each alpha
172 optimalsize=zeros;
173 h=0
174 for taus=0:.005:1 %cycle through taus
175 h=h+1
176 j=0;
177 for taug=0:.005:1 %cycle through taug
178 j=j+1;
179 if taus+taug>=1
180 optimalsize(h,j,1)=NaN;
181 optimalsize(h,j,2)=NaN;
182 optimalsize(h,j,3)=NaN;
183 optimalsize(h,j,4)=NaN;
184 optimalsize(h,j,5)=NaN;
185 optimalsize(h,j,6)=NaN;
186 else
187 maxutility=0;
188 for noM=1:1:top
189 utilityi=0;
190 utilityizero=0;
191 for i=0:1:noM
192 utilityi=utilityi+(factorial(noM)/(factorial(i)*...
193 factorial(noM-i)))*(rho^(noM-i))*((1-rho)^i)*U((((...
194 1-taus-taug)*k)-(2*alpha((taus*k),(taug*k))*(((noM-1)...
195 /noM))))*(((noM-i)*lambda1+i*lambda2)/noM));
196 end
197 if isreal(utilityi) %need to take out complex numbers...
198 for the graphing
199 if utilityi>maxutility %keeps tabs on the optimal...
200 market size
201 if noM>=top %this bit is just so that if it goes...
202 to the limit of our search we...
203 don’t have a flat line at ’top’
204 optimalsize(h,j,1)=taus;
205 optimalsize(h,j,2)=taug;
206 optimalsize(h,j,3)=NaN;
207 optimalsize(h,j,4)=NaN;
208 optimalsize(h,j,5)=NaN;
209 optimalsize(h,j,6)=NaN;
210 else
211 maxutility=utilityi;
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212 optimalsize(h,j,1)=taus;
213 optimalsize(h,j,2)=taug;
214 optimalsize(h,j,3)=noM;
215 optimalsize(h,j,4)=utilityi;
216 optimalsize(h,j,5)=incomp;
217 optimalsize(h,j,6)=alph;
218 end
219 end
220 else
221 optimalsize(h,j,1)=taus;
222 optimalsize(h,j,2)=taug;
223 optimalsize(h,j,3)=NaN;
224 optimalsize(h,j,4)=NaN;
225 optimalsize(h,j,5)=NaN;
226 optimalsize(h,j,6)=NaN;
227 end
228 end
229 end
230 end
231 end
232 figure; surf(optimalsize(:,:,1),optimalsize(:,:,2),optimalsize(:,:,4))
233 figure; surf(optimalsize(:,:,1),optimalsize(:,:,2),optimalsize(:,:,3))
opttau.m
235 global beta %weight on ameliorating capital
236 global delta %weight on specific contracting
237 global sigma %elasticity of substitution
238 global gamma %exponent on utility function
239 global rho %probability of low tech
240 global lambda1 %low tech
241 global lambda2 %high tech
242 global curves %gamma_s
243 global curveg %gamma_g
244 global taus %specific tau
245 global taug %general tau
246 global k %endowment level
247 global noM %market size
248 global b %agent Type
249 global incomp %"incompleteness"
250 global alph %exchange cost
252 %k=25;
253 beta=.03;
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254 curves=.065;
255 curveg=.085;
256 delta=.5;
257 sigma=0.5;
258 rho=.5;
259 lambda1=1;
260 lambda2=5;
261 ro=3;
262 U=@(W)(((W)^(1-ro)-1)/(1-ro));
263 b=1;
265 optimaltau=zeros;
267 top=50; %set the top of the range of coalition sizes through
268 which we index for each alpha
269 h=0
270 for k=20:.05:38
271 h=h+1
272 maxutility=0;
273 fguesses=zeros;
274 for noM=1:1:top
275 if noM<2
276 taus=0;
277 taug=0;
278 else
279 if noM==2 %finding the fguess here is difficile, this is a...
280 rough automation, but not always does it work
281 fguess=.025; %first stab is important
282 else
283 fguess=fguesses(noM-1);
284 end
285 while isreal(tausolve(fguess))==0 %cycle until tausolve is real
286 fguess=fguess+.0001;
287 end
288 options = optimset(’Display’,’off’,’TolFun’,1e-8);
289 [x,y,z]=fzero(@tausolve,fguess,options);
290 while z~=1 %cycle until fsolve works
291 fguess=fguess+.0001;
292 [x,y,z]=fzero(@tausolve,fguess,options);
293 if fguess>1
294 warning(’fguess>1; reset noM=2 fguess’)
295 break
296 end
297 end
298 taus=fzero(@tausolve, fguess,options);
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299 end
300 fguesses(noM)=fguess;
301 utilityi=0;
302 for i=0:1:noM
303 utilityi=utilityi+(factorial(noM)/(factorial(i)*...
304 factorial(noM-i)))*(rho^(noM-i))*((1-rho)^i)*...
305 U((((1-taus-taug)*k)-(2*alpha((taus*k),(taug*k))...
306 *((noM-1)/noM)))*(((noM-i)*lambda1+i*lambda2)/noM));
307 end
308 if isreal(utilityi) %need to take out complex numbers for...
309 the graphing: isreal(A) returns 1 if all...
310 elements of A are real, 0 otherwise
311 if utilityi>maxutility %keeps tabs on the optimal market size
312 if noM>=top %this bit is just so that if it goes to the...
313 limit of our search we don’t have a flat...
314 line at ’top’
315 optimaltau(h,1)=k;
316 optimaltau(h,2)=NaN;
317 optimaltau(h,3)=NaN;
318 optimaltau(h,4)=NaN;
319 optimaltau(h,5)=NaN;
320 optimaltau(h,6)=NaN;
321 optimaltau(h,7)=NaN;
322 optimaltau(h,8)=NaN;
323 optimaltau(h,9)=NaN;
324 optimaltau(h,10)=NaN;
325 else
326 maxutility=utilityi;
327 optimaltau(h,1)=k;
328 optimaltau(h,2)=taus;
329 optimaltau(h,3)=taug;
330 optimaltau(h,4)=noM;
331 optimaltau(h,5)=utilityi;
332 optimaltau(h,6)=incomp;
333 if noM>1
334 optimaltau(h,7)=alph;
335 optimaltau(h,8)=((noM-1)/noM)*alph;
336 optimaltau(h,9)=(taus+taug)*k+2*((noM-1)/noM)*alph;...
337 %per capita spend on tau and exchange
338 optimaltau(h,10)=optimaltau(h,9)/k; %kappa
339 else
340 optimaltau(h,7)=0;
341 optimaltau(h,8)=0;
342 optimaltau(h,9)=0;
343 optimaltau(h,10)=0;
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344 end
345 end
346 end
347 end
348 end
349 end
350 figure; stairs(optimaltau(:,1),optimaltau(:,2:3))
351 figure; stairs(optimaltau(:,1),optimaltau(:,8))
352 figure; stairs(optimaltau(:,1),optimaltau(:,10))
taxes.m
354 function alph = alpha(S,G)
356 global beta %weight on ameliorating capital
357 global delta %weight on specific contracting
358 global sigma %elasticity of substitution
359 global gamma %exponent on utility function
360 global rho %probability of low tech
361 global lambda1 %low tech
362 global lambda2 %high tech
363 global curves %gamma_s
364 global curveg %gamma_g
365 global taus %specific tau
366 global taug %general tau
367 global k %endowment level
368 global noM %market size
369 global b %agent Type
370 global incomp %"incompleteness"
371 global alph %exchange cost
373 optimaltau=zeros;
375 beta=.03;
376 curves=[.065 .1];
377 curveg=.085;
378 delta=.5;
379 sigma=0.5;
380 rho=.5;
381 lambda1=1;
382 lambda2=5;
383 ro=3;
384 U=@(W)(((W)^(1-ro)-1)/(1-ro)); %CRRA utility
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386 top=50;
387 k=25
388 taus=zeros;
389 h=0;
390 for taug=0.03:.0001:.08
391 maxutility=[0 0];
392 h=h+1
393 for b=1:2; %cycle through agent Types
394 for noM=1:1:top
395 taus(b)=(1/(beta*k))*(-log(1-((1/(1-delta))*(((2*((noM-1)/noM)...
396 *beta*k*exp(-beta*taug*k)*curveg*delta*((1-exp(-beta*taug*k))...
397 ^(curveg*sigma-1)))^(sigma/(sigma-1)))-delta*(1-exp(-beta*taug...
398 *k))^(curveg*sigma)))^(1/(curves(b)*sigma))));
399 if isreal(taus(b))
400 if taus(b)~=0
401 if taus(b)+taug<1
402 utilityi(b)=0;
403 for i=0:1:noM
404 utilityi(b)=utilityi(b)+(factorial(noM)/(factorial...
405 (i)*factorial(noM-i)))*(rho^(noM-i))*((1-rho)...
406 ^i)*U((((1-taus(b)-taug)*k)-(2*alpha((taus(b)*k),...
407 (taug*k))*((noM-1)/noM)))*(((noM-i)*lambda1+...
408 i*lambda2)/noM));
409 end
410 if isreal(utilityi(b))
411 if utilityi(b)>maxutility(b)
412 if noM>=top
413 optimaltau(h,b,1)=k;
414 optimaltau(h,b,2)=NaN;
415 optimaltau(h,b,3)=NaN;
416 optimaltau(h,b,4)=NaN;
417 optimaltau(h,b,5)=NaN;
418 optimaltau(h,b,6)=NaN;
419 optimaltau(h,b,7)=NaN;
420 optimaltau(h,b,8)=NaN;
421 optimaltau(h,b,9)=NaN;
422 optimaltau(h,b,10)=NaN;
423 optimaltau(h,b,11)=curves(b);
424 optimaltau(h,b,12)=NaN;
425 optimaltau(h,b,13)=NaN;
426 else
427 hstep=.01; %two-sided differences
428 for j=0:1
429 k2=k*(1+(-1+2*j)*hstep);
430 taus2(b)=(1/(beta*k2))*(-log(1-((1/(1-...
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431 delta))*(((2*((noM-1)/noM)*beta*k2*...
432 exp(-beta*taug*k2)*curveg*delta*((1...
433 -exp(-beta*taug*k2))^(curveg*sigma-...
434 1)))^(sigma/(sigma-1)))-delta*(1-...
435 exp(-beta*taug*k2))^(curveg*sigma)))...
436 ^(1/(curves(b)*sigma))));
437 utilityi2(b)=0;
438 for i=0:1:noM
439 utilityi2(b)=utilityi2(b)+(...
440 factorial(noM)/(factorial(i)*...
441 factorial(noM-i)))*(rho^(noM...
442 -i))*((1-rho)^i)*U((((1-taus2(b)...
443 -taug)*k2)-(2*alpha((taus2(b)*k2)...
444 ,(taug*k2))*((noM-1).../noM)))*...
445 (((noM-i)*lambda1+i*lambda2)/noM));
446 end
447 marginals(j+1)=utilityi2(b);
448 end
449 marginal=(marginals(2)-marginals(1))/(2*hstep);
450 maxutility=utilityi;
451 optimaltau(h,b,1)=k;
452 optimaltau(h,b,2)=taus(b);
453 optimaltau(h,b,3)=taug;
454 optimaltau(h,b,4)=noM;
455 optimaltau(h,b,5)=utilityi(b);
456 optimaltau(h,b,6)=incomp;
457 if noM>1
458 optimaltau(h,b,7)=alph;
459 optimaltau(h,b,8)=((noM-1)/noM)*alph;
460 optimaltau(h,b,9)=(taus(b)+taug)*k+2*...
461 ((noM-1)/noM)*alph;
462 optimaltau(h,b,10)=optimaltau(h,b,9)/k;
463 optimaltau(h,b,11)=curves(b);
464 optimaltau(h,b,12)=marginal;
465 optimaltau(h,b,13)=1/marginal;
466 else
467 optimaltau(h,b,7)=0;
468 optimaltau(h,b,8)=0;
469 optimaltau(h,b,9)=0;
470 optimaltau(h,b,10)=0;
471 optimaltau(h,b,11)=0;
472 optimaltau(h,b,12)=0;
473 optimaltau(h,b,13)=0;
474 end
475 end
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476 end
477 end
478 end
479 else
480 optimaltau(h,b,1)=k;
481 optimaltau(h,b,2)=NaN;
482 optimaltau(h,b,3)=taug;
483 optimaltau(h,b,4)=NaN;
484 optimaltau(h,b,5)=NaN;
485 optimaltau(h,b,6)=NaN;
486 optimaltau(h,b,7)=NaN;
487 optimaltau(h,b,8)=NaN;
488 optimaltau(h,b,9)=NaN;
489 optimaltau(h,b,10)=NaN;
490 optimaltau(h,b,11)=NaN;
491 optimaltau(h,b,12)=NaN;
492 optimaltau(h,b,13)=NaN;
493 end
494 else
495 optimaltau(h,b,1)=k;
496 optimaltau(h,b,2)=NaN;
497 optimaltau(h,b,3)=taug;
498 optimaltau(h,b,4)=NaN;
499 optimaltau(h,b,5)=NaN;
500 optimaltau(h,b,6)=NaN;
501 optimaltau(h,b,7)=NaN;
502 optimaltau(h,b,8)=NaN;
503 optimaltau(h,b,9)=NaN;
504 optimaltau(h,b,10)=NaN;
505 optimaltau(h,b,11)=NaN;
506 optimaltau(h,b,12)=NaN;
507 optimaltau(h,b,13)=NaN;
508 end
509 end
510 end
511 end
514 max=zeros; %finds optimal taug etc. for each Type
515 for b=1:2
516 maxu=0;
517 [m n]=size(optimaltau);
518 for i=1:1:m
519 if optimaltau(i,b,5)>maxu
520 maxu=optimaltau(i,b,5);
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521 max(1,b)=optimaltau(i,b,1);
522 max(2,b)=optimaltau(i,b,2);
523 max(3,b)=optimaltau(i,b,3);
524 max(4,b)=optimaltau(i,b,4);
525 max(5,b)=optimaltau(i,b,5);
526 max(6,b)=optimaltau(i,b,6);
527 max(7,b)=optimaltau(i,b,10);
528 max(8,b)=optimaltau(i,b,11);
529 max(9,b)=i;
530 max(10,b)=optimaltau(i,b,12);
531 end
532 end
533 end
534 max
536 theta1=1; %finding the egalitarian allocation
537 theta2=1;
538 maxmax=zeros;
539 maxweight=0;
540 [m n]=size(optimaltau);
541 for i=1:1:m
542 if theta1*optimaltau(i,1,5)+theta2*optimaltau(i,2,5)>maxweight
543 maxweight=theta1*optimaltau(i,1,5)+theta2*optimaltau(i,2,5);
544 for b=1:2
545 maxmax(1,b)=optimaltau(i,b,1);
546 maxmax(2,b)=optimaltau(i,b,2);
547 maxmax(3,b)=optimaltau(i,b,3);
548 maxmax(4,b)=optimaltau(i,b,4);
549 maxmax(5,b)=optimaltau(i,b,5);
550 maxmax(6,b)=optimaltau(i,b,6);
551 maxmax(7,b)=optimaltau(i,b,10);
552 maxmax(8,b)=optimaltau(i,b,11);
553 maxmax(9,b)=i;
554 maxmax(10,b)=maxweight;
555 maxmax(11,b)=optimaltau(i,b,12);
556 end
557 end
558 end
559 maxmax
561 maxpower=zeros; %index over taug for finding power allocations
562 maxweight=zeros;
563 i=0;
564 for l=max(9,2):max(9,1) %cycle from tau^2*_g to tau^1*_g
565 i=i+1;
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566 theta1=optimaltau(l,1,13)/(optimaltau(l,1,13)+optimaltau(l,2,13));
567 theta2=optimaltau(l,2,13)/(optimaltau(l,1,13)+optimaltau(l,2,13));
568 j=0;
569 maxweight(i)=0;
570 for m=max(9,2):max(9,1)
571 j=j+1;
572 if theta1*optimaltau(m,1,5)+theta2*optimaltau(m,2,5)>maxweight(i)
573 maxweight(i)=theta1*optimaltau(m,1,5)+theta2*optimaltau(m,2,5);
574 for b=1:2
575 maxpower(i,1,b)=optimaltau(l,b,3);
576 maxpower(i,2,b)=optimaltau(m,b,3);
577 maxpower(i,3,b)=l;
578 maxpower(i,4,b)=m;
579 maxpower(i,5,b)=theta1; %these are the weights implied...
580 by the taug
581 maxpower(i,6,b)=theta2;
582 maxpower(i,7,b)=optimaltau(m,1,13)/(optimaltau(m,1,13)+
583 optimaltau(m,2,13)); %these are the weights implied...
584 by the ex post marginal utilities
585 maxpower(i,8,b)=optimaltau(m,2,13)/(optimaltau(m,1,13)+
586 optimaltau(m,2,13));
587 end
588 end
589 end
590 end
592 maxedpower=zeros;
593 [p q]=size(maxpower); %pick out power equilibria from maxpower
594 for s=1:p
595 t=0;
596 if maxpower(s,3,b)==maxpower(s,4,b)
597 t=t+1;
598 for b=1:2
599 maxedpower(t,1,b)=optimaltau(maxpower(s,3,b),b,1);
600 maxedpower(t,2,b)=optimaltau(maxpower(s,3,b),b,2);
601 maxedpower(t,3,b)=optimaltau(maxpower(s,3,b),b,3);
602 maxedpower(t,4,b)=optimaltau(maxpower(s,3,b),b,4);
603 maxedpower(t,5,b)=optimaltau(maxpower(s,3,b),b,5);
604 maxedpower(t,6,b)=optimaltau(maxpower(s,3,b),b,6);
605 maxedpower(t,7,b)=optimaltau(maxpower(s,3,b),b,10);
606 maxedpower(t,8,b)=optimaltau(maxpower(s,3,b),b,11);
607 maxedpower(t,9,b)=maxpower(s,3,b);
608 maxedpower(t,10,b)=optimaltau(maxpower(s,3,b),b,12);
609 maxedpower(t,11,b)=optimaltau(maxpower(s,3,b),b,13);
610 end
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611 end
612 end
alpha.m
614 function alph = alpha(S,G)
616 global beta %weight on ameliorating capital
617 global delta %weight on specific contracting
618 global sigma %elasticity of substitution
619 global gamma %exponent on utility function
620 global rho %probability of low tech
621 global lambda1 %low tech
622 global lambda2 %high tech
623 global curves %gamma_s
624 global curveg %gamma_g
625 global taus %specific tau
626 global taug %general tau
627 global k %endowment level
628 global noM %market size
629 global b %agent Type
631 alph=(1-(delta*(1-(exp(-beta*taus(b)*k)))^(curves(b)*sigma)+(1-delta)*(1...
632 -(exp(-beta*taug*k)))^(curveg*sigma))^(1/sigma))*k;
633 incomp=(delta*(1-(exp(-beta*taus(b)*k)))^(curves(b)*sigma)+(1-delta)*(1...
634 -(exp(-beta*taug*k)))^(curveg*sigma))^(1/sigma);
tausolve.m
636 function y=tausolve(taus)
638 global beta %weight on ameliorating capital
639 global delta %weight on specific contracting
640 global sigma %elasticity of substitution
641 global gamma %exponent on utility function
642 global rho %probability of low tech
643 global lambda1 %low tech
644 global lambda2 %high tech
645 global curves %gamma_s
646 global curveg %gamma_g
647 global taus %specific tau
648 global taug %general tau
649 global k %endowment level
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650 global noM %market size
652 y=2*((noM-1)/noM)*(((delta*(1-exp(-beta*taus*k))^(curves*sigma))+...
653 ((1-delta)*(1-exp(-beta*(1/(beta*k))*(-log(1-((1/(1-delta))*(((2*...
654 ((noM-1)/noM)*beta*k*exp(-beta*taus*k)*curves*delta*((1-exp(-beta*...
655 taus*k))^(curves*sigma-1)))^(sigma/(sigma-1)))-delta*(1-exp(-beta*...
656 taus*k))^(curves*sigma)))^(1/(curveg*sigma))))*k))^(curveg*sigma)))...
657 ^((1-sigma)/sigma))*beta*k*exp(-beta*(1/(beta*k))*(-log(1-((1/(1-...
658 delta))*(((2*((noM-1)/noM)*beta*k*exp(-beta*taus*k)*curves*delta*...
659 ((1-exp(-beta*taus*k))^(curves*sigma-1)))^(sigma/(sigma-1)))-delta*...
660 (1-exp(-beta*taus*k))^(curves*sigma)))^(1/(curveg*sigma))))*k)*curveg*...
661 (1-delta)*(1-exp(-beta*(1/(beta*k))*(-log(1-((1/(1-delta))*(((2*((noM-1)...
662 /noM)*beta*k*exp(-beta*taus*k)*curves*delta*((1-exp(-beta*taus*k))^...
663 (curves*sigma-1)))^(sigma/(sigma-1)))-delta*(1-exp(-beta*taus*k))^...
664 (curves*sigma)))^(1/(curveg*sigma))))*k))^(curveg*sigma-1)-1;
666 taug=(1/(beta*k))*(-log(1-((1/(1-delta))*(((2*((noM-1)/noM)*beta*k*...
667 exp(-beta*taus*k)*curves*delta*((1-exp(-beta*taus*k))^(curves*sigma-...
668 1)))^(sigma/(sigma-1)))-delta*(1-exp(-beta*taus*k))^(curves*sigma)))...
669 ^(1/(curveg*sigma))));
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Appendix B
Data for Chapters 1, 2 and 3
All of the following data are also available in electronic form from the author by
email at alex.trew@dunelm.org.uk.
Data for Figure 1.1 is derived from the full database in Beck et al. (1999),
which is available from http://econ.worldbank.org/programs/finance/. We restrict
the sample to the “pure cross-sectional dataset” used by Levine et al. (2000), i.e.,
for the period 1960–95, for 71 of the 192 countries in the complete dataset as listed
in their Table 9. Table B.1 below gives for each year the number of countries with
missing observations for three series. The codes are used in later revisions of the
database: pcrdbofgdp is ‘Private credit by deposit money banks and other financial
institutions to GDP’; llgdp is ‘Liquid liabilities to GDP’; and, dbagdp is ‘Deposit
Money Bank Assets to GDP’. These are the three significant variables in Aghion
et al. (2005).
Figure 2.1 is generated using the ‘Revised Best Guess’ index of industrial pro-
duction in Crafts and Harley (1992), in their Table A3.I. The index is detrended
using a Hodrick-Prescott filter with different smoothing parameters before taking
growth rates. Table B.2 gives these data.
Table B.3 gives the series of per capita industrial production used for Figure
3.1, as taken from Bairoch (1982) Tables 9 and 12.
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Table B.1: Data for Figure 1.1. Finance to GDP Ratios. Source: Levine et al.
(2000) and own calculations.
year pcrdbofgdp llgdp dbagdp
1960 25 29 25
1961 24 28 23
1962 24 27 23
1963 21 24 20
1964 16 20 15
1965 16 21 16
1966 13 18 13
1967 14 17 13
1968 12 16 11
1969 9 14 9
1970 8 13 8
1971 7 11 6
1972 7 11 6
1973 6 11 6
1974 5 10 5
1975 5 9 5
1976 5 9 5
1977 5 9 5
1978 4 9 5
1979 4 9 5
1980 3 7 3
1981 3 7 3
1982 5 9 5
1983 5 10 5
1984 4 9 4
1985 4 9 4
1986 5 10 5
1987 5 10 5
1988 3 8 3
1989 4 8 4
1990 4 10 5
1991 5 10 5
1992 6 11 6
1993 5 11 5
1994 2 9 3
1995 3 9 3
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Table B.2: Data for Figure 2.1: Index of Industrial Production, Smoothing and
Growth Rates. Source: Crafts and Harley (1992) and own calculations.
year Revised growth HP growth HP growth
Best (non-HP) λ=10,000 λ=10,000 λ=100 λ=100
Guess
1700 1.92 2.068112 2.09101
1701 2.11 9.895833 2.085856 0.858006 2.112083 1.007796
1702 1.85 -12.3223 2.103586 0.849997 2.131446 0.916773
1703 2.6 40.54054 2.121289 0.841539 2.147368 0.747004
1704 2.4 -7.69231 2.138926 0.831454 2.155304 0.369549
1705 2.35 -2.08333 2.156509 0.822034 2.155234 -0.00324
1706 2.02 -14.0426 2.174073 0.814468 2.149586 -0.26204
1707 2.08 2.970297 2.191674 0.809587 2.142737 -0.31864
1708 2.19 5.288462 2.209352 0.806604 2.137765 -0.23203
1709 2.15 -1.82648 2.227136 0.804953 2.137123 -0.03002
1710 1.77 -17.6744 2.245054 0.804504 2.143786 0.311769
1711 2.1 18.64407 2.263124 0.804877 2.160857 0.796304
1712 2.12 0.952381 2.281318 0.803946 2.187702 1.242322
1713 2.26 6.603774 2.299592 0.801037 2.223077 1.617021
1714 2.18 -3.53982 2.317886 0.79551 2.265064 1.888661
1715 2.22 1.834862 2.336134 0.787279 2.31211 2.077047
1716 2.37 6.756757 2.354258 0.775838 2.361815 2.149771
1717 2.58 8.860759 2.372169 0.760793 2.410856 2.07642
1718 2.52 -2.32558 2.389778 0.742319 2.455993 1.872227
1719 2.62 3.968254 2.407018 0.721385 2.495676 1.615761
1720 2.52 -3.81679 2.423833 0.698597 2.528996 1.335114
1721 2.44 -3.1746 2.440191 0.674878 2.556288 1.079137
1722 2.68 9.836066 2.456068 0.650638 2.577794 0.841325
1723 2.69 0.373134 2.47144 0.625879 2.592598 0.574263
1724 2.58 -4.08922 2.486306 0.601509 2.600801 0.31641
1725 2.63 1.937984 2.500686 0.578385 2.603481 0.103064
1726 2.7 2.661597 2.514611 0.55684 2.601508 -0.07578
1727 2.66 -1.48148 2.528123 0.537343 2.596017 -0.2111
1728 2.51 -5.6391 2.541284 0.520575 2.589125 -0.26545
1729 2.41 -3.98406 2.554168 0.506989 2.583594 -0.21364
1730 2.54 5.394191 2.566847 0.496395 2.58139 -0.08529
1731 2.5 -1.5748 2.579377 0.488168 2.582747 0.052541
1732 2.53 1.2 2.591814 0.482158 2.587481 0.183308
1733 2.65 4.743083 2.604203 0.478014 2.594584 0.27452
1734 2.64 -0.37736 2.616585 0.475463 2.602472 0.304012
1735 2.65 0.378788 2.629005 0.47465 2.610115 0.293667
1736 2.69 1.509434 2.641509 0.475633 2.616857 0.258329
1737 2.63 -2.23048 2.654148 0.478455 2.622444 0.213498
1738 2.67 1.520913 2.666974 0.483266 2.627351 0.18711
1739 2.7 1.123596 2.680041 0.489935 2.632129 0.181853
1740 2.57 -4.81481 2.693399 0.498435 2.637756 0.213769
cont.
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year Revised growth HP growth HP growth
Best (non-HP) λ=10,000 λ=10,000 λ=100 λ=100
Guess
1741 2.64 2.723735 2.707103 0.508803 2.645887 0.308285
1742 2.58 -2.27273 2.721195 0.520541 2.657503 0.439012
1743 2.63 1.937984 2.735709 0.53337 2.673523 0.602809
1744 2.69 2.281369 2.750666 0.546742 2.694091 0.769341
1745 2.64 -1.85874 2.766077 0.560257 2.718918 0.921536
1746 2.69 1.893939 2.781945 0.573682 2.747673 1.057564
1747 2.76 2.60223 2.798263 0.586559 2.779234 1.148652
1748 2.82 2.173913 2.815013 0.598565 2.811905 1.175538
1749 2.87 1.77305 2.832172 0.609576 2.843796 1.134151
1750 2.97 3.484321 2.849721 0.619627 2.873099 1.030419
1751 2.95 -0.6734 2.867642 0.62887 2.898267 0.875999
1752 3.03 2.711864 2.88593 0.637737 2.918724 0.705806
1753 3.02 -0.33003 2.904588 0.646519 2.934407 0.537352
1754 2.94 -2.64901 2.923634 0.655711 2.946371 0.407718
1755 2.99 1.70068 2.943096 0.66569 2.956524 0.344592
1756 2.83 -5.35117 2.963006 0.676487 2.966711 0.344547
1757 2.98 5.300353 2.983398 0.688233 2.979111 0.417968
1758 2.94 -1.34228 3.004296 0.700449 2.994537 0.517793
1759 2.99 1.70068 3.025719 0.713103 3.013809 0.643597
1760 2.99 0 3.047685 0.725961 3.037205 0.776288
1761 3.09 3.344482 3.070204 0.738893 3.064762 0.90731
1762 3.05 -1.2945 3.093283 0.751698 3.096046 1.020756
1763 3.03 -0.65574 3.116929 0.764436 3.130875 1.124946
1764 3.22 6.270627 3.141146 0.776959 3.168606 1.20515
1765 3.13 -2.79503 3.165929 0.788989 3.20759 1.230309
1766 3.25 3.833866 3.191281 0.800781 3.246689 1.218938
1767 3.42 5.230769 3.217202 0.81222 3.283989 1.148878
1768 3.29 -3.80117 3.243695 0.823491 3.317612 1.023835
1769 3.43 4.255319 3.270787 0.835217 3.347037 0.886935
1770 3.39 -1.16618 3.298507 0.847516 3.371468 0.729949
1771 3.49 2.949853 3.326902 0.860841 3.390941 0.577555
1772 3.57 2.292264 3.356027 0.875421 3.405672 0.434441
1773 3.5 -1.96078 3.385952 0.891689 3.416873 0.328889
1774 3.23 -7.71429 3.416771 0.910202 3.427396 0.307975
1775 3.32 2.786378 3.448588 0.931197 3.440926 0.39475
1776 3.46 4.216867 3.481488 0.954021 3.459172 0.530277
1777 3.51 1.445087 3.515544 0.97821 3.482637 0.678322
1778 3.62 3.133903 3.550827 1.003622 3.511828 0.838201
1779 3.38 -6.62983 3.587407 1.030162 3.54753 1.016611
1780 3.49 3.254438 3.625359 1.057939 3.591606 1.242455
1781 3.61 3.438395 3.664741 1.086293 3.644247 1.465657
1782 3.65 1.108033 3.705595 1.114787 3.704625 1.656807
1783 3.73 2.191781 3.747958 1.143223 3.771571 1.807106
1784 3.95 5.898123 3.791862 1.171409 3.843371 1.903701
cont.
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year Revised growth HP growth HP growth
Best (non-HP) λ=10,000 λ=10,000 λ=100 λ=100
Guess
1785 3.96 0.253165 3.837337 1.199262 3.917892 1.938957
1786 3.93 -0.75758 3.884427 1.227163 3.99407 1.94437
1787 4.13 5.089059 3.933191 1.255378 4.071262 1.932655
1788 4.16 0.726392 3.983692 1.283957 4.148182 1.88935
1789 4.2 0.961538 4.036011 1.313325 4.224135 1.830974
1790 4.3 2.380952 4.090248 1.343823 4.29854 1.761426
1791 4.42 2.790698 4.146519 1.375735 4.370577 1.675863
1792 4.66 5.429864 4.204961 1.409428 4.439442 1.575641
1793 4.49 -3.64807 4.265739 1.445384 4.504822 1.472711
1794 4.47 -0.44543 4.329062 1.484465 4.568612 1.416036
1795 4.64 3.803132 4.395163 1.52692 4.632558 1.399672
1796 4.78 3.017241 4.464289 1.572768 4.697419 1.400114
1797 4.56 -4.60251 4.53671 1.62223 4.764029 1.418031
1798 4.71 3.289474 4.612729 1.675638 4.83405 1.469779
1799 5.13 8.917197 4.69265 1.732629 4.9071 1.511161
1800 5.07 -1.16959 4.776789 1.792989 4.98156 1.517376
1801 4.87 -3.94477 4.865503 1.857194 5.058036 1.535188
1802 5.14 5.544148 4.959181 1.925337 5.138022 1.581367
1803 5.19 0.972763 5.058209 1.996873 5.22113 1.617515
1804 5.36 3.27553 5.162995 2.071601 5.306993 1.644519
1805 5.48 2.238806 5.273958 2.14919 5.39493 1.657011
1806 5.52 0.729927 5.391536 2.229413 5.484794 1.6657
1807 5.74 3.985507 5.51619 2.312024 5.577284 1.686313
1808 5.46 -4.87805 5.648391 2.396608 5.673456 1.724348
1809 5.6 2.564103 5.788635 2.482904 5.77599 1.807252
1810 6.09 8.75 5.937398 2.569912 5.885432 1.894769
1811 6.4 5.090312 6.095137 2.656697 6.000568 1.956289
1812 6.02 -5.9375 6.262324 2.742957 6.12223 2.027515
1813 6.07 0.830565 6.439462 2.828633 6.255245 2.172658
1814 6.17 1.647446 6.62703 2.91279 6.403417 2.368761
1815 6.71 8.752026 6.825469 2.994397 6.568697 2.581124
1816 6.55 -2.3845 7.035176 3.072421 6.750703 2.770805
1817 7.16 9.312977 7.256536 3.146463 6.950465 2.959128
1818 7.46 4.189944 7.489883 3.215684 7.167006 3.115497
1819 7.21 -3.35121 7.735545 3.279913 7.401446 3.271099
1820 7.4 2.635229 7.993844 3.339122 7.657833 3.46401
1821 7.71 4.189189 8.265052 3.392707 7.938301 3.6625
1822 8.13 5.447471 8.549379 3.440118 8.242406 3.830861
1823 8.56 5.289053 8.846982 3.480992 8.567422 3.94321
1824 9.02 5.373832 9.157975 3.515241 8.909496 3.992733
1825 9.85 9.201774 9.482443 3.543006 9.264704 3.986845
1826 8.99 -8.73096 9.820457 3.564629 9.630225 3.945307
1827 10.2 13.4594 10.17212 3.580978 10.00909 3.934143
1828 10.9 6.862745 10.53747 3.591659 10.39793 3.884898
cont.
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year Revised growth HP growth HP growth
Best (non-HP) λ=10,000 λ=10,000 λ=100 λ=100
Guess
1829 10.5 -3.66972 10.91653 3.597215 10.79529 3.821515
1830 11.5 9.52381 11.30936 3.598464 11.20473 3.792712
1831 11.6 0.869565 11.71598 3.595445 11.62685 3.767314
1832 11.6 0 12.13643 3.588753 12.06521 3.770241
1833 12.2 5.172414 12.57076 3.578674 12.5231 3.795164
1834 12.9 5.737705 13.01892 3.565144 12.99917 3.801519
1835 13.4 3.875969 13.48087 3.548275 13.48882 3.76678
1836 14.7 9.701493 13.95653 3.528378 13.98647 3.689343
1837 14 -4.7619 14.44581 3.505774 14.48564 3.568993
1838 15.3 9.285714 14.94872 3.481329 14.98701 3.461132
1839 16.6 8.496732 15.4652 3.454993 15.48638 3.331992
1840 16.2 -2.40964 15.99523 3.427259 15.98268 3.204765
1841 16.5 1.851852 16.53891 3.399046 16.48599 3.149107
1842 15.7 -4.84848 17.09637 3.370573 17.00856 3.169771
1843 16.6 5.732484 17.66771 3.341888 17.56277 3.258428
1844 18.7 12.6506 18.25291 3.312265 18.14792 3.331801
1845 19.7 5.347594 18.85184 3.28128 18.7537 3.337985
1846 19.7 0 19.46441 3.249388 19.37529 3.314483
1847 19.1 -3.04569 20.09062 3.21719 20.01735 3.313802
1848 20.9 9.424084 20.73048 3.184898 20.68778 3.349264
1849 21.2 1.435407 21.38393 3.152103 21.38532 3.371749
1850 21.2 0 22.05089 3.119004 22.11082 3.392512
1851 22.1 4.245283 22.7313 3.085613 22.86328 3.403126
1852 23.9 8.144796 23.42498 3.051653 23.63259 3.364831
1853 25.6 7.112971 24.13171 3.016984 24.40101 3.251533
1854 25.6 0 24.8513 2.981947 25.15348 3.083746
1855 25.5 -0.39063 25.58373 2.947244 25.88691 2.915829
1856 27.3 7.058824 26.32903 2.913193 26.6027 2.765056
1857 28.4 4.029304 27.08725 2.879755 27.29836 2.615007
1858 27.1 -4.57746 27.8585 2.84728 27.97839 2.491099
1859 28.8 6.273063 28.64305 2.816195 28.65829 2.430108
1860 30.4 5.555556 29.44108 2.786138 29.3448 2.395486
1861 30 -1.31579 30.2528 2.757104 30.04605 2.389684
1862 30.2 0.666667 31.07851 2.72935 30.78073 2.445195
1863 30 -0.66225 31.91847 2.702705 31.56708 2.554696
1864 31.9 6.333333 32.77287 2.67682 32.41753 2.694105
1865 33.9 6.269592 33.6417 2.65107 33.32884 2.811138
1866 34.9 2.949853 34.52487 2.625219 34.29257 2.89159
1867 34.4 -1.43266 35.4223 2.599389 35.30603 2.955323
1868 35.5 3.197674 36.33397 2.573721 36.37257 3.020859
1869 35.3 -0.56338 37.25975 2.547953 37.48651 3.062583
1870 38.4 8.78187 38.1994 2.521909 38.63343 3.05954
1871 41.3 7.552083 39.15253 2.495137 39.77703 2.960142
1872 42.5 2.905569 40.11873 2.467797 40.8787 2.769625
cont.
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year Revised growth HP growth HP growth
Best (non-HP) λ=10,000 λ=10,000 λ=100 λ=100
Guess
1873 43.7 2.823529 41.09784 2.440516 41.91506 2.535195
1874 44.2 1.144165 42.0899 2.413904 42.87892 2.299552
1875 44.2 0 43.09524 2.388556 43.78095 2.10368
1876 44.7 1.131222 44.11439 2.364878 44.64505 1.973678
1877 45.4 1.565996 45.14799 2.343 45.49928 1.913379
1878 44.6 -1.76211 46.19674 2.322917 46.37226 1.918681
1879 42.8 -4.03587 47.26137 2.304547 47.29164 1.982595
1880 48.2 12.61682 48.34244 2.287421 48.26731 2.063093
1881 50.9 5.60166 49.44006 2.270523 49.26427 2.065494
1882 53.5 5.108055 50.55435 2.253822 50.24683 1.994477
1883 54.5 1.869159 51.68556 2.237605 51.19568 1.888372
1884 52.2 -4.22018 52.83423 2.222415 52.12401 1.813312
1885 50.4 -3.44828 54.00118 2.208712 53.07809 1.8304
1886 49.9 -0.99206 55.18719 2.196263 54.10492 1.934564
1887 53.7 7.61523 56.39265 2.184317 55.22473 2.069703
1888 57.2 6.517691 57.61745 2.171902 56.41571 2.156595
1889 60.9 6.468531 58.86118 2.158597 57.64078 2.171504
1890 61.8 1.477833 60.1234 2.144415 58.87072 2.133803
1891 62.3 0.809061 61.4039 2.129777 60.1089 2.10322
1892 59.1 -5.13644 62.70259 2.115006 61.38798 2.127942
1893 58 -1.86125 64.01952 2.100269 62.76254 2.239129
1894 61.8 6.551724 65.35433 2.085012 64.26426 2.392704
1895 64.2 3.883495 66.7061 2.068369 65.87721 2.509879
1896 68.8 7.165109 68.07353 2.049932 67.56083 2.555683
1897 69.6 1.162791 69.45508 2.029493 69.25775 2.511697
1898 72.8 4.597701 70.84927 2.007333 70.92303 2.404463
1899 76.3 4.807692 72.25466 1.983628 72.51512 2.244826
1900 76.4 0.131062 73.66997 1.958788 74.01128 2.063232
1901 75.8 -0.78534 75.09436 1.933472 75.42658 1.912273
1902 76.6 1.055409 76.52724 1.908103 76.79999 1.82086
1903 75.5 -1.43603 77.9681 1.882799 78.17422 1.789367
1904 76.2 0.927152 79.41642 1.857587 79.58999 1.811034
1905 81.7 7.217848 80.87146 1.832169 81.06124 1.848542
1906 85.9 5.140759 82.33215 1.806183 82.56805 1.858855
1907 88.7 3.259604 83.79749 1.779789 84.09687 1.851588
1908 82.6 -6.87711 85.26684 1.753461 85.66747 1.867609
1909 83.6 1.210654 86.74007 1.727787 87.34566 1.958951
1910 84.9 1.555024 88.21677 1.702433 89.16655 2.084701
1911 90.8 6.949352 89.6962 1.677039 91.12783 2.199568
1912 93.3 2.753304 91.17731 1.651251 93.1845 2.256905
1913 100 7.181136 92.65915 1.625233 95.28828 2.257656
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Table B.3: Data for Figure 3.1. Volume of Per Capita Industrial Production (UK
1900=100). Source: Bairoch (1982)
year UK US Japan France Germany Russia
1750 10 4 7 9 8 6
1800 16 9 7 9 8 6
1830 25 14 7 12 9 7
1860 64 21 7 20 15 8
1880 87 38 9 28 25 10
1900 100 69 12 39 52 15
1913 115 126 20 59 85 20
1928 122 182 30 78 101 20
1953 210 354 40 90 138 73
1980 325 629 353 265 393 252
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